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The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, 
making them a central institution of economic growth.  Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow 
from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment.  In contrast, in capital 
markets investors contract directly with firms, creating marketable securities.  The prices of these 
securities are observable, while financial intermediaries are opaque.  Why do financial intermediaries 
exist?  What are their roles?  Are they inherently unstable?  Must the government regulate them?  Why is 
financial intermediation so pervasive?  How is it changing?  In this paper we survey the last fifteen years’ 
of theoretical and empirical research on financial intermediation.  We focus on the role of bank-like 
intermediaries in the savings-investment process.  We also investigate the literature on bank instability 






* Forthcoming in Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edited by George Constantinides, Milt Harris 
and Rene Stulz (Amsterdam: North Holland).   1 
I. Introduction 
Financial intermediation is a pervasive feature of all of the world’s economies.  But, as Franklin 
Allen (2001) observed in his AFA Presidential Address, there is a widespread view that financial 
intermediaries can be ignored because they have no real effects. They are a veil.  They do not affect asset 
prices or the allocation of resources.  As evidence of this view, Allen pointed out that the millennium 
issue of the Journal of Finance contained surveys of asset pricing, continuous time finance, and corporate 
finance, but did not survey financial intermediation.  Here we take the view that the savings-investment 
process, the workings of capital markets, corporate finance decisions, and consumer portfolio choices 
cannot be understood without studying financial intermediaries.   
Why are financial intermediaries important?  One reason is that the overwhelming proportion of 
every dollar financed externally comes from banks.  Table 1, from Mayer (1990), is based on national 
flow-of-funds data.  The numbers are percentages, so in the United States for example, 24.4% of firm 
investment was financed with bank loans during the 1970 - 1985 period.  Bank loans are the predominant 
source of external funding in all the countries.  In none of the countries are capital markets a significant 
source of financing.  Equity markets are insignificant.  In other words, if finance department staffing 
reflected how firms actually finance themselves, roughly 25 percent of the faculty would be researchers in 
financial intermediation and the rest would study internal capital markets. 
As the main source of external funding, banks play important roles in corporate governance, 
especially during periods of firm distress and bankruptcy.  The idea that banks “monitor” firms is one of 
the central explanations for the role of bank loans in corporate finance.  Bank loan covenants can act as 
trip wires signaling to the bank that it can and should intervene into the affairs of the firm.  Unlike bonds, 
bank loans tend not to be dispersed across many investors.  This facilitates intervention and renegotiation 
of capital structures.  Bankers are often on company boards of directors.  Banks are also important in 
producing liquidity by, for example, backing commercial paper with loan commitments or standby letters 
of credit. 
Consumers use bank demand deposits as a medium of exchange, that is, writing checks, using 
credit cards, holding savings accounts, visiting automatic teller machines, and so on.  Demand deposits 
are securities with special features.  They can be denominated in any amount; they can be put to the bank 
at par (i.e., redeemed at face value) in exchange for currency.  These features allow demand deposits to 
act as a medium of exchange.  But, the banking system must then “clear” these obligations.  Clearing 
links the activities of banks in clearinghouses.  In addition, the fact that consumers can withdraw their 
funds at any time has, led to banking panics in some countries, historically, and in many countries more 
recently.   2 
Banking systems seem fragile. Between 1980 and 1995, thirty-five countries experienced banking 
crises, periods in which their banking systems essentially stopped functioning and these economies 
entered recessions. (See Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000), and Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996).)  Because bank loans are the main source of external financing for firms, if the banking system is 
weakened, there appear to be significant real effects (e.g., see Bernanke (1983), Gibson (1995), Peek and 
Rosengren (1997, 2000)).  The relationship between bank health and business cycles is at the root of 
widespread government policies concerning bank regulation and supervision, deposit insurance, capital 
requirements, the lender-of-last-resort role of the central bank, and so on.  Clearly, the design of public 
policies depends on our understanding of the problems with intermediaries.  Even without a collapse of 
the banking system, a credit crunch has sometimes been alleged to occur when banks tighten lending, 
possible due to their own inability to obtain financing.  Also, the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy may be through the banking system. 
Basically, financial intermediation is the root institution in the savings-investment process.   
Ignoring it would seem to be done at the risk of irrelevance.  So, the viewpoint of this paper is that 
financial intermediaries are not a veil, but rather the contrary.  In this paper, we survey the results of 
recent academic research on financial intermediation. 
In the last fifteen years, researchers have made significant progress in understanding the roles of 
financial intermediaries.  These advances are not only theoretical.  Despite a lack of data as rich as stock 
market prices, significant empirical work on intermediaries has been done.  All of this work has 
contributed to a deeper appreciation of the role of banks in the savings-investment process and corporate 
finance, of the issues in crises associated with financial intermediation, and of the functioning of 
government regulation of intermediation.  We concentrate on research addressing why bank-like financial 
intermediaries exist, and the implications for their stability. By bank-like financial intermediaries, we 
mean firms with the following characteristics: 
1.  They borrow from one group of agents and lend to another group of agents. 
2.  The borrowing and lending groups are large, suggesting diversification on each side of the 
balance sheet. 
3.  The claims issued to borrowers and to lenders have different state contingent payoffs. 
The terms “borrow” and “lend” mean that the contracts involved are debt contracts.  So, to be 
more specific, financial intermediaries lend to large numbers of consumers and firms using debt contracts 
and they borrow from large numbers of agents using debt contracts as well.  A significant portion of the 
borrowing on the liability side is in the form of demand deposits, securities that have the important 
property of being a medium of exchange.  The goal of intermediation theory is to explain why these 
financial intermediaries exist, that is, why there are firms with the above characteristics.   3 
Others have cited additional important characteristics of bank-like financial intermediaries, but in 
our view these seem less important.  For example, the maturity of the loan contracts is typically longer 
than the maturity of the debt on the liability side of the balance sheet, but that is essentially the third point 
above.  Also, Boyd and Prescott (1986) assert that financial intermediaries lend to agents whose 
information set may be different from their own, in particular, would-be borrowers have private 
information concerning their own credit risk.  Although this suggests a clear role for intermediaries, it is 
not clear that this is a necessary condition. 
Empirical observation is the basis for the statement that intermediaries involve large number of 
agents on each side of the balance sheet and also for the view that the nature of the securities issued to 
borrowers and lenders are different.  On the liability side of the balance sheet, intermediaries often issue a 
particular security to households, demand deposits, securities that serve as a medium of exchange.  On the 
asset side of the balance sheet, bank loans are not the same as corporate bonds.  Moreover, the structure of 
the bank loans does not mirror the bank’s obligations in the form of deposits.  Financial intermediaries 
with the above characteristics correspond most closely to commercial banks, savings and loans, and 
similar institutions.  But, securitization vehicles and conduits also satisfy the above definition, blurring 
the distinction between intermediated finance and direct finance, a topic we return to below. 
There are a number of issues in studying intermediation that are perhaps unique, compared to 
other areas of finance.  First, there are issues of data.  While governments often collect an enormous 
amount of data about banks, for example, in the U.S. there are the Call Reports that provide a massive 
amount of accounting information about commercial banks, there is a lack of price data.  Thus, unlike 
other areas of finance, there is an almost embarrassing lack of essential information, prices of loans, of 
secondary loan sales, and so on.  Researchers have been creative in finding data, however, as we discuss 
below.  Other periods of history have also been intensively studied.  Apparently, more so than other areas 
of finance, research in financial intermediation is intimately linked with economic history.  In addition, 
other countries offer rich laboratories as banking systems vary across countries to a significant degree. 
Second, in the study of financial intermediation, institutions, regulations, and laws are important.  
Banking systems have been influenced by laws and regulations for hundreds of years and it is difficult to 
make progress on many issues without understanding the enormous variation in banking system structures 
across countries and time, which is due to these laws and regulations.  This is most apparent in the variety 
of industrial organization of banking systems around the world and through history.  This variation is just 
beginning to be exploited by researchers and seems a likely area for further work. 
Finally, intermediation is in such a constant state of flux that it is not much of an exaggeration to 
say that many researchers in financial intermediation do not realize that they are engaged in economic 
history.  It is a challenge to determine whether there are important features of intermediation that remain   4 
constant across time, or whether intermediation is being fundamentally altered by securitization, loan 
sales, credit derivatives, and other recent innovations.   
  The paper proceeds as follows.  We begin in Section II by discussing evidence on the uniqueness 
of banks and theories that seek to motivate the existence and structure of these financial intermediaries. 
Key issues include monitoring or evaluating borrowers, providing consumption smoothing and other 
types of liquidity, combining lending and liquidity provision as a commitment mechanism, and the 
coexistence of banks and markets. 
In Section III we focus on the specifics of interaction between banks and borrowers. Key issues 
include the pros and cons of dynamic bank-borrower relationships, the relationship between loan structure 
and monitoring and between banking sector structure and monitoring, “credit cycles” and capital 
constraints, and the role of “non-traditional” bank activities such as equity investment. 
In Section IV we focus on banking panics and the stability of the banking system.  Key issues 
include evidence on the incidence of banking panics internationally and historically, the causes of panics, 
the role of bank coalitions in forestalling panics, whether banks are inherently flawed.  Section V 
concerns bank regulation, deposit insurance, and bank capital requirements.  Government intervention 
into banking is a fairly recent phenomenon, but has come to be a widely accepted role because of 
concerns about moral hazard problems emanating from deposit insurance.  The paradigm of moral hazard 
is reviewed, with particular focus on the empirical evidence.  Corporate governance in banks, capital 
requirements for banks, and other issues are also reviewed. 
Finally, in Section V we summarize where all of this research leaves us, both in terms of our 
present understanding and in terms of directions for the future. 
 
II.  The Existence of Financial Intermediaries 
The most basic question with regard to financial intermediaries is: why do they exist?  This 
question is related to the theory of the firm because a financial intermediary is a firm, perhaps a special 
kind of firm, but nevertheless a firm.  Organization of economic activity within a firm occurs when that 
organizational form dominates trade in a market.  In the case of the savings-investment process, 
households with resources to invest could go to capital markets and buy securities issued directly by 
firms, in which case there is no intermediation.  To say the same thing a different way, nonfinancial firms 
need not borrow from banks; they can approach investors directly in capital markets.  Nevertheless, as 
mentioned in the Introduction, most new external finance to firms does not occur this way.  Instead, it 
occurs through bank-like intermediation, in which households buy securities issued by intermediaries who 
in turn invest the money by lending it to borrowers.  Again, the obligations of firms and the claims 
ultimately owned by investors are not the same securities; intermediaries transform claims.  The existence   5 
of such intermediaries implies that direct contact in capital markets between households and firms is 
dominated.  “Why is this?” is the central question for the theory of intermediation. 
Bank-like intermediaries are pervasive, but this may not require much explanation.  On the 
liability side, demand deposits appear to be a unique kind of security, but originally this may have been 
due to regulation.  Today, money market mutual funds may be good substitutes for demand deposits.  On 
the asset side, intermediaries may simply be passive portfolio managers, that is, there may be nothing 
special about bank loans relative to corporate bonds.  This is the view articulated by Fama (1980).   
Similarly, Black (1975) sees nothing special about bank loans.  Therefore, we begin with an overview of 
the empirical evidence, which suggests that there is indeed something that needs explanation. 
 
A.  Empirical Evidence on Bank Uniqueness 
What do banks do that cannot be accomplished in the capital markets through direct contracting 
between investors and firms?  There is empirical evidence that banks are special.  Some of this evidence 
also attempts to discriminate between some of the explanations for the existence of financial 
intermediaries, discussed below. 
To determine whether bank assets or liabilities are special relative to alternatives, Fama (1985) 
and James (1987) examine the incidence of the implicit tax due to reserve requirements.  Their argument 
is as follows.  Over time, U.S. banks have been required to hold reserves against various kinds of 
liabilities.  In particular, if banks must hold reserves against the issuance of certificates of deposit (CDs), 
then for each dollar of CDs issued, the bank can invest less than a dollar.  The reserve requirement acts 
like a tax.  Therefore, in the absence of any special service provided by bank assets or bank liabilities, 
bank CDs should be eliminated by nonbank alternatives.  This is because either bank borrowers or bank 
depositors must bear the tax.  Since CDs have not been eliminated, some party involved with the bank is 
willing to bear the tax.  Who is this party?  Fama finds no significant difference between the yields on 
CDs and the yields on commercial paper and bankers acceptances.  CD holders do not bear the reserve 
requirement tax and he therefore concludes that bank loans are special.  James revisits the issue and looks 
at yield changes around changes in reserve requirements and reaches the same conclusion as Fama. 
Another kind of evidence comes from event studies of the announcement of loan agreements 
between firms and banks.  Studying a sample of 207 announcements of new agreements and renewals of 
existing agreements, James (1987) finds a significantly positive announcement effect.  This contrasts with 
non-positive responses to the announcements of other types of securities being issued in capital markets 
(see James (1987) for the references to the other studies).  Mikkelson and Partch (1986) also look at the 
abnormal returns around the announcements of different type of security offerings and also find a positive   6 
response to bank loans.
1  Table 2 provides a summary of the basic set of results.  There are two main 
conclusions to be drawn.  First, bank loans are the only instance where there is a significant positive 
abnormal return upon announcement.  Second, equity and equity-related instruments have significantly 
negative abnormal returns.  James (1987) concludes, “…banks provide some special service not available 
from other lenders” (p. 234).   
The results of James are quite dramatic and many researchers followed up on them.  Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) distinguish between new bank loan agreements and revisions to agreements already in 
place.  Further, they classify announcements concerning existing agreements into announcements 
containing positive information and those containing negative information.  This classification is based on 
whether the terms of the agreement (maturity, interest rate, dollar value, covenants) are revised favorably 
or unfavorably (some have both favorable revisions in some dimensions and unfavorable revision in 
others).  They find no abnormal return to announcement of new agreements.  Favorable renewals have 
significantly positive abnormal returns, while negative renewals have significantly negative abnormal 
returns.  The strongest negative response comes when the bank initiates a loan cancellation.  The strongest 
positive response is associated with loan renewals where there was previously public information 
suggesting the loan was in trouble.  The results of Lummer and McConnell suggest that the bank is not 
producing information upon first contact with a borrower.  Rather, the bank either learns information later 
or takes action later, and this is revealed when a loan is renewed or restructured.  The results are 
consistent with the view that a continuing relationship with a bank can signal changes in value to capital 
markets. 
Best and Zhang (1993) confirm Lummer and McConnell (1989).  But, with a revised definition of 
“new” loans, Billet, Flannery, and James (1995) find no significant differences between initiation of loans 
and loan renewals.  Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) and Hadlock and James (2000) also find no 
differences. 
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) look at an interesting implication of the result that bank 
loans are somehow different than other securities.  If loans are special, in some sense, then when a 
borrower’s bank fails, does that adversely affect that borrower?  To address this they examine share price 
responses of bank borrowers’ shares upon the announcement of the failure of their bank, Continental 
Illinois.  If banks are simply passive investors, and their loans are indistinguishable from bonds, then 
when there is a bank failure, borrowers simply go elsewhere to borrow funds.  However, if there is a 
“customer relationship,” then banks acquire private information about their borrowers and the bank’s 
                                                 
1 Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1988) find significantly positive announcement abnormal returns associated with the 
announcement of standby letters of credit.  Preece and Mullineaux (1989) find that the reaction to loan agreements 
with insurance companies is similar to that for bank loan agreements.  Also, see Mullineaux and Preece (1996).   7 
failure would mean that this intangible asset is destroyed, causing borrowers losses.  Slovin, Sushka, and 
Polonchek (1993) find that Continental Illinois borrowers incurred significantly negative abnormal 
returns (- 4.2% annually) during the bank’s impending failure.  This evidence is consistent with bank 
relationships being important, an issue discussed further below.  Bernanke (1983) essentially argues that 
crisis in the U.S. banking system during the Great Depression can be viewed in the same way, causing 
real adverse effects for borrowers.  Gibson (1995) studying the effects of the health of Japanese banks 
finds that investment is thirty percent lower by firms that have a Japanese bank that is weak. 
Another area in which banks appear to be different from bondholders’ concerns reorganization of 
firms in financial distress, though this depends on the characteristics of the particular sample studied.  
Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) find that the likelihood of a successful debt restructuring by a firm in 
distress is positively related to the extent of that firm’s reliance on bank borrowing.  The interpretation is 
that it is easier to renegotiate with a single bank, or small number of banks, than it is with a large number 
of dispersed bondholders, in which case there are free rider problems.  However, Asquith, Gertner, and 
Scharfstein (1994), and James (1995), find that for firms with public debt outstanding, banks rarely make 
unilateral concessions to distressed firms.  Franks and Torous (1994) study 45 distressed exchanges and 
37 Chapter 11 reorganizations during the period 1983 to 1988.  Unlike Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), 
Franks and Torous find that firms that successfully complete exchange offers do not owe significantly 
more of their long-term debt to banks.  Franks and Torous’ firms all have publicly traded debt and tend to 
be larger than the firms in the Gilson, Lang, and John sample.  James (1996) partially reconciles some of 
these conflicting results.  He finds that the higher the proportion of total debt held by the bank, the higher 
the likelihood the bank debt will be impaired, and so the higher the likelihood it participates in the 
restructuring.  Banks do not act unilaterally when the firm has significant public debt outstanding because 
banks, as senior lenders, would be transferring wealth to the public debt holders in these cases. 
In other countries, banks interact with borrowers in different ways than in the United States.  
Such examples offer another type of evidence on the ability of banks to provide valuable services that 
cannot be replicated in capital markets.  Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a, b, 1991) find that firms 
in Japans in keiretsu, that is, firms with close times to banks, are less liquidity constrained compared to 
firms without such ties.  Also, firms with close ties are able to invest more when they are financially 
distressed, suggesting the importance of a bank relationship.  In Germany, Gorton and Schmid (1999) 
find that bank equity ownership improves the performance of firms.  Also, see Fohlin (1998).  We review 
more evidence on “bank relationships” in Section III below. 
We conclude that financial intermediaries are producing services that are not easily replicated in 
capital markets.  We turn now to the major theories that have been put forth as explanations for the 
existence of financial intermediation.  These theories are not mutually exclusive.   8 
B.  Banks as Delegated Monitors 
Diamond (1984) offered the first coherent explanation for the existence of financial 
intermediaries.
2  Diamond’s intermediaries “monitor” borrowers.  Since monitoring is costly, it is 
efficient to delegate the task to a specialized agent, the bank.  The notion of monitoring borrowers has 
become an influential idea, which subsequent researchers have further developed. 
Not only do Diamond’s intermediaries contain most of the important elements of a theory of 
intermediation, discussed above, but he also identifies and solves a fundamental problem at the root of 
intermediation theory.  That problem concerns the fact that whatever problem the intermediary solves to 
add value with respect to borrowers would seem to imply that lenders to the intermediary would face the 
same problem with respect to their lending to the intermediary.  In Diamond (1984), the intermediary 
“monitors” borrowers on behalf of investors who lend to the intermediary.  But, then it would appear that 
the lenders to the intermediary have to “monitor” the intermediary itself.  How is this problem, which has 
come to be known as the “monitoring the monitor” problem, solved?  Diamond (1984) was the first to 
recognize and then solve this problem. 
In Diamond (1984) borrowers must be “monitored” because there is an ex post information 
asymmetry in that lenders do not know how much the firm has produced.   Only the individual borrower 
observes the realized output of his project, so contracts cannot be made contingent on the output.   
Consequently, a lender is at a disadvantage because the borrower will not honor ex ante promises to pay 
unless there is an incentive to do so.  The first possibility Diamond considers to solve this contracting 
problem is the possibility of relying on a contract that imposes nonpecuniary penalties on the borrower if 
his payment is not at least a certain minimum.  This contract is costly because such penalties are imposed 
in equilibrium, reducing the utility of borrowers.  If, instead, the lender had available an information 
production technology, then the information asymmetry could be overcome by application of this 
technology, at a cost.  Perhaps this would be cheaper, and hence more efficient, than imposing 
nonpecuniary penalties.  Diamond termed production of information about the borrower’s realized output, 
at a cost, “monitoring.” 
The notion of “monitoring” in Diamond (1984) appears inspired by Townsend (1979), but there is 
a critical difference.  In Townsend the lender must bear a cost to determine whether the borrower has the 
resources to repay the loan or not, a decision made after the borrower’s project output has been realized 
and after a payment has been offered to the lender.   That is, in Townsend, the decision by a lender to 
monitor a borrower is made after the entrepreneur has made a payment to the lender; it is contingent on 
                                                 
2 For reasons of space, we do not survey the previous transaction cost-based literature.  For surveys of this literature, 
see Benston (1976) and Baltensperger (1980).   9 
the amount of the payment.  Hence, it is known as “costly state verification.”  In Diamond, however, 
monitoring is not state contingent and the cost must always be borne because, in Diamond, the monitoring 
cost must be incurred before the output realization of the borrower’s project is known to anyone. 
This difference between Townsend and Diamond, with respect to monitoring, leads to another 
difference.  In Townsend, the costly state verification problem motivates the form of the contract between 
a borrower and lender: it is a debt contract (since random monitoring is assumed away; see Boyd and 
Smith (1994)).  In Diamond, the optimal contract between the borrower and the lender is a debt contract 
in the absence of monitoring, but once monitoring is introduced, the optimal contract is undetermined.  It 
is feasible for the contract to be an equity contract, for example.  On the one hand, this does not matter for 
Diamond’s basic argument, but, on the other hand, it seems potentially important for understanding why 
agents trading in markets cannot replicate the function of the intermediary, as we discuss further below. 
The monitoring solution may dominate the contract that imposes nonpecuniary penalties, but it 
raises another problem.  If a single borrower has many lenders, then each lender will have to bear the cost 
of monitoring, which in turn will lead to duplication of monitoring costs or free riding problems among 
individual lenders.  This raises the prospect of a third solution.  If the task of monitoring were delegated 
to a single agent, free riding and duplication of monitoring costs problems could potentially be 
eliminated.  But if the lenders were to delegate the task of monitoring, then the same problem would still 
exist, but at one step removed.  That is, the individual lenders would then face the task of monitoring the 
agent delegated to monitor the borrower(s).  This is the problem of “monitoring the monitor.”  Diamond 
(1984) presents the first coherent theory of banking that solves the problem of monitoring the monitor. 
To be more precise, the problem of “monitoring the monitor” is this: lenders to the intermediary 
can reduce monitoring costs if the costs of monitoring the intermediary are lower than the costs of lenders 
lending directly to borrowers and directly incurring the monitoring costs.  Diamond’s fundamental result 
is to show that as an intermediary grows large, it can commit to a payment to depositors that can only be 
honored if, in fact, the intermediary has monitored as it promised.  If not, then the intermediary incurs 
nonpecuniary penalties, interpreted by Diamond as bankruptcy costs or loss of reputation. 
To see the argument, we follow Williamson’s (1986) presentation of the Diamond result; unlike 
Diamond, it does not rely on precise contractual specification of nonpecuniary penalties, which is rarely 
seen in practice.  Williamson’s monitoring technology follows Townsend, so Diamond’s result does not 
depend on the timing of monitoring (that is, whether it is state contingent or not).  A brief outline of the 
essential part of the Williamson model is as follows.  Borrowers need resources to invest in their projects.  
They invest K units of endowment at date 0 and receive  w ~ K at date 1, where w ~ is a random variable 
distributed according to the density f(w).  As shown by Gale and Hellwig (1985), the optimal contract 
between the borrower and a lender is a debt contract.  At date 1 borrower j has a realized return of wj per   10 
unit invested.  Borrower j pays the lending intermediary a gross rate of return R in a state, wj, where there 
is no monitoring and R(wj) when there is monitoring.  Define the set B={wj: R(wj) < R } and B
c ={wj: 
R(wj) ≤ R }.  Finally, let r denote the certain market return, required by risk neutral investors. 
When the intermediary has m borrowers, each investing K, then the total return to the 
intermediary (before compensating depositors) is: 
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Consequently, since the intermediary’s return must be at least the market return, r, if the 
following inequality holds: 
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then, as the intermediary grows large, it can guarantee a certain return of r to its depositors. 
If the intermediary is finite sized, that is, it lends to a finite number of borrowers, then depositors 
must monitor the intermediary to ensure that the intermediary, in turn, is monitoring the borrowers.  Since 
monitoring is costly, and given the certain market return that must be obtained, the depositors must be 
compensated for these monitoring costs by the intermediary.  Compensating the depositors for monitoring 
costs incurred, lowers the profitability (utility) of the intermediary.  However, the central result of 
Diamond (1984) applies here, namely, that the depositors need not monitor an infinitely large 
intermediary because such a firm can achieve r with probability one.  In the limit, depositors do not need 
to monitor the intermediary.  The “monitoring the monitor” problem is solved by diversification. 
One might object that, in practice, financial intermediaries are not infinitely diversified, and some 
credit risk is not diversifiable; also, it seems likely that a depositor finds it more difficult to monitor a 
large bank than to monitor a small bank. Krasa and Villamil (1992a,b) address these concerns.  Suppose 
we modify Williamson (1986) by assuming that larger banks’ returns are more costly to verify.  If loan 
returns are stochastically independent of one another, Krasa and Villamil (1992a) apply the Large 
Deviation Principle to show that, so long as a depositor’s cost of monitoring doesn’t increase 
exponentially with bank size, the expected costs of monitoring a sufficiently large bank go to zero. 
Moreover, they show through examples that even relatively small banks (e.g., 32 loans) get enough gains 
from diversification to dominate direct lending.  If some loan risk is systematic, the chance of bank failure 
is bounded away from zero as bank size grows (Krasa and Villamil, 1992b). In this case, since the cost of   11 
monitoring banks that fail is increasing in bank size, there is a bank size past which the increase in 
monitoring costs dominates marginal benefits from additional diversification.  Moreover, this optimal size 
diminishes as the systematic component of loan risk increases. 
Winton (1995a) addresses another issue, namely the role of bank capital. Suppose that the banker 
invests his own funds in the bank as “inside” equity capital. Being junior, such equity absorbs losses first, 
reducing the probability with which the bank defaults and depositors must monitor. Thus, bank capital is 
another mechanism for implementing delegated monitoring. Since the bankers’ capital is fixed, it will be 
most helpful for smaller banks; also, the relative importance of capital versus diversification increases as 
more loan risk is systematic.
3 
Of course, Diamond (1984) does not explain all the characteristics of intermediaries.  But, he 
elegantly explains the existence of intermediaries, in particular, as coalitions, of borrowers and lenders, 
which dominate the alternative of direct investment by investors in securities issued by firms.  The 
securities market fails in the sense that intermediation, centralization of the task of monitoring, is a lower 
cost solution to the ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.  Diversification is 
critical to intermediation providing a lower cost solution because diversification is critical to reducing the 
monitoring the monitor problem.  The textbook idea that individual investors can diversify nonsystematic 
risk on their own does not take into account the role diversification plays in allowing an intermediary to 
be monitored costlessly (in the limit). 
Other papers that study banks as delegated monitors include Gorton and Haubrich (1987) and 
Seward (1990). 
 
C.  Banks as Information Producers 
If information about investment opportunities is not free, then economic agents may find it 
worthwhile to produce such information.  There will be an inefficient duplication of information 
production costs if multiple agents choose to produce the same information.  Alternatively, a smaller 
number of agents could produce the information, becoming informed, and then sell the information to the 
uninformed agents.  This, however, introduces the “reliability problem” originally identified by 
Hirshleifer (1971): it may be impossible for the information producer to credibly ensure that he has, in 
fact, produced the valuable information.  
A related problem concerns resale of the information.  If an information producer could credibly 
produce valuable information, and then sell it to another agent, then there is no way to prevent the second 
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is created, who are junior to depositors but senior to the banker.   12 
agent from selling it to a third agent, and so on.  In other words, purchasers of the information can sell or 
share the information with others without necessarily diminishing its usefulness to themselves.  This is 
known as the “appropriability problem.”  The returns to producing the information could not all be 
captured by the information producer, possibly making the production of information uneconomic (see 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)).  The resale and appropriability problems in information production can 
motivate the existence of an intermediary. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) were the first to suggest that an intermediary could overcome the 
reliability problem.  The intermediary can credibly produce information by investing its wealth in assets 
about which it claims to have produced valuable information.  The starting point for Leland and Pyle 
(1977) is a single entrepreneur who has private information about an investment opportunity, but who has 
insufficient resources to undertake the investment.  Since outside investors do not observe the 
entrepreneur’s private information, there is an adverse selection problem.  Leland and Pyle show that the 
entrepreneur’s private information can be signaled by the fraction of equity in the project that the 
entrepreneur retrains, while he sells the remaining fraction to outside investors.
4  At the end of their paper, 
Leland and Pyle suggest that financial intermediaries might efficiently solve the reliability and 
appropriability problems inherent in information production by issuing securities and using the proceeds 
to invest in a portfolio of securities about which the intermediary has become privately informed.  After 
deriving his delegated monitoring model, Diamond (1984) also derives a Leland and Pyle model in which 
diversification lowers the intermediary’s signaling costs compared to the entrepreneur’s costs. 
Following Leland and Pyle, a number of papers, notably Campbell and Kracaw (1980), also 
argued that financial intermediaries might exist to produce information about potential investments, 
information that could not be efficiently produced in securities markets.  Campbell and Kracaw (1980) 
show that appropriability and reliability problems can be eliminated if the information producer has a 
sufficient minimum amount of wealth to risk if he does not produce the information.  To risk his own 
money requires that the intermediary actually invest on behalf of other agents.  The paper, however, that 
most fully articulates the argument that coalitions of agents should form to produce information ex ante 
about potential investments is Boyd and Prescott (1986). 
The underlying problem faced by agents in Boyd and Prescott (1986) is an information 
asymmetry that occurs prior to contracting and investing, resulting in an adverse selection problem.   
Agents are of different types and this information is private to each agent.  Each agent, however, is 
endowed with a technology to evaluate projects, that is, the technology can determine agent type.  Ex ante 
information production can alleviate the adverse selection problem.  This can be done in a market context, 
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where an agent evaluates his own project, and then issues securities to investors that promise specified 
returns.  Or, a coalition of agents can offer investors a claim on group returns.  Financial intermediaries 
are coalitions of agents that evaluate projects, invest in those determined to be high-value projects, and 
share the returns from the portfolio of projects. 
More specifically, the outline of the model is as follows.  Agents live for two periods.  Each agent 
is endowed with a project of unknown type (good or bad).  Agents know their own type, so there is no 
opportunity to enter into contracts before knowing their types.  Each project type can have a high or low 
return (good projects are more likely to realize the high return).  An agent can expend his endowment 
either on producing information about a single project’s type or as an investment in a single project, his 
own if he has not evaluated it or another agent’s project.  If a project is evaluated, then a noisy signal of 
true project type is received.  Project evaluation and investment are publicly observable and verifiable, as 
are project returns, evaluation results, consumption outcomes, and contract terms. 
An efficient outcome invests in as many good projects as possible.   But, the difficulty in 
accomplishing this is that bad-type agents will want to mimic good-type agents, claiming that they are 
good, promising the same high return to investors as the good-type agents, and then hoping that their 
project realizes the high return.  Indeed, there is such a securities market equilibrium, but it is one in 
which some bad-type projects are evaluated, by mimicking agents.  This is inefficient. 
The alternative is the financial intermediary coalition.  The model is one of mechanism design.  
One interpretation of how to implement the equilibrium with the coalition (given by Boyd and Prescott) is 
as follows.  Coalition members deliver their endowments to the coalition prior to investment.  These 
endowments are used for project evaluation.  Depositors are other agents who turn over their endowments 
to the coalition in exchange for a promised amount of consumption.  The depositors give the coalition the 
right to invest in their project and to receive the entire project output, if the coalition desires.  Project 
owners are promised very high returns if evaluation reveals a good project and if the realized return is 
high.  Otherwise, depositors are promised an amount of consumption which is more than a bad-type agent 
could achieve on his own, but less than the promised amount for projects with a good evaluation and high 
realized returns.  Members of the coalition are residual claimants and share profits equally. 
The coalition’s sharing rules induce truthful revelation of agent type.  The coalition then 
evaluates good-type projects and funds each of these projects with a good evaluation.  It uses the 
remaining proceeds to fund bad-type projects without evaluation.  This is the critical point.  The promised 
returns separate types, and since good types are relatively scarce, the coalition ends up funding some bad-
type projects, but it does not waste resources evaluating those projects.  This is why it dominates the 
securities market.   14 
The intermediary dominates the securities market because the intermediary coalition can induce 
agents to truthfully reveal their type and this cannot be achieved in the securities market.  Truthful 
revelation allows the coalition to avoid inefficiently evaluating some bad-type projects.   The reason is 
that, by conditioning returns on the coalition’s portfolio returns, rather than on the returns of a single 
project, the coalition can offer higher returns to bad-type agents, so they will participate in the coalition.  
The relative proportions of good-types and bad-types are also important.  In particular, good-type agents 
must be scarce.  Note also that it is important that a coalition be large because a small coalition may end 
up with so many good-type projects that they cannot all be funded.  In the population, good-type projects 
are relatively scarce and this must be reflected in coalition membership.  Thus, as in Diamond (1984), size 
of the coalition is critical for the argument. 
The equilibrium concept in Boyd and Prescott is based on the core of an economy.  That is, an 
allocation is an equilibrium if no large coalition of agents, with specified fractions of agent types, can 
achieve a different allocation, satisfying resource, consumption, incentive and other constraints, and make 
at least some agent type better off without reducing any other type’s utility.  Deviating coalitions are not 
allowed to attract higher than population proportions of type-i agents unless it makes them strictly better 
off. Although the solution of the model is standard in that it relies on the revelation principal, the 
equilibrium concept is less common in the finance and financial contracting literature.  This may account 
for why this paper has not led to a successor literature in banking per se; instead, it has been more 
influential in macroeconomics, where the equilibrium concept has been taken up, though see the 
discussion of Williamson (1988), below. 
Boyd and Prescott’s intermediary has the characteristics of bank-like intermediaries identified in 
the introduction.  Other researchers have pursued solutions to the problems of reliability and 
appropriability of valuable private information, but these other solutions do not involve bank-like 
intermediation.  Two settings in particular have been examined.  The first considers delegated portfolio 
management, i.e., a setting where a fund manager may claim to have superior information or superior 
ability and offers to invest on behalf of investors.  The second considers the sale of valuable information 
about investments when the information producer does not invest on behalf of investors.  A theory of 
intermediation must distinguish between firms that sell information, like rating agencies, firms that are 
delegated portfolio managers, like mutual funds or hedge funds, and bank-like financial intermediaries. 
At the level of casual empiricism there are identifiable differences between these types of 
arrangements.  A bank-like intermediary does not sell information that it produces.  Rather, as in Boyd 
and Prescott, it uses the information internally to improve the returns to coalition members.  This is very 
different from the case of a firm that sells information to investors, like a rating agency.  Firms selling 
information face problems of reliability and appropriability, but they do not lend money.  Purchasers of   15 
the information may lend in reliance on the information purchased, but they are then directly lending, not 
via an intermediary.  A portfolio manager, claiming to have superior information, accepts investments 
from one set of agents and then uses the proceeds to invest in securities.  This seems very similar to a 
bank-like intermediary.  One difference is that the claims held by the investors do not have different state 
contingent payoffs than the payoff on the portfolio of claims chosen by the portfolio manager; essentially, 
the investors and the portfolio manager all hold equity claims in the portfolio. 
In Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer’s (1985) model, investors want to hire portfolio managers, but 
there are two sources of private information that make this difficult.  First, investors must hire a manager 
from pool of managers with heterogeneous abilities.  A manager or agent has the ability to receive an 
informative signal about the risky asset (there is also a riskless asset).  Once a manager has been hired, he 
must be induced to truthfully reveal the signal he has received.  However, once the principal has designed 
the contract and hired a manager, the manager/agent’s only role is to transmit the information to the 
principal.  There is no portfolio management by the manager/agent since the principal can directly invest 
using the information supplied by the manager/agent.  There is no intermediary (nor do Bhattacharya and 
Pfleiderer claim that there is; the purposes of their paper are different). 
Allen (1990) presents a model that distinguishes conditions under which information is sold to 
agents who then use the information to make investments from the case where the buyers of the 
information then act as intermediaries and resell the information.  Essentially, reselling the information 
allows more of the value of the information to be captured.  Because the initial information seller must 
distinguish himself from potential uniformed mimics, he faces a number of constraints.  These constraints 
limit the amount of profit he can take in from selling the information.  This is the basis for information 
resellers to enter the market; they find it profitable to resell the information rather than use it as a basis for 
their own investments because they can capture more of the value of the information.  Here there is a type 
of intermediation: there are agents who buy information and then resell it.  But, these agents do not invest 
on behalf of others. 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) consider a setting in which firms issuing new shares to the 
public can hire an agent to produce information about their quality.  Information production requires a 
costly, and unobservable, effort, so the information producer would like to avoid this cost if he can do so 
without being detected.  There is an ex post noisy indicator of the information producer’s effort choice, so 
compensation for information production can be linked to this indicator.  Because information producers 
are risk averse, they would prefer to avoid the risk that the noise in the indicator prevents them from 
obtaining compensation for their efforts.  The main point of Ramakrishnan and Thakor is that this risk is 
mitigated if one infinitely large intermediary is formed since this diversifies the risk associated with the 
effort indicator.  The large intermediary is formed when information producers can costlessly monitor   16 
each other’s efforts.  (Millon and Thakor (1985) extend the analysis to the case where the internal 
monitoring is costly.)  Ramakrishnan and Thakor’s intermediary, however, does not accept funds for 
investment.  Rather, it is a pure information seller.  In this regard, also see Lizzeri (1999). 
In general, the differences in settings where some agents would like valuable, but costly, 
information produced for investment purposes are subtle.  In many models there is no need for the 
information seller to actually accept the funds that will be invested on the basis of the superior 
information.  In Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, Allen, and Ramakrishnan and Thakor, the information 
producer sells the information to investors, but does not need to actually invest the funds of the investors.  
In Boyd and Prescott the intermediary accepts deposits, produces information, and invests in projects 
based on the information produced.  Only by conditioning the returns on the portfolio that is produced by 
the coalition can truthful revelation be induced. 
A potentially important aspect of information production by banks concerns whether the 
information is produced upon first contact with the borrower or is instead learned through repeated 
interaction with the borrower over time.  Another strand of the literature on banks as information 
producers argues that banks acquire (private) information over time through repeatedly lending to a 
borrower.  The acquisition of this private information over time is known as a “customer relationship” 
and is discussed in Section III below. 
 
D.  Banks as Consumption Smoothers 
Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) develop a role for bank liabilities, without 
stressing any particular features of bank assets.  Bank liabilities do not function as a transactions medium.  
Rather, banks are vehicles for consumption smoothing; they offer insurance against shocks to a 
consumer’s consumption path. 
The Diamond and Dybvig model assumes that the payoffs from the available investment 
opportunities are inconsistent with the possible consumption paths desired by consumers.  In particular, 
consumers have random consumption needs, and satisfying these needs may require them to prematurely 
end investments unless they save via intermediation so that they can to some extent diversify these 
consumption shocks. The model offers a view of the liability side of banking; the right to withdraw from 
the bank, prematurely ending investment in order to satisfy sudden consumption needs, corresponds with 
notions of how demand deposits actually work.  The model also focuses on banking panics, a separate 
topic that we discuss in Section IV below. 
The outlines of the Diamond and Dybvig model are as follows.  There are three dates 0, 1, and 2 
and a single good.  The available technology allows one unit of investment to be transformed over two 
periods into R>1 units at the final date.  If this investment is interrupted at the interim date, then it just   17 
returns the initial one unit.  Importantly, the long-term investment only realizes a return over the initial 
investment if it reaches fruition at date 2.  All consumers are identical initially, at date 0, but each faces a 
privately observable, uninsurable risk with regard to their preferences.  At date 1, each consumer learns 
whether he cares only about consumption at date 1, an “early consumer,” or only about consumption at 
date 2, a “late consumer.”   The problem is evident: consumers would like to insure themselves against 
the bad luck of being an early consumer.  Without being able to write such insurance contracts, because 
consumer type is not observable, early consumers can do no better than consuming their single unit of 
endowment, which was invested in the investment technology but which is liquidated early.  The lucky 
late consumers consume R>1. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that a bank can provide insurance against the risk of being an 
early consumer.  Basically, a bank works as follows.  At date 0 the bank opens and accepts “deposits” of 
endowment.  The bank promises a fixed claim of r1 per unit deposited will be paid out to consumers who 
withdraw at date 1.  The return on a deposit that is not withdrawn at date 1, but is withdrawn at date 2, 
depends on how much was withdrawn at date 1.  Suppose the fraction of consumers who will turn out to 
be early consumers is fixed and known.  Then Diamond and Dybvig show that the return of r1 can be set 
to the amount that an early consumer would achieve if there were complete insurance markets.  So the 
bank can support the full-information risk-sharing equilibrium. 
The Diamond and Dybvig model has important features of intermediaries and the real world 
environment.  First, it incorporates the idea that consumers have uncertain preferences for expenditure 
streams, producing a demand for liquid assets.  Furthermore, the modeling representation of this 
uncertainty, the technique of early and late consumers, has been very influential in its own right.   
Uncertainty about preferences for expenditure streams leads to the bank offering claims that look like 
demand deposits.  This is combined with a second important feature, namely, real investment projects are 
irreversible, or at least costly to restart once stopped.  A third important feature of the model is the idea 
that individual consumers have private information about the realization of their type, the realization of 
their preferred consumption stream.  There is no credible way to truthfully reveal this information.  
We  now turn to some details about why insurance or securities markets cannot provide 
consumption smoothing or insurance against the risk of uncertain preferences for expenditure streams. In 
Diamond and Dybvig, an intermediary that issues demand deposits allows greater risk sharing than 
autarky.  Diamond and Dybvig assume that demand deposits cannot be traded and do not consider other 
securities markets.  Their model assumes a sequential service constraint, that is, a first-come-first-served 
ruled under which at date 1 the bank honors claims to withdraw in the order in which they are received 
until the bank runs out of resources to honor the claims.  The remaining consumers seeking to withdraw 
receive nothing and the bank fails.  We discuss models that motivate the sequential service constraint in   18 
Section IV below.  Here, we simply note that the idea it attempts to capture is that consumers cannot 
coordinate to go to any securities market at the same time to trade; they are busy doing other things such 
as shopping, eating, sleeping, working, etc.  Thus, Diamond and Dybvig’s assumptions that demand 
deposits cannot be traded and that no other securities markets are open are not completely without 
foundation. 
This point is important because Jacklin (1987) and Haubrich and King (1990) argue that the 
existence of Diamond and Dybvig intermediaries requires the restriction that consumers only have 
nontraded demand deposits available to them.  Jacklin (1987) begins by asking, why does a securities 
market fail in the Diamond and Dybvig model?  In order to highlight the importance of trading 
restrictions and preferences for Diamond and Dybvig’s result that intermediation is the best insurance 
arrangement, he proposes an alternative arrangement that uses traded securities.  Suppose that there are 
firms in Diamond and Dybvig that own the two-period production technology.   Each firm raises capital 
by issuing dividend-paying shares at date 0.  Consumers buy the shares, entitling them to set the 
production policy and to set dividend policy about the amount paid out to share owners at date 1.   The 
“dividends” on Jacklin’s equity are set to smooth income in exactly the desired way; they are not just 
pass-throughs from the firms.  Shareholders of record at date 0 receive the dividend at date 1 and then can 
sell the share in a share market at date 1.  At date 1 consumers learn their preferred consumption streams.  
Early consumers will want sell their shares ex dividend to late consumers.  Jacklin shows that the social 
optimum obtains with this share market in place.  Thus, the bank cannot do any better. 
Jacklin goes on to show that the result that the intermediary cannot improve upon trading 
dividend-paying shares is not true in general.  Recall that, in Diamond and Dybvig, some consumers find 
that they must consume early; it is all or nothing.  If instead preferences are smooth, so that one type of 
consumer will learn that he has a stronger preference for earlier consumption than the other type, then it 
can happen that demand deposits dominate traded equity shares, but only under certain conditions.   
Furthermore, if demand deposits can be traded, then optimal risk sharing does not occur regardless of 
preferences.  Finally, Jacklin argues that, if new assets can be introduced, individuals will deviate from 
either the demand deposit arrangement or from the economy with traded dividend-paying shares.  These 
points lead Jacklin to conclude that the Diamond and Dybvig “demand-deposit” intermediary can only 
exist if trading restrictions limit consumers to the type of demand deposits that Diamond and Dybvig 
model.  This highlights the importance of the sequential service constraint and its interpretation. 
Haubrich and King (1990) revisit in detail the issue of financial intermediation in settings where 
agents are subject to privately observable income shocks.  Their main conclusions are similar to Jacklin 
(1987), namely, that “demand deposits uniquely provide insurance only if there are restrictions on 
financial side exchanges, which may be interpreted as exclusivity provisions or regulations on security   19 
markets.  If these restrictions cannot be implemented, then our environment does not rationalize banks” 
(p. 362; emphasis in original).  They also make the useful distinction between two separate issues.  One is 
the fact that the available investment technology is illiquid in the sense that no return is earned if the two-
period investment is ended early.  The other is that risk averse consumers with privately observable 
income shocks have a demand for insurance.  They argue that a securities market is as good as banks in 
providing liquidity.  In their model, the bank’s comparative advantage is in providing insurance against 
private income shocks rather than providing liquidity per se, but that advantage still depends on trading 
restrictions.  
Hellwig (1994) and von Thadden (1998) examine how banks function when additional 
considerations are introduced into Diamond and Dybvig’s structure. Hellwig shows that if market returns 
at the interim (early-consumption) date are subject to systematic “interest-rate shocks,” banks optimally 
do not provide insurance against such interest rate risk. Von Thadden shows that if depositors can join 
outside coalitions that engage in market activity, banks’ ability to provide insurance is severely curtailed, 
and banks are more constrained as long-term investment opportunities are more reversible. Intuitively, ex 
ante insurance makes the return to holding deposits at the interim date deviate from returns available by 
directly investing, allowing arbitrage. 
Diamond (1997) responds to Jacklin (1987), Haubrich and King (1990), Hellwig (1994), and von 
Thadden (1998) in a model with both banks and a securities market in which (by assumption) only a 
limited subset of agents participate in the market.  The main focus of the paper is on the interactions 
between bank provision of “liquidity” and the depth of the market.  As more agents participate in the 
securities market, banks are less able to provide additional liquidity. 
Allen and Gale (1997) introduce a different smoothing role for financial intermediaries, namely, 
that they are unique in providing a mechanism for smoothing intertemporal intergenerational risks.  Allen 
and Gale study the standard overlapping (risk averse) generations model with two assets, a risky asset in 
fixed supply and a safe asset that can be accumulated over time.
5  The risky asset lasts forever and pays 
out a random dividend each period.  The safe asset consists of a storage technology.  First, consider the 
market equilibrium in this economy.  Perhaps counterintuitively, the safe asset is not a useful hedge 
against the uncertainty generated by the risky asset.  Because the risky asset’s returns are independently 
and identically distributed in any period, a representative young agent solves the same decision problem 
at any date.  Old agents supply the risky asset inelastically, so the equilibrium price of the risky asset is 
                                                 
5 Freeman (1988) and Qi (1994) introduce Diamond and Dybvig banks into an overlapping generations model, but 
do not consider intertemporal smoothing of risk. 
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constant and nonstochastic.  Because the dividend is nonnegative, the safe asset is dominated and is not 
held in equilibrium. 
This market equilibrium is in contrast with the portfolio allocation that would occur for an 
infinitely lived agent facing the same investment opportunities.  Such an individual can self-insure against 
low dividend periods by holding a buffer stock of precautionary savings in the form of the safe asset.  
Intuitively, when the dividend is high, the individual saves some of the dividend for a “rainy day” when 
the dividend is low.  In the overlapping generations setting, a social planner can make a Pareto 
improvement by following the same type of rule. 
The market equilibrium in the overlapping generations model cannot achieve the allocation that 
the social planner could achieve because private agents cannot trade before they are born, while the social 
planner can, in effect, trade at all dates.  In particular, the social planner trades ex ante, that is, before the 
realization of the path of dividends.  A representative young agent, however, is born into a world where 
the dividend has just been realized.  There is no willingness to implement insurance once the state is 
known.  For example, suppose the dividend just realized is low.  Then, the social planner would like to 
implement a transfer from the young to the old, to smooth their income.  On the other hand, if the 
dividend just realized is high, then the social planner would like to transfer some of that to the current 
young.  Some excess may be saved for the next period.  These transfers insure that each generation 
receives the expected utility targeted by the social planner. 
It is well known that markets are incomplete in overlapping generations models, but the point 
made by Allen and Gale is that a long-lived financial intermediary may be the institutional mechanism to 
provide for this intertemporal smoothing.  The intermediary would hold all the assets and offer a deposit 
contract to each generation.  After accumulating large reserves, the intermediary offers (almost) all 
generations a constant return on deposits, independent of the actual dividend realizations.  How such an 
institution would be set up initially, and how it would be maintained when some agents will have 
incentives to renege on the arrangement, are not clear.  Allen and Gale loosely interpret the institution as 
corresponding to German universal banks.   
Consumption insurance that implements smooth patterns of intertemporal consumption plans is at 
the center of the model of consumer behavior of neoclassical economics.  Another central notion concerns 
the use of “money” to facilitate exchange.  The search models of money or models with cash-in-advance 
constraints attempt to explain why “money” exists.  The notion of banks as consumption-smoothing 
institutions attempts to wed these two ideas.  Bank liabilities are seen as claims that facilitate 
consumption smoothing.  But, there is no notion of exchange in the model, no sense in which transactions 
are taking place where bank “money” is being used to facilitate the smoothing.  Instead, agents are 
essentially isolated from each other; there is no trade with other agents where “money” buys goods.    21 
Rather agents fear missing out on long-term investment opportunities because of possible shocks to their 
preferences.  Agents trade only with the bank. 
 
E.  Banks as Liquidity Providers 
Bank liabilities function as a medium of exchange.  This basic observation leads to ideas and 
models concerning “liquidity” that are quite distinct and perhaps more natural than viewing bank 
liabilities as allowing consumption smoothing.  A medium of exchange is a set of claims or securities that 
can be offered to other agents in exchange for goods.  Such claims can dominate barter and may dominate 
government-supplied money.  What are the advantages of privately-produced trading claims to be a 
medium of exchange?   One class of these models considers settings where agents cannot contract and 
trade with each other due their inability to meet at a single location.  Without “money” they must barter, 
and this is clearly inefficient.  This generates a need for a payments system, essentially a trading center or 
bank that can produce and net claims.  A second notion of liquidity is related to the information properties 
of claims that are privately produced as a medium of exchange.  The focus is on reducing trading losses 
that agents who need to consume face when other traders with private information seek to use this 
information to make trading profits. Yet a third notion of liquidity uses a setting where moral hazard 
problems limit firms’ ability to borrow to meet unexpected investment needs.  Because moral hazard 
limits the effectiveness of transactions between firms with excess liquidity and firms that need liquidity, a 
bank that provides contingent liquidity to those that need it can dominate a decentralized market. 
The first view of banks as liquidity providers concerns the role of banks in the payments system.  
Freeman (1996a,b) models an environment where agents are spatially separated and the timing of 
transactions is such that they cannot simultaneously trade at a central location.  The problem in the model 
is that some agents, buyers, wish to consume goods from other agents, but have no goods that the buyers 
want to offer these sellers in exchange.  Nor do buyers have any money, though later at another location 
they will be able to sell their goods in exchange for money.  So, buyers issue i.o.u.’s – promises to pay at 
the central location next period with fiat money – to  the sellers.  Fiat money is used to settle the debts, 
but money and private debt coexist.  Now, at the central clearing location it may happen that all creditors 
and debtors arrive simultaneously, in which case clearing occurs directly.  If arrival is not simultaneous, 
however, settling can take place through a clearinghouse.  The clearinghouse accepts money in payment 
of i.o.u.’s and pays off i.o.u.’s presented.  However, if creditors arrive first, then the clearinghouse must 
have some means of paying them before the debtors arrive.  A basic point of Freeman is develop the 
notion of the clearinghouse issuing its own i.o.u.’s, bank notes for example, that can circulate and be 
redeemed for fiat money later.   22 
Green (1997) builds on the Freeman model, arguing that a clearinghouse “netting by novation” 
can also achieve the efficiency gain in Freeman’s model.  In the same vein, McAndrews and Roberds 
(1999) model the efficiency gains from introducing banks that allow for centralized netting of claims.  A 
bank can lend to firms via overdrafts.  The firms are willing to accept payment in bank funds since the 
income funds can be used to repay the overdraft loan.  Banks can provide “liquidity” to the extent that the 
payments they are requested to make are offsetting.  Williamson (1992) also presents a model in which 
fiat money and private bank “money” coexist in equilibrium.  Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) study a 
random-matching model in which some agents, called banks, can produce information about the trading 
histories of other agents, called nonbanks.  The equilibrium is one in which the banks issue and redeem 
private bank notes. 
In these models, banks issue private money to facilitate their role in clearing transactions.  This is 
related to the historical experiences during which banks actually did issue their own private money, 
notably during the American Free Banking Era, 1838-1863.  During this period hundreds of different 
banks’ monies circulated.  Early economic historians and monetary theorists viewed the experience as a 
failure, arguing that it was marked by “wildcat banking” which justified a role for the government in the 
provision of a fiat currency.  Following earlier work by Rockoff (1974, 1975), Rolnick and Weber (1982, 
1983, 1984, 1985) reexamine failure rates over the cross section of states with different banking regimes 
and conclude that the period was not marked by such episodes.  Gorton (1996, 1999) analyzes the prices 
of private bank notes and concludes that the market for banknotes worked well in pricing the risk of bank 
failure and in preventing wildcatting.  Some experiences of Illinois, New York and Wisconsin during the 
Free Banking period are studied by Economopoulos (1988, 1990). 
The pricing of free bank notes raises another issue concerning the production of liquidity.  When 
offered a bank liability in exchange for goods, the seller of goods must recognize the risk that the bank 
can fail before the liability is honored.  If some agents have private information about the likelihood of 
bank failure, they may be able to benefit from this when trading bank liabilities.  An important property of 
a medium of exchange may well be that there is little or no such risk; that is, the value of the medium of 
exchange is independent of such considerations.  But then it must be riskless in the sense that its value 
does not depend on the likelihood of the bank failing.  This intuition is developed in the second view of 
liquidity, exemplified by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) begin with a common assumption of financial market models, 
namely the existence of “noise traders” or “liquidity traders.”  Kyle (1985) originally introduced these 
traders as a reduced-form modeling device, following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  These models do 
not explicitly examine the motives of these noise traders; instead, they are posited to conveniently trade 
and lose money, making it profitable for other traders to undertake costly information production.     23 
Implicitly, these models seem to assume larger settings in which agents face cash-in-advance constraints 
and suffer shocks to income or preferences, causing them to sell securities.  These models assume 
symmetrically that there are also noise traders who have sudden urges to buy securities, though it is less 
clear what the source of this urge is exactly.  Intuitively, these traders either sell securities at too low a 
price or buy securities at too high a price because they are uninformed and the prices at which securities 
are traded are not fully revealing. 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) observe that these noise traders should recognize their problem, 
namely, that they lose money when they trade securities with better-informed traders.  Consequently, they 
should demand securities with the property that when they are traded it is not possible for insiders to 
benefit at the expense of less informed traders.  Thus, a security is said to be “liquid” if uninformed 
traders can sell it (unexpectedly) without a loss to more informed traders.  The higher the variance of the 
value of a security, the greater the potential losses to insiders when uninformed traders must sell.  If 
securities could be valued independently of information known only to the informed traders, then these 
securities would be highly desirable for trading purposes.  Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) argue that 
splitting the cash flows of an underlying portfolio to create debt and equity can create such “liquid” 
securities, namely the debt.  If the debt is riskless, then there can be no information advantage that other 
agents could possess.  Uninformed agents with unexpected needs to sell securities can sell these securities 
to satisfy their liquidity needs.  Financial intermediaries are the natural entities to create such securities, as 
they hold diversified portfolios of assets.  Consequently, their debt should be used for transactions 
purposes. 
Holmström and Tirole (1998) provide another rationale for intermediaries based on a third notion 
of “liquidity.”  They begin by deriving a demand for “liquidity” that emanates from firms rather than 
consumers.  There are three dates in their model, 0, 1, and 2.  At date 0 the entrepreneur running the firm 
raises outside financing.  At date 1 there is a “liquidity shock” requiring the entrepreneur to invest more in 
the project if it is to obtain a return at date 2.  After the realization of the liquidity shock, the decision to 
continue or not is made, followed by the entrepreneur’s effort choice.  If the project is continued, then an 
outcome is realized at date 2 and contract payments are made.  Because there is a moral hazard problem 
in inducing the entrepreneur to expend effort, outside investors cannot be promised the full social value of 
the investment.  The firm raises less financing than the first-best social optimum.  If the firm can store the 
initial resources, then it faces a dilemma.  It can reduce the amount it invests at date 0, to have an amount 
to hedge against a liquidity shock.  Or, it can invest more at date 0, but then have less on hand if it needs 
more at date 1.   
Now, suppose there is no storage and no aggregate uncertainty.  The only way to transfer value 
across time is to use claims issued by firms.  In general equilibrium, some firms will need resources at   24 
date 1 and some will not.  A second-best arrangement would allow firms with large needs for resources at 
date 1 to utilize the market value of those firms with low needs at date 1.  How would this actually work?  
A firm with a liquidity shock at date 1 cannot meet its needs by selling claims at date 1; it is too late to do 
that.  Could the firm instead hedge against an adverse liquidity shock at date 1 by buying claims on other 
firms at date 0, and then selling those claims at date 1?  There are two problems with this arrangement.  
First, if the moral hazard problem is severe enough, then a market in firm claims will not supply enough 
“liquidity.”  Second, there is an inefficient distribution of liquid assets (the claims that can be sold at date 
1 by firms needing resources).  Firms without adverse liquidity shocks end up holding claims at date 1 
that they do not need. 
An intermediary can provide liquidity by issuing claims to investors at date 0 on its value at date 
2.  At date 0 it contracts with each firm to provide a line of credit at date 1.  The maximum credit line is 
incentive compatible with the entrepreneur making an effort.
6  Unlike claims in the financial market, 
which cannot be made contingent on a firm’s liquidity shock, firms only draw on the credit line at date 1 
to the extent that they need resources.  If there is aggregate uncertainty, then this arrangement may not 
work, and there can be a role for a government bond market. 
Both Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Holmström and Tirole (1998) have intermediaries 
creating securities that have desirable state contingent payoffs.  In Gorton and Pennacchi, the bank creates 
demand deposits whose value does not depend on the state of the world.  This security is in demand 
because its value is not state contingent and, therefore, uninformed traders will not lose to better-informed 
traders who know the state of the world.  In Holmström and Tirole, the intermediary creates a security, 
the credit line, which is valuable because it is state contingent; it is only drawn on when a firm needs 
resources at the interim date.  Capital market securities issued by firms cannot replicate this state-
contingent payoff. 
 
F.  Banks as Commitment Mechanisms 
An important question concerns why illiquid bank assets are financed by demand deposits that 
allow consumers to arrive and demand liquidation of those illiquid assets.  Calomiris and Kahn (1991) 
and Flannery (1994) link the fragility of bank capital structures to the role of banks.  These authors begin 
with the assumption that banks are somewhat opaque institutions, more so than nonfinancial firms.   
Evidence for this opaqueness compared to nonfinancial firms can be found, for example, in Slovin, 
Sushka, and Polonchek (1992) and Morgan (2000).  Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that bank demand 
                                                 
6 Because the entrepreneur pays a fee at date 0 for the credit line, he can borrow at a lower rate at date 1 
than if he issued securities at date 1.  This lower rate leads to greater effort for any amount of borrowing.   25 
deposits include the right to withdraw at anytime at par along with a sequential service constraint in order 
to control the risk taking activities of bankers.  If information about the banker’s decisions must be 
produced at a cost, then individual depositors who expend resources to produce the information will get 
into line to withdraw at the bank first.  Because the sequential service constraint is a first-come-first-
served rule, it rewards those depositors in line first, and so information-producing depositors will recover 
more than other depositors.  This argument was the first to suggest that banks’ capital structures are 
deliberately made fragile so as to commit to not engaging in certain activities.  From this viewpoint, 
fragility is a positive attribute of banks.  Jean-Baptiste (1999) also argues that the instantly callable 
feature of demand deposits is necessary as a device to discipline bankers. 
  Flannery (1994) makes a related argument.  He argues that bank creditors cannot effectively 
control bank asset substitution because of the ease of flexibly altering the bank portfolio, but they can 
estimate a bank’s riskiness at any point in time.  To control bankers, short-term debt is used because 
changes in bank risk will be reflected in financing costs.  Again, the basic point is that the capital 
structure of banks is designed to be fragile, so that it functions as a commitment mechanism.  Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996) show empirically that bank debt prices do reflect bank risk. 
Diamond and Rajan (2001) use this idea that fragility is a commitment device to construct a 
model of bank-like financial intermediation.  In their model, entrepreneurs need to raise money from 
outside investors to finance their projects.  The specific abilities of the entrepreneur are important for the 
project to generate high cash flows; that is, if the entrepreneur refuses to work, then the project is worth 
less when someone else runs it.  Moreover, the entrepreneur cannot commit to stay with the project.  A 
lender, however, can build a relationship by lending to entrepreneur and learning about the project.  If this 
relationship lender “liquidates” the project by separating the entrepreneur from the project, then the 
project is worth less than it would be worth with the entrepreneur, but more than if it is run by someone 
other than the relationship lender. 
Because the entrepreneur cannot commit to stay with the asset, Diamond and Rajan say that the 
asset is “illiquid.”  This “illiquidity” makes it possible for the entrepreneur to hold up the relationship 
lender.  Because potential relationship lenders anticipate this holdup problem, the amount that the 
entrepreneur can borrow is limited.  Lenders also have problems because they may face a realized 
liquidity shock at an interim date.  If a relationship lender needed cash at the interim date, the project 
would have to be sold to a non-relationship investor in whose hands it is worth even less.  The prospect of 
such a shock makes relationship lending expensive, if not prohibitive. 
The consequences of this chain of illiquidity could be mitigated if the relationship lender could 
borrow against the full value of the loan when faced with a liquidity shock.  But this requires that the 
relationship lender commit to not separate from the project in the future.  Diamond and Rajan argue that a   26 
bank can achieve such a commitment by designing a fragile capital structure, as follows.  If the 
relationship lender issues demand deposits that are subject to collective action problems among the 
depositors, then if the relationship lender threatens to withdraw from the project, depositors will run the 
bank and the relationship lender will receive no rents. 
As Diamond and Rajan note, this fragile structure is not first-best if banks face undiversifiable 
liquidity shocks.  In this case, runs may occur because of high liquidity demand rather than because of 
bank moral hazard.  Diamond and Rajan (2000) use this problem to motivate the existence and optimal 
level of bank equity capital.  We return to this point in Section III below. 
 
G.  Empirical Tests of Bank Existence Theories 
Theories of the existence of bank-like financial intermediaries link banks’ activities on the asset 
side of their balance sheets with the unique liabilities that banks issue on the liability side of their balance 
sheets.  Such a link is important for establishing what it is that banks do that cannot be replicated in 
capital markets.  As we have seen, these arguments take two linked forms. First, the banks’ balance sheet 
structure may ensure that the bank has incentive to act as delegated monitor or information producer.  
Second, by virtue of holding a diversified portfolio of loans, banks are in the best position to create 
riskless trading securities, namely, demand deposits. 
Two papers, in particular, construct empirical tests of hypotheses about links between the two 
sides of bank balance sheets.  Berlin and Mester (1999) look for a link between bank market power in 
deposits markets and the types of loan contracts that the bank enters into with borrowers.
7  “Core 
deposits” are those deposits, demand deposits and savings deposits, which are mostly interest rate 
inelastic.  To the extent that a bank has such core deposits, it can safely engage in long-term contracts 
with borrowers; in particular, it can smooth loan rates.  Using a large sample of loans from the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to Business, they find that banks that are more heavily 
funded through core deposits do provide borrowers with smoother loan rates in response to aggregate 
shocks. 
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2001) empirically analyze the link between loan commitments and 
demand deposits.  While demand deposits are liabilities and loan commitments are assets, the two 
securities both commit the bank to potentially meet demands for cash.  That is, depositors may withdraw 
their deposits and borrowers may draw on their loan commitments.  To be prepared for such 
contingencies, each of these security types requires the bank to hold liquidity.  As long as the demands for 
                                                 
7 Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) provide evidence of bank monopoly power in the 
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cash on loan commitments and on deposits are not perfectly correlated, there are economies of scale to 
holding cash against both types of contingencies.  They find that banks make more loan commitments 
than other types of intermediaries and that, within the banking sector, banks with high ratios of 
transaction deposit to total deposits also have high ratios of loan commitments to total loans. 
The dramatic increase in loan sales constitutes a challenge, both theoretically and empirically, to 
arguments concerning bank existence.  In a loan sale, the cash flows from a loan on a bank’s balance 
sheet are sold to investors in the capital markets, through issuance of a new security (a secondary loan 
participation).  This seems paradoxical: the borrowing firm could have issued a security directly to the 
same investor in the capital markets without going to the bank, and yet chose to borrow from a bank.  The 
above arguments for the existence of financial intermediation imply that the bank loan should not be 
resold because if it can be resold there is no incentive for the bank to screen ex ante or monitor ex post.  
Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) explore these issues empirically, testing for the presence of incentive-
compatible arrangements that could explain loan sales.  One of their main findings is that the bank keeps 
a portion of the cash flows that is consistent with maintaining incentives.  The idea is that the bank faces 
the same incentives as it would have had the entire loan been kept on its balance sheet.  There are now a 
number of papers on this subject, but the basic paradox of loan sales remains unexplained.  Indeed, the 
paradox is somewhat deepened to the extent that banks can transfer the credit risk of their loans to third 
parties via credit default swaps.  Market participants seem to rely on banks’ incentives to maintain their 
reputations for monitoring, but the efficacy of this mechanism is largely unexplored. 
 
H.  Bonds versus Loans 
  If banks monitor borrowers in ways that cannot be accomplished by dispersed bondholders, or 
produce information that capital markets investors cannot produce, then how can bonds and loans 
coexist?
8  Why don’t loans dominate bonds?  This poses the question of the existence of bank loans in a 
different light.  A number of authors have addressed this issue, attempting to differentiate between bonds 
and loans, in terms of their characteristics, but also in such a way that firms will demand both. 
Detragiache (1994) presents a model in which firms use both bonds and loans.  Bonds (or 
synonymously “public debt”) cannot be renegotiated, while loans (synonymously “private debt”) can be 
costlessly renegotiated.  Loans are senior to bonds.  Equity holders face an asset substitution problem at 
the initial date, and renegotiation with the bank or liquidation may occur at the interim date.  In 
renegotiation only the senior lender, the bank, can forgive debt, so bank debt has a clear advantage.  But 
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bonds also have a role.  The payoff to equity is decreasing in the amount of bonds and this helps to limit 
the incentive to engage in asset substitution at the interim date.  Renegotiation allows equity to capture 
some surplus at the interim date, even if creditors are not satisfied, so risky projects can become 
attractive.  But, if some debt is owed to creditors with whom it is impossible to renegotiate, equity’s 
payoff is reduced and the incentive to engage in asset substitution is mitigated. 
In Diamond (1991), new borrowers, i.e., young firms, borrow from banks initially.  Then later, 
based on the credit record established while being monitored by a bank, the firm can issue bonds.  There 
are three types of borrowers. Two of these types are fixed at either Good (G) or Bad (B) while the third 
can choose between Bad and Good (BG).  Type refers to the value of the firm’s project so that if the 
investors knew the firm’s type, its debt would be priced accordingly.   Over time, investors or the bank 
can learn the type of the firms with a fixed type by observing whether there has been a default.  Diamond 
(1989), with the same model, shows that, over time, a surviving BG type has a “reputation” that is 
consistent with being a G type, and this makes the cost of funding so low that it always chooses the Good 
project.  In Diamond (1991) reputation effects eliminate the need for future monitoring so G types can 
issue bonds.  Also, B types cannot benefit from monitoring, so they issue bonds that are appropriately 
priced.  The BG types borrow from banks, which then monitor them.  This result explains the coexistence 
of bonds and loans, but not for the same firm.  
  In Bolton and Freixas (2000) bank loans are valuable to firms because, unlike bonds, bank loans 
can be renegotiated.  The problem, however, is that bank capital is costly, which makes bank loans costly 
relative to bonds.  Firms trade off the benefits of bank loans against the cost.  Cantillo (1998) also 
considers the cost of banks in determining the choice between loans and bonds.  Outside investors lend to 
firms but can only verify the firms realized returns at a cost, which is necessary if there is a default on the 
debt.  Thus, the set-up is one of costly state verification following Townsend (1979).  Banks, however, are 
better at performing the costly state verification; banks take less time to verify than do nonbank lenders.  
Nevertheless, banks do not dominate nonbank lenders because they too are firms, so their returns also 
require costly state verification.  The more banks lend, for a given amount of equity, the more likely that 
consumers financing the bank will have to expend costs to verify the state of the bank.  Again, this causes 
firms that are more likely to be in financial distress to choose bank loans, whereas firms that are less 
likely to be in financial distress choose direct lending.   
  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) take a different approach.  They assume that some firms are 
more likely to be in financial distress than others.  Firm type is private information.  Banks are valuable to 
these firms if they will commit more resources to evaluating firm type in financial distress.  Banks can 
develop a reputation for doing this.  Then firms with a high likelihood of needing a bank select banks that 
are more committed to adding value to distressed firms because of their reputation.  Firms that have a low   29 
likelihood of being in financial distress issue bonds because they do not want to pool with the riskier 
firms.  Banks are of high and low cost types in terms of their ability to evaluate firms.  The game is 
repeated so that over time firms learn about bank type, corresponding to a “reputation.” 
  Cantillo and Wright (2000) empirically investigate two large panel data sets of firms to 
investigate the choice of firms between bonds and loans.  Their evidence is consistent with their model, in 
which large firms that are less likely to need banks as monitors and reorganizers in the event of financial 
distress issue bonds.  Smaller firms rely more heavily on bank loans.  These determinants of choice of 
lender are most important during downturns. 
  In the papers just discussed, firms generally choose between bank loans and bonds but do not mix 
the two.  In Section III, we return to this issue in more detail and discuss two extensions – papers that 
focus on the optimal mix of bank loans and bonds, and papers that explore differences in the contractual 
features of these two funding sources. 
 
I.  Banks versus Stock Markets 
  The fact that some economies are more bank-dependent and have small or almost nonexistent 
stock markets raises the question of how these savings and investment organizations differ.  Research on 
the roles of banks has been discussed above.  But what function do stock markets perform?  Do stock 
markets perform the same functions as banks, so that banks and stock markets are substitute institutions?  
These questions are implicitly posed by studies of Germany, for example, where the economy appears to 
be very successful, but where historically the economy has been organized around banks.
9  Little research 
has been done on these questions.  In part, more economic history research is needed, but perhaps 
surprisingly it is also not so clear what role the stock market really performs. 
  Dow and Gorton (1997) present a model of the stock market in which stock prices serve two 
roles.  First, informative stock prices can lead to efficient executive compensation.  But stock prices are 
only informative if some traders are willing to trade on their information about projects that the firm is 
considering undertaking.  Thus, informative stock prices have a second role: the firm can use information 
from stock prices in making capital budgeting decisions.  In this way, the stock market performs both a 
screening role for projects and a monitoring role in the sense of performance-sensitive compensation.  But 
Dow and Gorton show that a bank can also perform these roles, suggesting that banks and stock markets 
are alternative institutions in the savings/investment process. 
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  By contrast, Allen (1993) and Allen and Gale (1999) argue that banks and stock markets are 
fundamentally different in the way that they process information.  Stock markets can aggregate diverse 
opinions, particularly about new technologies, while banks are inherently conservative.  The prediction is 
that stock market-based economies will embrace new technologies, while bank-based economies will be 
less dynamic.  This appears consistent with casual observations about venture capital, and raises 
interesting questions about the differences between banks and venture capital.
10 
  Baliga and Polak (2001) address the question of why financial systems with banks and with 
bonds arise and persist.  They argue that an important distinction between the German and Anglo-Saxon 
financial systems concerns not the distinction between banks and stock markets, but between bank loans 
and bonds.  They ignore equity because equity finance was unimportant quantitatively at the start of the 
industrial revolution, the period that they have in mind for their model.  Their model is one of moral 
hazard on the part of borrowers.  If a borrower is monitored (bank finance), then the first best outcome 
can be enforced, but at a cost.  If the borrower is not monitored (bonds), then only a second best outcome 
can be achieved, but there is no monitoring cost.  There are multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked.  
Interestingly, the Anglo-Saxon system can only persist if it is efficient, but the economy can get stuck in 
an inefficient German system. 
  Levine (2000) and Levine and Zervos (1998) are examples of the latest empirical research to 
explore questions about bank-based systems and stock market-based systems. The general conclusion of 
this literature is that the level of financial development is more critical than the relative dominance of 
banks or stock markets. Nevertheless, these papers focus on questions of overall economic growth rather 
than cross-sectional effects on different industries or firms. Differential effects such as those predicted by 
Allen (1993) or Allen and Gale (1999) remain largely unexamined. 
 
 
III.  Interactions Between Banks and Borrowers 
As discussed in the previous section, one view of banks as intermediaries focuses on their role as 
delegated monitors or evaluators of borrowers that hold loans as a way of making their monitoring 
credible. To make this basic point, however, initial models of delegated monitoring abstracted from a 
number of realistic complications. In terms of interaction between borrower and lender, monitoring or 
evaluation is a one-time affair, behavior is fixed ex ante by contract, and optimal loan contracts are quite 
simple. In terms of interaction among lenders, borrowers use only one lender, and if competition among 
lenders is modeled at all, it is assumed that there are infinite numbers of perfectly diversified 
intermediaries offering identical terms.  
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Reality is much more complex. Loan contracts often include many pages of terms and conditions 
(“covenants”), and some banks hold equity claims on borrowers. Terms are often selectively enforced or 
renegotiated as bank and borrower interact repeatedly over time. Borrowers often obtain financing from 
multiple sources: even small firms may have trade creditors, and larger firms often use several bank 
lenders or mix bank finance with funding from dispersed investors. Indeed, many loan terms govern 
relations between the bank and other claimants. Banks are rarely perfectly diversified and face varying 
degrees of competition.  
In what follows, we survey research on these issues. In order to narrow the field, we emphasize 
work that has appeared since the beginning of the 1990s; for a survey of some of the earlier work, see 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). Moreover, we emphasize papers that focus on monitored finance – that 
is, papers in which some lenders have access to information that the investing public does not have. 
Because work on banks as underwriters has largely focused on potential conflicts of interest between 
banks and investors rather than its impact on bank borrowers per se, we reserve this topic for our 
discussion of regulation in Section V below. For reasons of space, we also abstract from work on how 
bank lenders may influence borrowers’ industry structure.
 11  
 
A.    Dynamic Relationships and the Pros and Cons of Bank Monitoring 
As noted above, early papers on delegated monitoring focused on one-time interaction between 
banks and borrowers and emphasized the savings from having a single investor monitor. Subsequent 
research has shown that a dynamic setting introduces additional pluses and minuses to delegated 
monitoring. On the plus side, long-term relationships between banks and borrowers allow for improved 
outcomes through implicit contracts enforced by concerns for reputation or future rents. On the minus 
side, a credible long-term relationship leaves bank and borrower locked in to one another, so the borrower 
may exploit the bank, the bank may exploit the borrower, or the borrower may find itself without needed 
funding if the bank suffers difficulties from the rest of its business. If these problems are severe, it may be 
better to forgo delegated monitoring entirely and rely instead on “arm’s-length” finance from dispersed 
investors. 
One of the first papers to recognize the potential gains from long-term interaction between banks 
and borrowers is Haubrich (1989). In single-period delegated monitoring models, there is some 
probability each period that the borrower will do poorly enough that the bank must monitor. Haubrich’s 
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insight is that, in a repeated relationship between bank and borrower, the bank can simply keep track of 
reports from the borrower and penalize the borrower if too many reports are bad. If both the bank and 
borrower are sufficiently patient (have discount rates close to zero), the threat of being penalized and 
losing funding access in the future is sufficient to make the borrower report truthfully, sparing the bank 
the need to monitor more closely. This is true even if the reports are not verifiable in a court of law – the 
relationship is sustained by a tacit (“implicit”) agreement. To the extent that reviewing and tracking 
reports is still costly, there is still a gain to having a single bank lender rather than multiple lenders. 
Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993) suggest another way in which long-term relationships and 
implicit contracting may reduce costs compared to explicit, completely specified contracts. They start 
with the observation that many bank-borrower arrangements give banks a great deal of flexibility: for 
example, credit lines often have clauses which let the bank renege on the credit line if the borrower’s 
situation undergoes a “material adverse change.” Since many of these lines are used to back commercial 
paper borrowings and are meant to be used when the borrower is having trouble refinancing its 
commercial paper, it is not clear why borrowers pay fees for such a credit line – and yet they do. 
The key insight of Boot, et al. is that if the bank committed to honor the credit line no matter 
what, it might be forced to make good on its commitment in situations where its overall situation was 
weak, further weakening its financial position. The “material-adverse-change” clause allows the bank to 
renege in such situations. Nevertheless, the bank does not wish to renege all the time – if it did, market 
participants would not pay for its credit lines, hurting its future profits. By putting its reputation on the 
line, the bank is able to offer a product that lets it renege when its current situation is so severe that the hit 
to its reputation and future profits is less costly than honoring the commitment now. Of course, if this 
arrangement is to work, the bank must be sufficiently patient and must have future rents or quasi-rents 
that are sufficiently attractive; an increase in competition among banks would reduce such rents and 
jeopardize such implicit contracting. 
There is some evidence that bank relationships do help borrowers through implicit contracting. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that small firms that have been with their bank for a longer time 
(controlling for firm age) have greater access to credit, especially if they rely on a single bank rather than 
multiple banks. Berger and Udell (1995) find that a longer bank relationship (again controlling for firm 
age) lowers interest rates and collateral requirements on loan commitments. As noted in Section II, Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a,b, 1991) find that Japanese firms that are members of a keiretsu face 
lower costs of financial distress than those faced by non-member firms. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) find 
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that troubled German firms are more likely to get additional financing if they have a “main bank” 
(hausbank) relationship.
12 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest yet another way in which long-term relationships can benefit 
borrowers. Suppose that banks do not initially know which borrowers are good and which are bad, but do 
learn this over time as the firm establishes a track record for itself. Initially, firms can also unobservably 
choose projects with higher risk but lower returns, and their incentive to do so increases in the interest 
rate they are charged. If banks compete actively for loans, the rate they charge initially will reflect 
average credit quality, which may in turn be so high that even good firms choose risky projects, which in 
turn may lead to credit rationing (as per Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). By contrast, if banks have some market 
power, then they can choose a lower rate initially, knowing that they can make up any losses by earning 
monopoly rents on good firms in the future; this in turn may reduce initial risk-shifting incentives and 
thus initial credit rationing. 
Petersen and Rajan test their theory by regressing the rates that small businesses pay on their 
loans against a number of controls for firm risk and the Herfindahl index of the local banking market. 
Consistent with their theory, in highly concentrated banking markets, young firms are more likely to 
receive bank finance, and the rate of interest that firms pay declines more slowly over time, allowing 
banks to earn rents on survivors.
13 
The common theme of these papers is that long-term relationships increase contracting flexibility. 
Since the theoretic models rely on future rents or quasi-rents to maintain incentive compatibility, it 
follows that if increased competition among banks decreases rents, such competition should also 
undermine relationships. This in turn suggests a possible drawback to relationships: since bank-borrower 
relationships implicitly rely on lack of competition, they create an environment where the borrower is 
exposed to the bank’s weakness or outright exploitative behavior, and vice versa. 
The first paper to focus on the drawbacks of bank-borrower relationships is Sharpe (1990), who 
shows that a bank’s monitoring activity may give it informational rents which in turn may distort 
borrower behavior. To see this, consider a firm’s “inside” bank (one that already has a lending 
relationship with the firm). Based on the relationship, the inside bank will have some idea of the firm’s 
                                                 
12 See also the references and discussion in Berger and Udell’s (1998) review article on small firm finance. 
13 In related work, Fischer (2000) finds that German firms in more concentrated banking markets are less credit-
constrained and transfer more information to their lender; also, banks provide more liquidity if they have received 
such information. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2001) examine the impact of local bank concentration on 
rates of firm creation in Italy. They find that less competitive banking markets have lower rates of firm creation on 
average, but the opposite is true in industries with low fixed assets, which they argue proxies for high asymmetric 
information. At a “macro” level, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) examine how cross-country differences in banking 
sector concentration affects different industries’ growth rates. They find that more concentrated banking sectors 
lower average growth rates, but do increase the growth rates of industries that have very high external finance needs.    34 
eventual chance of success (“credit quality”); by contrast, banks that do not have a relationship with the 
firm (“outside banks”) have not monitored and are thus relatively uninformed about the firm’s credit 
quality. If outside banks were to offer rates that reflected average credit quality, only below-average firms 
would switch, and the outside banks would lose money on average. To protect themselves from this 
“Winner’s Curse,” these banks offer higher rates. This in turn lets the inside bank charge higher rates, 
letting it earn informational rents on above-average quality firms.
14 Higher borrowing rates discourage 
investment by good firms with established bank relationships. Moreover, even if initial competition for 
unattached borrowers causes banks to compete away these subsequent rents, this gives too much capital to 
firms that are unproven. 
Rajan (1992) takes this analysis further in several ways. Unlike Sharpe, he explicitly models 
agency problems between a firm and its investors that may make delegated monitoring attractive. 
Specifically, a firm’s eventual chance of success is determined by the unobservable costly effort of its 
entrepreneur. After this initial exertion of effort, an interim private and unverifiable signal reveals 
whether the firm will be successful or not; if not, it is efficient to liquidate the firm promptly rather than 
let it continue. If a single investor (“bank”) holds the firm’s debt, it also sees this signal, but free-rider 
problems are assumed to rule this out when investors are dispersed (“arm’s-length finance”).  
First, if the bank holds short-term debt, it can threaten to liquidate the firm regardless of the 
interim signal, triggering renegotiation of the loan. If the bank’s bargaining power in renegotiation is 
high, it can hold up the entrepreneur for a high share of any surplus; knowing this will happen, the 
entrepreneur underinvests in effort. Long-term bank debt removes the hold-up problem by removing the 
bank’s ability to threaten to liquidate the borrower. The borrower can still initiate negotiations if 
liquidation is efficient, capturing a share of any liquidation proceeds. The drawback to this arrangement is 
that, ex ante, the borrower’s incentive to put effort into assuring good future outcomes is reduced, since 
the borrower effectively gets some insurance against bad outcomes that lead to liquidation. If the bank has 
a lot of bargaining power, long-term bank debt is better: renegotiations favor the bank, so short-term debt 
would lead to excessively high rents whereas long-term debt gives the borrower little insurance against 
liquidation. When bank bargaining power is low, the opposite is true.  
Second, Rajan considers the incentive effects of arm’s-length finance from dispersed lenders. 
Since arm’s-length lenders are poorly informed, their decisions to renew loans or demand immediate 
repayment forcing liquidation are not efficient. Moreover, since they will charge a rate to protect 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, Sharpe’s analysis of the Winner’s Curse is incorrect, since he assumes that a pure strategy 
equilibrium in rate-setting exists. Broecker’s (1990) analysis of bidding by multiple banks with private signals of 
borrower quality suggests that the equilibrium should involve mixed strategies (randomized rate-setting); this holds 
in Rajan’s (1992) setting, and von Thadden (forthcoming) shows that this holds in Sharpe’s setting as well. 
Nevertheless, the informed bank does earn positive rents on average, so Sharpe’s basic intuition is correct.   35 
themselves from inefficient continuation/liquidation decisions, the borrower’s initial investment decisions 
may also be distorted. Nevertheless, for intermediate levels of bank bargaining power, arm’s-length 
finance may dominate both types of bank finance. 
Finally, Rajan endogenizes bargaining power by allowing for interim competition between an 
“inside” bank, which has monitored and knows the firm’s situation, and uninformed “outside” banks. As 
in Sharpe (1990), the “Winner’s Curse” lets the inside bank earn rents on average; the greater the 
information advantage, the greater the rents and thus the bank’s effective bargaining power. If a firm’s 
chance of success (“quality”) is high, the inside bank’s information advantage is small, and there is little 
difference between bank finance and arm’s-length finance. At intermediate quality levels, bank finance 
dominates, while at lower quality levels, the informed bank’s information advantage is so high that the 
benefits of efficient liquidation are outweighed by the bank’s high rents and the entrepreneur’s 
consequent underinvestment in effort. 
Dinc (2000) examines how such informational rents affect banks’ ability to sustain implicit 
relationship lending arrangements. In his model, it is ex ante efficient for bank lenders to commit to 
rescue firms that are distressed but not outright failures; however, because much of the benefits from such 
rescues flow to the entrepreneur, it is not in a bank’s interest ex post to rescue the firm. Although the bank 
can be compensated by giving it higher payments when the firm is successful, in one-shot arm’s-length 
lending, the bank always reneges on rescues ex post. In a repeated-game setting, so long as banks do not 
discount future profits too much, they may be able to establish reputations for rescuing distressed firms 
and so capture relationship rents. Such implicit contracting is impossible if too few banks compete: 
informational monopoly lets the lender set its rate so high that any additional gains to maintaining a good 
reputation are too small to prevent reneging. On the other hand, if too many banks compete, rents from 
maintaining a good reputation are reduced, and once again banks renege.
15 Thus, relationship lending can 
only be sustained for an intermediate number of banks. 
As noted by Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000), another implication of the “Winner’s Curse” 
is that firms that rely on a bank may be hurt if that bank faces financial distress. Intuitively, a distressed 
bank may have difficulty supplying its good borrowers with sufficient credit for their needs. If instead 
these borrowers try to switch to new banks, the “Winner’s Curse” problem will be especially severe 
because the inside bank’s mix of loans is known to be worse than average. As a result, good borrowers of 
a distressed bank may find that additional financing is very expensive or perhaps even nonexistent. 
                                                 
15 A key difference between Rajan (1992) and Dinc (2000) is that, in Rajan, only the inside bank has private 
information, so it alone earns informational rents; in Dinc, all competing banks get (costless) private signals, and in 
equilibrium they earn positive informational rents that decline with the number of banks.   36 
In Section II, we noted that Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) find evidence that Continental 
Illinois Bank’s near-failure in 1984 had a significant negative impact on firms for whom Continental was 
the main bank. Moreover, since their results focus on firms with some access to public markets (those 
with publicly-traded stock), it seems likely that smaller firms without such access were hit even harder. 
Kang and Stulz (2000) find similar effects when examining how Japan’s long-drawn banking crisis of the 
1990s affected firms that were dependent on bank finance. 
By themselves, these findings do not prove that bank relationships are wholly bad; after all, 
before the banks in these samples got into trouble, they may have been critical in funding their 
relationship borrowers. Nevertheless, to the extent that a relationship with a single bank leads to possible 
hold-up problems or overexposure to that bank’s risk, firms may wish to establish multiple bank 
relationships, breaking a single bank’s information monopoly and diversifying exposure to any one 
bank’s risk.
16 Jean-Baptiste (2001) shows how multiple relationships mitigate the hold-up problem. 
Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) examine the diversification argument. They find that, when 
asymmetric information concerns are high, firms opt for multiple banks; the risk of being denied funding 
if the firm relies on a single bank that gets into trouble is too great. Similarly, the number of relationships 
should increase as bank fragility increases.
17 
Empirical tests of the number of bank relationships per firm yield mixed results. For example, 
using data on Italian firms, Detragiache et al. generally find support for their model’s predictions: if bank 
liquidity shocks are high or bank size is low, firms are more likely to opt for multiple banks and more 
likely to have more relationships once they go to multiple banks. By contrast, Foglia, Laviola, and Reedtz 
(1998) examine Italian data and find that multiple bank relationships tend to be associated with greater 
borrower risk; however, they do not control for bank fragility. Similarly, Farinha and Santos (1999) 
examine Portuguese data and find that firms with greater growth opportunities, less liquidity, or greater 
bank dependence are more likely to switch to multiple bank relationships, all of which is consistent with 
reducing hold-up problems. Ongena and Smith (2000) examine how the number of bank relationships per 
firm varies across different countries. They find that, for low levels of bank fragility (measured by credit 
rating), the number of relationships per firm decreases as fragility increases, but the relationship does 
become positive at higher levels of bank fragility; however, they do not control for firm risk. 
                                                 
16 Carletti (2000) shows that having multiple banks has the drawback of decreasing each bank’s incentive to 
monitor; however, total monitoring may increase if monitoring costs are sufficiently convex in monitoring intensity. 
17 If the probability of bank liquidity problems is very high, however, firms switching banks face less of an adverse 
selection problem: outside banks know that the firm is more likely to switch because its old bank had problems 
rather than because the firm is a “lemon.” Thus, for high bank fragility, single banking may again dominate.   37 
A final piece of evidence comes from Houston and James (1996), who examine the mix of bank 
debt and public (i.e., arm’s-length) debt for a sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms. To the extent the hold-
up problem of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) is significant, it is likely to be most costly for firms that 
have many growth opportunities that need funding, and so these firms should use more public debt. 
Conversely, if the hold-up problem is not an issue, the advantages of relationship lending should make 
bank debt more attractive for firms with greater growth opportunities. Houston and James find that firms 
with a single bank relationship tend to rely less on bank debt as growth opportunities are higher, but the 
opposite is true for firms with multiple bank relationships. This is consistent with the notion that having 
multiple bank relationships mitigates the hold-up problem.
18  
In sum, theory and evidence both suggest pros and cons to bank-borrower relationships. Benefits 
include increased flexibility and access to funding; drawbacks include hold-up problems and negative 
spillovers from bank fragility. Which of these is dominant depends critically on both the nature of the 
borrowing firm and the nature of the banks that the firm has access to. Increased competition among 
banks tends to undermine relationships, but too much monopoly power may have the same effect. 
 
B.   Monitoring and Loan Structure 
The papers just discussed generally assume that a firm is funded either by one bank or by many 
dispersed lenders with loans of the same size, that a single bank lender costlessly monitors whereas 
dispersed lenders do not, and that any debt has a simple structure. We now discuss research that has 
focused on these missing details: how bank monitoring interacts with loan features and a borrower’s 
overall financial structure. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, bank loans are often quite complex, and the terms are 
often renegotiated over time. Moreover, if one compares bank loans and other privately-held debt with 
publicly-held bonds and notes, privately-held debt typically has more covenants and other terms and is 
much more likely to be renegotiated than publicly-held debt. These general facts make sense if banks are 
to be delegated monitors; after all, complex covenants are only useful if the lender observes whether these 
have been violated, and dispersed lenders will lead to duplication of effort and free-riding problems in 
monitoring. Similarly, renegotiation is likely to be inefficient if lenders are poorly-informed or dispersed 
(“arm’s-length” lending); again, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). 
These ideas have led to a more dynamic view of loan features. In the old view, best represented 
by Smith and Warner (1979), covenants and repayment schedules simply prevent borrowers from 
exploiting lenders. For example, a borrower may shift into a riskier line of business, capturing any 
                                                 
18 For further references on the pros and cons of bank relationships, see the survey by Boot (2000).   38 
increased upside over and above the promised payments on the debt while using limited liability to share 
any increased downside with the lender (“risk-shifting” or “asset-substitution”); a covenant forbidding 
change of business focus prevents this. In the new view, covenants and repayment schedules are tripwires 
which give an informed lender the right to threaten the borrower with default, after which renegotiation 
can occur. In our example, a lender faced with a borrower’s proposal to change to a riskier line of 
business can make several choices. If the change is a reaction to deteriorating conditions, and the firm’s 
assets are best used elsewhere, the lender can force default and liquidation. If the change is truly the best 
option, the bank can simply increase the interest rate to reflect increased risk, and perhaps tighten other 
terms to prevent any increased chance of future exploitation. 
Berlin and Mester (1992) are among the first to model these issues. They show that the ability to 
renegotiate covenants can substantially improve their usefulness, because renegotiation allows the use of 
unverifiable information that the borrower and lender may have. If the borrower's actual situation is poor, 
the borrower can comply with the covenant, eschewing exploitative behavior and preventing default. If 
the borrower's actual situation is good, so that violating the covenant is actually good for overall firm 
value, the borrower can violate the covenant knowing that it will be in the lender's interest to renegotiate 
rather than allow default and associated costs to occur. As a result, in settings where lenders are 
concentrated (so that the lenders have more incentive to be informed and renegotiation is easier), 
covenants can be set more stringently, improving overall firm value on an ex ante basis. Since the value 
of allowing renegotiation increases with the ex ante risk of the borrower, private debt contracts should be 
more prevalent among riskier borrowers. 
Berlin and Mester’s work has some weaknesses. First, renegotiation is possible only when the 
covenant is tripped, so it is possible that the firm may actually be in trouble based on unverifiable 
information and yet its covenants are not violated. In such a case, a loan with short-term maturity would 
be better, since the bank could use all information (verifiable or not) in deciding whether to renew the 
loan or instead call for immediate repayment, triggering default. Second, the bank observes the 
borrower’s condition at no cost, abstracting from the need to provide the bank with incentives to monitor. 
Subsequent research has addressed both issues.
19 
One problem with a short-term loan is the hold-up problem of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992); 
indeed, Rajan shows that a severe hold-up problem may make long-term bank debt attractive. One can 
then think of long-term debt with covenants as a happy medium: unlike pure long-term debt, this gives 
                                                 
19 A more technical issue is that Berlin and Mester focus on the case where the verifiable information in covenants is 
almost perfectly correlated with the firm’s actual (unverifiable) situation, ruling out comparative statics on the 
relative precision of verifiable information. 
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the bank some power to force renegotiation, but this power is limited to cases where verifiable 
information suggests that the firm is likely to be in trouble. 
Rajan and Winton (1995) highlight another possible disadvantage of short-term loans: 
paradoxically, by restricting the bank’s power to call for repayment, long-term debt with covenants may 
increase the bank’s incentive to monitor in the first place. Suppose that a firm has a number of claimants 
besides the bank (trade creditors, shareholders, etc.). Two signals of the firm’s condition are available: a 
free but noisy public signal, and a costly but more precise private signal that is only partially verifiable. If 
the public signal is not too noisy, a bank that holds short-term debt may prefer to rely on this signal; the 
bank would bear the entire cost of the private signal, but the benefits of more efficient 
continuation/liquidation decisions would accrue to all claimants. By allowing the bank to call the loan 
only when costly verifiable information suggests that the firm is in trouble, long-term debt with covenants 
forces the bank to observe the private signal. Of course, if the public signal is very imprecise (as for very 
young firms), even a bank with short-term debt will monitor; conversely, if the public signal is very 
precise, costly monitoring is unnecessary, and the firm can rely on publicly-held arm’s-length debt. These 
results are consistent with the fact that firms that rely on long-term privately-placed debt tend to be larger 
and older than firms that rely on relatively short-term bank debt, whereas both types of firms tend to be 
smaller than firms that issue public debt. 
Gorton and Kahn (2000) explore a different aspect of the dynamic nature of bank loans. Suppose 
that an entrepreneur who borrows money may engage in two forms of moral hazard: as in Rajan (1992), 
he may continue the firm when liquidation is more efficient, and he may also choose to increase the 
firm’s risk in continuation even though this increase in risk is costly. There are situations where it is better 
to forgive some of the debt so as to deter additional risk-shifting rather than forcing liquidation, but this 
requires that the debt be held by a single lender so as to allow renegotiation. Even with a single bank 
lender, short-term debt may lead to excessive liquidation, and so it may be better to give the bank long-
term debt with limited ability to call the loan early. The upshot is that, for bank debt, initial terms are not 
set to price default risk but rather are set to efficiently balance bargaining power in later renegotiation, 
and renegotiated interest rates may not be monotonic in firm risk. 
Yet another strand of research has focused on how the need for bank monitoring affects the mix 
of bank debt and public debt and the allocation of maturity or seniority between these two groups of 
creditors. One early paper on this topic is Besanko and Kanatas (1993). As in Rajan (1992), entrepreneurs 
require outside financing, which then reduces their incentive to exert effort. A bank can force the 
entrepreneur to exert effort (“monitor”) at a cost that is increasing in the effort level desired, but such 
monitoring is not contractible. Since the bank chooses monitoring levels without considering the   40 
entrepreneur’s cost of effort, it is optimal to use some public debt as a way of reducing the bank’s claim 
on the firm and thus its incentive to monitor excessively. 
Besanko and Kanatas say little about the relative priority or maturity of bank and public creditors. 
A starting point for this topic can be found in the work of Diamond (1993a,b) and Berglöf and von 
Thadden (1994). In these papers, splitting a firm’s financing into a short-term senior component and a 
long-term junior component creates a credible threat of liquidation: the firm’s value in liquidation may be 
enough to satisfy short-term senior debtholders even if junior claimants would prefer to let the firm 
continue. An appropriate mix of short-term senior debt and long-term junior debt balances credible 
liquidation threats against actual inefficient liquidation in a way that either forces the firm to avoid risk-
shifting (Berglöf and von Thadden) or minimizes the firm’s total cost of capital (Diamond).  
Although Diamond (1993b) argues that an active monitor should hold short-term senior debt and 
focus on deciding when to liquidate the firm, none of these papers explicitly analyze monitoring 
incentives. It is not immediately clear that active monitors should be senior; if a senior secured creditor’s 
claim is safe regardless of what happens to the firm, the creditor will have no incentive to monitor. 
Models of costly state verification such as Winton (1995b) suggest that the investor with greatest 
monitoring skills or lowest costs should be most junior and thus monitor more often, and indeed, venture 
capital and other private equity funds hold relatively junior claims and monitor intensively.  
On the other hand, bank loans are often secured, hence senior to other debt. If banks are active 
monitors, it follows that their security cannot make them completely safe. Rajan and Winton (1995) show 
that giving the bank collateral can improve monitoring incentives if the collateral’s value is sensitive to 
inefficient continuation of the firm’s current business strategy. In this case, the bank must monitor the 
firm’s situation so that it can use the threat of calling the loan to force the firm to adopt a more 
conservative policy or even outright liquidation so as to preserve the value of the bank’s collateral. 
Examples of collateral with this feature include inventory and accounts receivable, both of which may 
suffer drastic declines in value if the borrowing firm continues to run its operations inefficiently. By 
contrast, a loan secured by real estate whose value was independent of the firm’s operations would give 
the bank little incentive to monitor.
20  
Although Rajan and Winton explore a mechanism where the bank’s taking of additional collateral 
signals to public creditors that the borrower is in trouble, they do not examine the implications that this 
has for the optimal mix of public versus private debt. Repullo and Suarez (1997) focus on this mix in a 
                                                 
20 Along similar lines, Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) show that if entrepreneurs have sufficiently high low-
risk collateral, similar considerations undermine banks’ incentives to screen good entrepreneurial projects from bad 
ones.  
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somewhat simpler setting. An entrepreneur borrows money now and exerts costly effort that increases his 
firm’s chance of eventual success; if it does not succeed, the firm is worth zero. If the firm is liquidated at 
an interim date, proceeds are less than the initial investment amount, but this may still be better than 
letting the firm continue if initial effort is too low and the chance of failure is high. For a fixed cost, an 
investor can commit to monitor the entrepreneur’s effort choice at this interim date.  
If liquidation values are low or the entrepreneur has sufficient investable wealth, uninformed 
finance (arm’s length debt or equity) is optimal. If liquidation values are high relative to the 
entrepreneur’s wealth, it is optimal to have a single investor (bank) monitor and hold short-term debt, 
forcing liquidation if the entrepreneur does not exert enough effort. For intermediate levels, however, 
giving the bank all of the firm’s debt does not achieve first-best effort: if the entrepreneur deviates 
slightly from this effort level, the bank’s share of future proceeds in success is high enough that it prefers 
to let the firm continue rather than forcing liquidation. In this case, giving junior debt to arm’s length 
investors restores the credibility of the bank’s liquidation threat by shrinking the bank’s share of future 
proceeds relative to its senior claim on liquidation proceeds. As liquidation value falls, the optimal mix of 
debt shifts towards public (junior) debt and away from private (senior) debt.  
A weakness with this model is that it requires that the bank can commit to monitoring. Without 
commitment, the bank would not monitor if it knew that the entrepreneur would choose first-best effort 
for sure, and this lack of monitoring would in turn reduce the entrepreneur’s effort incentives. Park (2000) 
examines monitoring choice when commitment is impossible. He shows that it is optimal to give the bank 
senior debt that is not fully collateralized, so that the bank is somewhat impaired when it forces interim 
liquidation. This gives the bank an incentive to monitor so that it only liquidates when liquidation is 
efficient. Even so, subject to this incentive constraint, it is best to use as little senior bank debt as 
possible; otherwise, as in Repullo and Suarez (1997), the liquidation threat is less credible. Note the 
contrast with the results of Besanko and Kanatas (1993). In Besanko and Kanatas, monitoring 
automatically forces the entrepreneur to exert effort, and the problem with too much bank debt is 
excessive monitoring. In Park, monitoring only forces effort through the liquidation threat, and too much 
bank debt undermines efficient liquidation. 
Longhofer and Santos (2000) provide another motivation for making banks senior to other 
creditors, one that combines monitoring incentives with active benefits from relationship lending. For 
relationship lending to have value, the bank must have incentive not only to monitor the borrowing firm’s 
situation but also to help the firm when times are bad but the firm is essentially sound, which is just when 
uninformed investors are unwilling to lend more money. If the bank had a junior claim, it might not be 
willing to advance the firm additional money in bad times. This is a version of the underinvestment 
problem of Myers (1977): in bad times, even senior creditors’ claims may be somewhat risky, in which   42 
case some of the benefit from the bank’s additional investment flows to the senior creditors. If the bank is 
senior, it internalizes this benefit and is willing to lend in bad times.  
These theories of public and private debt are consistent with a number of stylized facts: bank 
loans tend to be secured and relatively short-term, public debt is more likely to be subordinated or 
relatively long-term, etc. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little empirical work on the detailed 
implications of these theories. As noted in Section II, James (1995, 1996) finds that, for firms in financial 
distress, banks generally do not make concessions unless public debt holders do, and banks typically 
make fewer concessions than public debt holders. This is consistent with the view that banks hold more 
senior claims and are tougher negotiators than public, more junior debt holders.  
Other empirical work has focused on how the mix of public debt and bank debt varies with firm 
characteristics. As noted above, Houston and James (1996) find that firms that rely on a single bank use 
more public debt as growth opportunities are larger, which is consistent with the view that firms with 
lower tangible assets (and thus liquidation value) should use more public debt. Although Houston and 
James find that the opposite relationship holds for firms with multiple banks, they note that multiple 
banks are a step in the direction of public, diffusely-held debt. Johnson (1997) finds that the proportion of 
firm debt held by banks is greater as the firm has a lower market to book value ratio, which again is 
consistent with a positive link between public debt and growth opportunities. He also finds that smaller 
and younger firms use more bank debt, consistent with the notion that banks focus on firms with 
relatively greater information costs. In a study of initial public debt offerings, Datta, et. al. (2000) find 
that the negative average stock price response to these offerings is mitigated for firms with higher growth 
opportunities. Since such offerings reduce the fraction of financing provided by bank debt, this too is 
consistent with the notion that firms with fewer tangible assets should use more public debt. On the other 
hand, one could argue that this is simply a case where having well-known positive NPV projects mitigates 
the “lemons”-type announcement effect of issuing securities. 
The upshot is that many of the complexities found in actual loan contracts – seniority, collateral, 
covenants – can be motivated as mechanisms for fine-tuning the bank’s monitoring and control incentives 
as a function of firm characteristics. The same applies to the mix of (concentrated) bank debt and (diffuse) 
public debt. 
 
C.   Beyond Lending: Equity Stakes, Board Seats, and Monitoring 
Thus far, we have assumed that banks only make loans, i.e., they do not hold equity. Although 
this is generally the case in the U.S., other countries have allowed banks to hold equity, Japan and 
Germany being well-known examples. Moreover, as James (1995) shows, U.S. banks have been allowed 
to take equity as a consequence of loan restructuring, and in many cases they hold these stakes for a   43 
considerable time after the restructuring. Banks may also gain power over firms by proxy voting of shares 
that the banks hold in trust.
21 Finally, even in the United States, bank officers may sit on the board of 
directors of firms to which they lend. In this subsection, we discuss research on how a bank’s relationship 
with a borrower is affected by having the bank hold shares, vote proxies, or occupy board seats.
  
At first glance, allowing banks to hold equity has several potential advantages. In a discussion 
piece, Stiglitz (1985) argues that, although institutional shareholders might have goals more aligned with 
value-maximization, their shareholdings are usually too small to give them much direct control. By 
contrast, banks have a lever of control that an institution holding 1% of a firm’s shares does not have – 
namely, the ability to refuse to renew loans. Since lenders get at most a fixed payment (interest plus 
principle), they care little about a firm’s upside and much more about its downside. To the extent they 
exercise control over management, they will focus on avoiding bad outcomes; moreover, for large firms 
with extremely low chances of default, banks may simply do nothing. If banks hold significant equity 
stakes along with their loans, then they would care more about maximizing overall firm value. 
John, John, and Saunders (1994) examine this issue in a simple model of firm risk-taking. If a 
bank’s loan covenants give it effective veto power over the borrower’s choice of project risk, then 
allowing bank holdings of equity does improve the efficiency of the borrower’s risk choice; the intuition 
is precisely that of Stiglitz. The downside is that, because all else equal equity is riskier than debt, and 
because the firm chooses a higher (albeit more efficient) level of risk, holding equity increases the bank’s 
overall portfolio risk. Thus, allowing banks to hold equity may exacerbate costs linked to bank failure.
22 
Mahrt-Smith (2000) shows that bank holdings of equity have another advantage: they can reduce 
the hold-up problem analyzed in Rajan (1992). In Mahrt-Smith’s model, a firm that has already received 
funds from an informed inside bank needs financing for additional investment. As in Rajan, the Winner’s 
Curse faced by outside banks gives the inside bank informational rents which in turn distort the firm’s 
investment decisions. If the inside bank holds both debt and equity, then any debt that outside banks 
provide is senior to the inside bank’s equity claim. The more the inside bank’s claim consists of equity, 
the more senior and so the less risky are the outside banks’ claims. Less risk means less sensitivity to 
information, diminishing the Winner’s Curse problem faced by the outside banks. Thus, having the inside 
                                                 
21 Although voting shares held in trust is typically associated with German banks (see Gorton and Schmid, 2000), 
Haubrich and Santos (2002) show that modern-day U.S. bank trust departments also have significant voting powers. 
22 On the other hand, if the bank is a relatively passive investor, John, John, and Saunders show that letting the bank 
hold equity is more likely to reduce the risk of both the firm and the bank. The intuition follows Green (1984). If the 
bank holds only debt, the firm’s controlling shareholders engage in some risk-shifting, so firm risk and thus the 
bank’s loan risk are inefficiently high. Equity lets the bank share in the firm’s upside potential, diminishing the 
controlling shareholders’ gains from risk-shifting. Santos (1999) pursues the implications that this has for optimal 
regulation, and finds that regulation restricting bank equity holdings is either not binding or inefficient.   44 
bank hold equity reduces the informational rent earned by that bank. The caveat is that, as in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), greater use of external equity finance reduces the amount of effort that the firm’s owner 
exerts, and so there is a cost to having the firm’s inside bank hold equity. Because the ability to reduce the 
outside bank’s risk is tied to the firm’s need for additional funds, bank equity holdings are most attractive 
for financing firms with high growth potential.  
Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996) focus on how a bank’s shareholdings in a firm affect potential 
collusion between the bank and the firm against the interests of other nonequity stakeholders. Bank debt 
is assumed to be senior to the stakeholders’ claims, and the firm and the bank observe an interim signal of 
the firm’s situation, whereas the stakeholders do not. If the signal is good and the firm is really healthy, 
the firm and the bank may collude to convince stakeholders that the firm is distressed and concessions are 
required from creditors; these unnecessary concessions boost the firm’s profits. The bank finds this 
attractive only if its equity share of the increase in profits offsets the concessions it must make on its debt. 
This puts a cap on the optimal amount of equity the bank can hold. On the other hand, if the firm is really 
distressed and concessions are required to prevent costly bankruptcy, the bank and the firm may collude 
to convince the stakeholders that the firm is healthy. This is a problem when deadweight bankruptcy costs 
are small, so that the bank prefers its senior claim on net bankruptcy proceeds to making concessions. In 
this case, having the bank hold some equity subordinates part of its claim to the stakeholders and rules out 
the bank’s incentive to collude. 
One caveat to Mahrt-Smith (2000) and Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996) is that subordinating 
the bank’s loans accomplishes the same ends as having the bank hold equity. Indeed, in Mahrt-Smith’s 
model, subordinated debt dominates equity because it does not cause under-exertion of effort by the 
firm’s owner. Berlin, John, and Saunders suggest that the bank may not be able to credibly subordinate its 
debt claim because it could always take additional collateral when the firm’s position begins to 
deteriorate. This would be most applicable to firms with many collateralizable assets. All else equal, such 
firms also tend to have lower bankruptcy costs, so this is consistent with their prediction that bank equity 
holdings are most useful for firms with small bankruptcy costs. 
A more far-reaching objection to these models is that, even in countries where banks are 
permitted to hold equity, bank portfolios overwhelmingly favor loans over shareholdings. Santos (1998) 
finds that, as of year-end 1995, bank shares and equity participations were less than five percent of bank 
assets in a number of developed countries, including the G7. Germany, Japan, and Switzerland topped the 
list with shareholdings at 4.8%, 4.6%, and 4.9% of total bank assets, respectively.
 23 Large banks in these 
                                                 
23 Because these numbers include equity investments in financial firms, some of which may be unconsolidated 
affiliates, Santos’ numbers may overstate the extent of bank shareholdings in unaffiliated firms.   45 
countries had somewhat greater shareholdings, but even in Germany (the highest), shareholdings for large 
banks were only 6.3% of assets. Moreover, Mahrt-Smith and Berlin, John, and Saunders motivate bank 
shareholdings as a way to resolve frictions between a well-informed inside bank and uninformed 
outsiders, yet there is evidence that bank shareholdings tend to focus on the shares of large, publicly-
traded firms, where such information asymmetries should be smallest. For example, Saunders and Walter 
(1994) report that, in 1989, German banks as a group held only .6% of all industrial firms’ shares, but 
roughly 5% of the top 100 firms’ shares. Thus, there must be some countervailing friction that weighs 
against bank shareholdings in general and bank shareholdings in smaller firms in particular. 
Winton (2001) motivates these patterns as responses to banks’ liquidity considerations. When a 
bank seeks funding to meet unexpected withdrawals, loan takedowns, and so forth, there is some chance 
that this funding must be explicitly or implicitly backed by the bank’s claims on firms that it monitors. 
These are precisely the assets on which the bank has more information than its providers of funds have, 
giving rise to an adverse selection problem. In equilibrium, the bank prefers to let some liquidity needs go 
unmet, creating liquidity costs. Because, all else equal, equity is more risky, hence more exposed to inside 
information, than debt, the bank can minimize adverse selection costs by holding debt rather than equity. 
Of course, the bank can hold some equity without having a high chance that it will have to use these 
assets as backing for funding, but the bulk of its claims on firms that it monitors should be debt. 
Similarly, because the bank’s information advantage is smallest for large, publicly-traded firms, holding 
equity in these firms leads to fewer adverse selection costs. Finally, to the extent that larger banks are 
better diversified against individual customer liquidity needs, they are less likely to face very severe 
liquidity needs, so they are able to hold more equity as a fraction of assets. 
Thus far, our discussion has focused on the impact of bank shareholdings in terms of cash flow 
rights: Stiglitz, Mahrt-Smith, and Berlin, John, and Saunders emphasize shares’ junior status and their 
claim to the firm’s potential upside, and Winton focuses on the higher risk and thus information-
sensitivity that these features create. Shares’ voting rights provide banks with control rights over and 
above those associated with bank loans, and a bank with a significant equity stake in a firm may be 
pivotal in proxy or takeover contests. Such control rights can be amplified beyond the bank’s actual 
shareholdings if it uses stock pyramids to concentrate its voting power, or if it can exercise the votes of 
shares that it holds in trust for investors. Moreover, whether through shareholdings or through their role 
as lenders, banks may use their influence to win seats on a firm’s board of directors. We conclude this 
segment with a discussion of research on these issues. 
There has been relatively little theoretical research on how the additional control rights possible 
through shares or board seats affect optimal contracting between a bank and its borrower.  By contrast, 
such modeling is very common in work on venture capital, where, in contrast to bank loans, contracts   46 
typically provide far more control rights and far more upside via equity or conversion features.
 24 
Although there has been little work on the circumstances in which venture capital financing dominates 
traditional bank lending, von Thadden (1995) is a partial exception: he does not explicitly model debt 
versus equity lending contracts, but he does show that giving delegated monitors significant control rights  
and claims on a firm’s cash flow “upside” is optimal in circumstances that resemble venture capital.  
In von Thadden’s model, an entrepreneur chooses between short- and long-term projects. Interim 
returns reveal information about the project’s innate quality, and this is the only information about project 
quality that the entrepreneur and arm’s-length investors receive. There are cases where long-term projects 
are ex ante optimal, yet the firm has a high chance of poor interim returns and should be liquidated if 
these occur. Short-term arm’s-length finance implements such liquidation, but it may cause the 
entrepreneur to myopically prefer the short-term project, which has a higher chance of good interim 
returns. By monitoring at a cost, a “bank” can get clearer information on the firm’s eventual chance of 
success, avoiding inefficient liquidation based on interim returns alone and achieving first-best results. 
The contract that implements the first-best outcome is a long-term contract that gives the “bank” total 
control over project continuation but requires that the bank compensate the entrepreneur whenever the 
interim return is poor, even if the project is then liquidated.  
There are two critical ways in which this model differs from “standard” models of bank control 
such as Rajan (1992). First, the “bank” can learn information that even the entrepreneur does not have. 
Second, monitoring is optimal for projects that are very likely to be (optimally) liquidated, yet have a very 
small chance of producing very high returns. It follows that the “bank” gets most of its return in unlikely 
but very high return states. Both features resemble venture capital settings: the venture capitalist typically 
has more financial and general business expertise than the entrepreneur, and most target firms do poorly 
and are terminated but a few offset this by doing very well. Nevertheless, von Thadden does not model 
the “bank’s” incentives to monitor, nor does he allow for intermediate levels of monitoring that would 
correspond to bank lenders being less informed than venture capitalists but better informed than arm’s-
length investors. The choice between bank loans and venture capital remains largely unmodeled. 
Empirical work on bank control rights through shareholdings and board seats typically focuses on 
two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, it is possible that these additional control rights enhance 
bank’s ability to control firm agency problems in a positive way. On the other hand, because a bank’s 
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shareholdings are typically small relative to its loans to and other dealings with a firm, the bank may 
emphasize policies that help it at the expense of shareholders as a group.
25  
Findings depend critically on the economic and institutional environment in which banks operate. 
Examining German banks in 1975 and 1986, Gorton and Schmid (2000) find that banks use their 
shareholdings and board representation to improve firm performance. They find little evidence that banks 
use their voting powers for shares held in trust, whether for good or bad. Gorton and Schmid also find that 
banks’ use of control is more beneficial than that of a nonblank blockholder. This suggests that bank 
blockholders are less likely to emphasize private benefits that harm shareholder value, perhaps because 
banks’ “private benefits” take the form of loans, which do benefit from improved firm performance. 
Similar results are found by Kaplan and Minton (1994), who find that Japanese banks are more likely to 
get seats on a firm’s board following poor performance by the firm, and that turnover of incumbent top 
executives increases in the year of the appointment. On the other hand, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and 
Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) find that Japanese firms with a main bank relationship tend to 
have lower growth and profitability and pay higher interest rates than firms without such relationships, 
and the effects tend to rise with the fraction of shares held by the main bank. Although the results on 
growth might be due to selection bias (banks prefer to hold more shares in more stable firms), the results 
on interest expense suggest that banks are not entirely innocent of pursuing private benefits of control. 
By contrast with these results, Kroszner and Strahan (1999, 2001) find that U.S. banks are more 
likely to sit on the boards of firms that are large and stable, have high proportions of tangible assets, and 
rely little on short-term financing. Although these firms are more likely to borrow from a bank that has 
seats on their board than from other banks, this does not seem to alter loan terms: the terms do not differ 
significantly from those of loans that the same bank makes to similar firms whose board it does not sit on. 
Kroszner and Strahan interpret this as evidence that U.S. legal doctrines such as equitable subordination 
and lender liability discourage banks from sitting on boards of firms that have high expected costs of 
financial distress, and from sitting on boards of informationally-opaque firms where conflicts of interest 
might be easier to hide, hence more tempting.
26 
 
                                                 
25 This is a variant of the corporate governance concern that shareholders with more voting power than cash flow 
rights tend to pursue private benefits of control rather than enhancement of shareholder value. See the discussion 
and references in “Corporate Governance and Control,” by Becht, Bolton, and Roell (this volume). 
26 Under equitable subordination, a bank that is found to have exercised managerial control over and above what any 
arm’s length lender might do may have all its claims subordinated to those of other creditors. Lender liability allows 
creditors to sue the bank if it has exercised such control. Berlin and Mester (2001) show that these features can be an 
optimal way of getting a large investor to both monitor and try to assure good outcomes for the firm as a whole – if a 
court finds that the investor misused its private information and control rights, it is subordinated and so penalized.   48 
D.   Banking Sector Structure and Lending 
We now turn to research on how banking sector structure interacts with banks’ role as delegated 
monitors of borrowing firms. This research largely falls into two broad and overlapping areas: the role of 
scale economies or diseconomies in monitoring, and the role of economies of scope in monitoring.
  
Much of the literature on scale economies in monitoring focuses on the role of diversification. In 
the early work on delegated monitoring discussed in Section II, a better-diversified bank is better able to 
resolve the agency concerns of its own investors, giving it a funding advantage. Since fixed costs of 
monitoring or evaluating borrowers are at the heart of these models, it follows that, rather than 
diversifying by making smaller loans to more borrowers, it is cheaper to diversify by keeping loan size 
fixed and lending to more borrowers. For this reason, larger banks should find it cheaper to diversify than 
small banks, giving them an efficiency advantage. 
The early papers did not go much beyond this insight. In Diamond (1984), a single bank is 
examined in isolation; in Boyd and Prescott (1986) or Williamson (1986), infinite numbers of perfectly 
diversified banks compete perfectly. Also, all of these papers assumed that all loans are stochastically 
independent of one another, and that the marginal cost of monitoring additional loans is constant, so that 
infinitely-diversified banks offer depositors risk-free investments. In reality, there are only finite numbers 
of different borrowers, default risk across loans is partly systematic (defaults rise in recessions), and 
larger banks may face various diseconomies of scale. All of these issues have been the focus of later 
research into banking sector structure. 
Yanelle (1989, 1997) and Winton (1995a, 1997) focus on how the finiteness of the economy 
affects equilibrium banking sector structure. As Yanelle (1989) notes, one immediate problem is that 
when finite numbers of banks compete for finite numbers of depositors and borrowers, the paradigm of 
perfect Bertrand (price) competition is not reasonable. To see why, suppose that two banks are 
competing; one offers a lower lending rate than the other, but the bank with the higher rate has offered a 
higher rate on its deposits and is expected to capture the deposit market. All else equal, a borrower that 
chooses the bank with lower lending rates might find itself at a bank without any funds to lend. If 
everyone expects this to be the case, the bank with higher rates may end up capturing the market.  
A related feature of these models is the existence of multiple equilibria. This is due to “adoption 
externalities,” where a depositor’s or borrower’s utility from a given bank’s offered rates depends on how 
many other depositors and borrowers plan to use that bank. To see this, suppose that two banks compete 
and offer the same deposit and lending rates. If the market splits (the classic Bertrand outcome), both 
banks will have equal size and diversification. Now suppose instead that a number of depositors “switch” 
from the first bank to the second, and that several borrowers at the first bank anticipate this and also 
switch so as to get funding. If this occurs, the second bank is better diversified than the first, and to the   49 
extent that the second bank is now less likely to fail, its depositors are better off. Anticipating this, more 
depositors (and thus firms) may also want to switch to the second bank. Thus, if agents can coordinate, 
one bank should dominate. On the other hand, if they cannot coordinate, the market-splitting outcome is 
also possible.
27 These adoption externalities mean that agents’ beliefs about how other agents will react to 
a given set of bank rates have dramatic effects on equilibrium outcomes, leading to multiple equilibria.  
Winton (1995a) looks at bank structure when agents can freely become investors, banks, or firms, 
after which banks compete for deposits and loans simultaneously. There are usually multiple equilibria, so 
without coordination there is no guarantee that the most efficient outcome will emerge. If a single bank is 
most efficient and regulators charter one bank to attain this, the monopoly bank might exploit its power so 
greatly that direct lending without banks is preferable. This is least likely to be a problem when 
monitoring costs are high; intuitively, this is when direct lending is most likely to cause credit rationing 
(Williamson, 1986) or even autarky, so that the reduction in monitoring costs through delegation to the 
monopoly bank is most attractive.
28 
Both Yanelle (1997) and Winton (1997) address the problem of multiple equilibria in models 
where numbers of firms and investors are fixed exogenously. Yanelle (1997) assumes that fixed numbers 
of banks compete for each side of the market sequentially, and applies game-theoretic equilibrium 
refinements such as coalition-proofness and evolutionary stability. Outcomes depend on which side of the 
market “moves” first. When banks compete for loans first, multiple banks can coexist and earn positive 
profits in equilibrium. The coalition-proof equilibrium has the maximum feasible number of banks 
coexisting and earning zero profits, but this is not evolutionarily stable, so refinements do not yield clear 
predictions. If instead banks compete first for deposits, the coalition-proof outcome is evolutionarily 
stable. In it, heavy competition for deposits makes both deposit and lending rates Walrasian levels. At 
most one bank is active, capturing the market and earning zero profits. Since higher deposit rates increase 
banks’ chance of default and associated costs, it is possible that direct lending is preferable to delegated 
monitoring, in which case banks compete themselves out of existence.
29 
Rather than use “standard” single-period equilibrium refinements, Winton (1997) examines 
which investor beliefs are most plausible at different stages of a banking system’s development. Early on, 
                                                 
27 Since a single depositor’s wealth cannot finance an entire firm, switching by a single depositor does not increase a 
bank’s effective lending capacity, and market-splitting is a Nash Equilibrium. 
28 Yosha (1997) also examines tradeoffs between diversification and competition, but his focus is on Cournot 
competition among risk-sharing intermediaries that resemble mutual funds more than banks. 
29 The difference between the “loans-first” and “deposits-first” results is caused by Yanelle’s assumption that 
deposits are in excess supply. Winton (1997) focuses on competition for deposits when loans are in excess supply, 
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banks are not yet well established, and investors can only coordinate on banks via the rates that banks 
offer. Here, free entry tends to the maximal number of small, fragile banks. Although a larger, better-
diversified bank that pays somewhat lower deposit rates would be best, the only way for banks to achieve 
this profitably is to lower their rate from the competitive equilibrium – a move that is unlikely to attract 
depositors to an untried bank. Over time, some banks fail, and investor beliefs begin to focus on the 
survivors in the sense that, all else equal, they expect the survivors will maintain their market shares. This 
creates an endogenous barrier to entry: expecting incumbent banks to be better diversified than new 
entrants, depositors are willing to accept lower deposit rates from incumbents. Barriers to entry and 
smaller numbers of surviving banks both promote collusive outcomes.
30 Evidence from this history of 
relatively unregulated banking regimes is consistent with these conclusions. 
Up to this point, our discussion has assumed that a larger, better-diversified bank is always 
potentially more efficient than a smaller, less-diversified bank. There are several reasons why this may 
not be true. As noted in Section II, Krasa and Villamil (1992a,b) show that the combination of increasing 
costs for monitoring larger banks and nondiversifiable risk lead to an optimal bank size; Winton (1995a) 
shows that a banker’s own limited capital can reduce expected costs of monitoring, which is most 
beneficial for smaller banks. Cerasi and Daltung (2000) focus on a third possibility, which is that the 
marginal cost for monitoring additional loans may be increasing. Again, the motivation stems from an 
individual banker’s limited resources. Because any one banker has limited time and attention, his or her 
cost of monitoring additional loans increases with the number of loans already being monitored. Even if 
the bank creates a hierarchy of bankers monitoring other bankers, greater size should lead to more layers 
of monitoring and thus higher costs per loan. Since the diversification benefit from an additional loan 
diminishes as bank size grows, this cost structure leads to a finite optimal bank size. Although Cerasi and 
Daltung focus on the case where loans are stochastically independent, it is clear that any systematic loan 
risk will reinforce the effect of their scale diseconomy. 
Another objection to these models is that, whereas they all assume that diversification is a passive 
function of bank size, in practice, diversification is to some extent a choice variable. For example, in 
1982, Continental Illinois was one of the ten largest banks in the U.S., yet roughly 20% of its loan 
portfolio was in the energy sector – a fact that proved nearly fatal when oil prices dropped precipitously 
that year. To the extent that depositors cannot observe loan concentrations in timely fashion, banks may 
be tempted to choose a more concentrated and risky portfolio than depositors initially expected: 
                                                 
30 Deposit insurance reduces this barrier to entry, since depositors will no longer care as much (if at all) about a 
bank’s chance of failure. Applying deposit insurance early on leads to even greater entry, fragmentation, and 
fragility, but fairly-priced insurance applied to a system that is already concentrated can be beneficial: by threatening 
incumbents with entry, deposit insurance can reduce their ability to sustain collusion.   51 
shareholders gain from increased upside, while increased downside is shared with depositors because of 
limited liability. In a single-period setting where depositors cannot observe bank portfolio choice before 
risk is resolved, Hellwig (1998) shows that the bank will concentrate risk as much as possible. Even 
though depositors anticipate this and charge a higher rate as compensation, some diversification benefits 
are lost; indeed, if all funds can be concentrated on a single (large) borrower, delegated monitoring is 
completely undermined. 
In a more dynamic setting, matters are less stark. As Marcus (1984) first showed, future rents or 
quasi-rents reduce a bank’s incentive to take on more risk now, since higher risk means a greater chance 
of failure and loss of future value. Besanko and Thakor (1993) embed this in a model that combines 
active choice of diversification across two loan sectors with future relationship rents along the lines of 
Petersen and Rajan (1995). If bank competition increases, banks earn lower relationship rents and 
generally have more incentive to concentrate their portfolios.
31  
Winton (1999) suggests that risk-shifting via loan concentration per se may not be the biggest 
problem in banking in developed economies. If loans are relatively illiquid and it is difficult to change 
loan concentrations very quickly, investors are able to get some information about loan concentrations 
and adjust deposit rates accordingly before the loans mature and the outcome of risk shifting is realized. 
This gives banks some ability to commit to diversification strategies: loan concentrations will be detected 
before the bank can exploit depositors, so more “virtuous” strategies will be rewarded with lower deposit 
rates, and vice versa. By contrast, loan monitoring is more difficult to observe in a timely fashion, which 
may let a bank shift risk simply by not monitoring its loans.  
This possibility does not arise in the previous papers on diversification because they model 
monitoring as ex post costly state verification that can be committed to up front. As we have seen, a more 
realistic view is that the bank must have incentives to monitor, and monitoring is useful because it lets the 
bank intervene before matters deteriorate too greatly – it is proactive. In other words, monitoring must be 
done ex ante and it is mostly of use when a borrower is in bad shape ex post. Similarly, banks’ ex ante 
screening activities (e.g., Boyd and Prescott (1986)) seek to avoid making bad loans. In both cases, the 
emphasis is on avoiding or ameliorating bad outcomes. This is in contrast to most nonfinancial firms, 
where firms’ actions may also seek to improve good outcomes. Loans have limited upside, and the 
emphasis is on avoiding downside.  
It follows that a bank that does not monitor saves the cost of monitoring but makes bad outcomes 
worse or more likely. Since credit risk is correlated across loans in a given sector, the ex post gains from 
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Nevertheless, as Hellwig’s (1998) analysis shows, even with risk-sensitive deposit rates or insurance premiums, 
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monitoring are greatest when a loan sector is in a downturn. If the chance of troubled loans is very low 
when the sector is doing well (as for many commercial loans), not monitoring loans is a form of risk 
shifting. In good times, the bank saves monitoring costs and does not have many more defaults; in bad 
times, the bank is more likely to fail, leaving its debtholders with much of the worse performance. In this 
case, diversifying across sectors can improve monitoring incentives; diversification reduces the dispersion 
of the bank’s loan returns (monitored or no), decreasing the gains to risk shifting. On the other hand, if the 
risk of troubled loans is so high in good times that monitoring pays for itself even then (as might be the 
case for credit card loans), monitoring incentives are strong even if the bank focuses on a single sector.
32 
Winton argues that this may be one reason why Continental Illinois’ focus on “Rust-Belt” and energy 
sector commercial loans was accompanied by lack of monitoring and eventual failure, whereas 
specialized credit card banks such as CapitalOne or MBNA had strong monitoring skills and cultures that 
withstood repeated sector downturns in the 1990s.  
Since diversification is in part a matter of choice as well as a passive function of size, it follows 
that the decision to diversify rather than specialize will depend on the presence of scope economies as 
well as scale economies. The role of scope economies in monitoring and bank sector structure began with 
models of spatial differentiation, where transportation or other distance costs give local banks an 
advantage over more distant rivals. As Besanko and Thakor (1992) note, “local” advantage in the lending 
market need not be geographic; a bank with a lending focus on one industry or sector may be more 
effective in making loans to that sector than rivals whose focus is somewhat different.
33 
Both Besanko and Thakor (1992) and Gehrig (1995) use spatial models to examine the impact of 
increased entry on overall welfare and bank risk. In both papers, banks, firms, and depositors are located 
equidistantly around a “circular” economy of constant size. In Besanko and Thakor, an exogenous 
increase in the number of banks increases competition for both deposits and loans, making depositors and 
firms better off and bank shareholders worse off. The increase in deposit rates also increases the amount 
of deposits in the system and reduces bank capital ratios, increasing banks’ chance of failure. Gehrig 
improves on this analysis in two ways. First, he endogenizes entry, and shows that entry can be either 
excessive or insufficient relative to the social optimum. Second, whereas Besanko and Thakor assume 
                                                 
32 If there are deadweight costs to bank failure (such as ex post verification), diversification may still be attractive, 
but it is also possible that diversification can actually increase the bank’s chance of failure for plausible levels of 
leverage. This occurs because loan returns are highly skewed to the left: there is a high chance loans pay off in full, 
and a low chance that they are troubled and produce losses. If losses in a sector downturn are high but the chance of 
a downturn is sufficiently low, a diversified bank may fail if any sector it is exposed to has a downturn, whereas a 
specialized (one-sector) bank only fails if its sector has a downturn. 
33 There is a great deal of evidence that the pricing of small loans and retail deposits does in fact vary regionally 
within the U.S.; see for example Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992).   53 
that downturns affect all locations at once, Gehrig assumes that downturns hit an economic region of 
random size and location. Since larger banks are less likely to have their whole portfolio suffer a negative 
shock, they are less likely to fail. Increased entry tends to increase the risk of bank failure by shrinking 
bank size, and so increased incidence of regional shocks make entry less attractive, all else equal. 
Matutes and Vives (1996) use a simpler spatial model to examine the impact of deposit insurance 
on bank competition and diversification. Two banks compete for deposits, which they then invest; 
depositors face distance costs, and larger banks are less likely to fail. As in Yanelle (1989, 1997) and 
Winton (1995a, 1997), there are multiple equilibria. Deposit insurance eliminates multiple equilibria and 
increases the supply of deposits, but increases the probability of bank failure and associated costs. The 
positive effects tend to dominate negative effects when uninsured banks would be local monopolies (some 
depositors don’t use either bank); the opposite is true when uninsured banks would serve the entire market 
and compete directly. 
Another approach to scope economies focuses on explicit information differentials between banks 
that are competing for the same borrowers. The first paper to address this is Broecker (1990).  He shows 
that when banks get imperfectly-correlated binary signals about a borrower’s quality, whichever bank gets 
the borrower’s business knows that other banks were likely to have received more negative signals – a 
version of the “Winner’s Curse.” As there are more banks bidding for a given pool of borrowers, the 
equilibrium probability that some bank will accept a given borrower increases, and so the average quality 
of actual loans goes down. Riordan (1993) takes this a step further by examining continuous signals. He 
finds that, as the number of banks increases, banks apply more conservative acceptance standards, but the 
overall percentage of bad loans granted still increases. 
We have already seen another implication of the Winner’s Curse in the work of Sharpe (1990), 
Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (forthcoming): banks that are better informed about a given borrower 
have a comparative advantage over uninformed banks, enabling them to earn rents. Dell’Ariccia, 
Friedman, and Marquez (1999), Marquez (2001), and Dell’Ariccia (2000) explore how this affects 
banking sector structure. In Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), two banks compete, first offering rates to all firms 
that they do not have relationships with, then offering rates to their existing customer bases. The Winner’s 
Curse gives each bank an advantage over its existing customers that are in good shape. Because 
Dell’Ariccia et al. assume that banks cannot distinguish between naturally unattached firms and “lemons” 
that have left their existing bank, the bank with smaller customer base faces relatively more adverse 
selection when competing for new business. As a result, the smaller bank breaks even on new business, 
and the larger bank earns higher overall profits. Moreover, if a third bank with no market share tries to 
enter the market, it loses money in equilibrium; the Winner’s Curse is a barrier to entry. Marquez (2001) 
shows that entry is easier as borrower turnover is higher (so that the pool of unattached firms has   54 
relatively fewer “lemons”) or as entrants’ ability to screen is higher. Dell’Ariccia (2000) endogenizes 
entry and market shares by incorporating a spatial setting in which firms face “distance” costs of 
borrowing. He shows that the equilibrium number of banks under free entry decreases as information 
asymmetries increase; intuitively, this worsens the Winner’s Curse problem faced by entrants. 
Since informational rents can lead to ex ante effort distortions as per Rajan (1992), it might be 
welfare improving if banks could commit to share their information. In fact, credit bureaus provide just 
this function and are becoming widespread. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that lenders’ incentives to 
join such an information-sharing arrangement are greater as there is more borrower heterogeneity, as 
borrowers are more mobile, and as the lending market is larger – all of which tend to increase adverse 
selection problems. Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that such information sharing intensifies competition 
by reducing Winner’s-Curse effects, reducing effort distortions as well. Nevertheless, the higher effort 
makes lenders better off, so it is possible that banks participate despite the loss of potential rents. In 
addition, when default information is shared, borrowers may further increase their efforts so as to avoid 
defaulting and being labeled a bad credit risk (Padilla and Pagano, 2000).
34  
In these papers, a bank’s screening ability is innate and any signals that it receives are free. Some 
recent work has sought to endogenize banks’ screening or monitoring ability. Thakor (1996) and Ruckes 
(1998) endogenize the probability with which banks engage in costly screening, and focus on how this 
interacts with macroeconomic conditions. We will return to their work in the next subsection. Gehrig 
(1998) examines the impact of integrating two previously separate monopoly banking markets when 
banks can choose their costly screening technologies’ Type I and Type II error probabilities. Although 
integration may increase rate competition in a beneficial way, entry may be blocked as in Dell’Ariccia et 
al. (1999); if so, each bank focuses exclusively on its “home” market. Also, in some cases, integration 
reduces banks’ investment in screening, reducing overall welfare. 
Boot and Thakor (2000) focus on banks’ decision to invest in expertise that differentiates them 
from their competitors. Firms can get “transaction” loans in which the bank simply lends and takes 
borrower quality (default chance) as given, or “relationship” loans in which the bank monitors at a cost 
and has some chance of improving the return of firms that would otherwise fail. Because relationship 
loans are assumed to be a differentiated product, increases in competition between banks undermine rents 
                                                 
34 Gehrig and Stenbacka (2001) raise an important caveat to these results. Just as in switching-cost models in the 
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on transaction loans relatively more than rents on relationship loans. As a result, banks invest less in 
relationship expertise, but more of their loans are relationship loans.
35 
In Boot and Thakor (2000), both interbank competition and relationship expertise are modeled in 
reduced form. Hauswald and Marquez (2000) endogenize these features and get a richer set of 
implications for bank strategy choice. In their model, banks are spatially differentiated and can make 
unscreened “transaction” loans or make screened “relationship” loans. Screening ability deteriorates as 
the “distance” between bank and borrower increases. Banks can improve their screening ability by 
investing in “sector” expertise that is location-specific or in “transferable” expertise that reduces the 
negative effects of distance. As in Boot and Thakor (2000), as costs of entry decline and more banks 
enter, transaction lending decreases and relationship lending increases; however, banks invest less in 
transferable expertise and more in sector-specific expertise. Thus, greater entry makes banks compete less 
heavily in peripheral lending markets, freeing up resources which are used to bolster their position in their 
core lending markets.
36 
Because all of these models of differential information focus exclusively on expected loan 
returns, they ignore how differential information affects bank risk. Winton (1999) addresses this issue. 
Just as effective monitoring or screening reduces the potential downside of loans, weaker or monitoring or 
screening skills exacerbate this downside. As a result, a bank diversifying into sectors where it lacks 
expertise faces greater downside risk from this sector, offsetting the potential benefits of risk 
diversification. Moreover, this increased downside risk can undermine the bank’s incentive to monitor not 
only loans in the new sector but in the bank’s core sector as well. Indeed, a number of well-known large 
banks that aggressively diversified during the 1980s found themselves with poor loan performance in 
many sectors, Citicorp being a case in point. 
The general thrust of these theoretical papers on banking sector structure and monitoring is that 
the assumption that perfectly-diversified-and-perfectly-competitive banks form quickly and efficiently is 
overstated. Even if diversification offers scale economies, competitive forces may lead to high entry and 
fragmentation in the early stages of a banking system. Diseconomies of scale and informational 
economies of scope make slower diversification or even a strategy of specialization attractive. To the 
extent that a bank does want to expand, the results on Winners-Curse-type barriers to entry suggest two 
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decrease in this cost has the opposite effect as an increase in interbank competition: bank lending rents and the total 
number of bank loans fall, reducing entry into banking; this makes relationship expertise more attractive. 
36 In a related vein, Almazan (2002) examines banks’ specialization decisions in a spatial model, where monitoring 
is more expensive the further a borrower is from the bank. Because capital improves bank monitoring incentives, 
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strategies. One is to focus on lending types or sectors where the entrant bank has the least disadvantage 
relative to incumbents; an example is Citicorp’s successful expansion of credit card lending in East Asia 
in the 1990s, which exploited Citicorp’s technological advantages vis-à-vis local banks in credit scoring 
and information systems.
37 An alternative strategy is to acquire banks that are already established in 
unfamiliar sectors, effectively buying lending expertise; drawbacks are that the acquiring bank may find 
itself buying banks that are “lemons,” and the acquiring bank may find it harder to monitor its lenders in 
such unfamiliar sectors. 
There are many empirical papers on these issues, mostly focusing on the impact of bank size and 
diversification on lending and loan portfolio risk. This in turn is somewhat subsumed in the even larger 
literature on bank efficiency. Rather than survey the efficiency literature in detail, we present highlights 
here, and refer the interested reader to the surveys by Berger and Mester (1997), and Berger, Demsetz, 
and Strahan (1999). Essentially, throughout the 1980s, studies tended to find few significant scale 
economies in banking past banks of moderate size; however, more recent studies (such as Berger and 
Mester, 1997) have found significant scale economies for banks of sizes as high as $25 billion. One 
possibility is that advances in technology have led to significant advantages for large banks; a case in 
point is credit card operations, which benefit from specialized expertise in credit scoring, account 
servicing, and customer information retrieval. A second possibility, which we explore below, is that larger 
banks are better diversified and can invest more of their assets in risky loans rather than safer but less 
profitable cash and government securities. 
That larger U.S. banks do take on more risk is beyond doubt; see e.g. Boyd and Graham (1991), 
Chong (1991), Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997), Demsetz and Strahan (1997), and Hughes, Lang, 
Mester, and Moon (1999). Whether or not this is wholly due to greater risk-bearing capacity or to 
exploitation of deposit insurance and “too-big-to-fail” is less clear. Boyd and Graham (1991) present 
evidence that, in the 1970s and 1980s, a higher percentage of large banks failed than of small banks, 
suggesting that banks may have gone beyond the exploitation of scale economies of diversification. 
Examining publicly-traded U.S. banks during 1980-1993, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that larger 
banks’ stock returns have less firm-specific risk, and that banks that are more diversified (both by loan 
sector and by geographic region) have lower firm-specific risk. Nevertheless, up through 1991, larger 
banks’ total stock return variance was no less than that of smaller banks, suggesting that larger banks took 
on more risk to offset diversification advantages. Hughes et al. (1999) estimate a structural model of the 
decisions of risk-averse bank managers. They find that geographically-diversified banks gain both in 
efficiency and in reduced “insolvency risk” (standard deviation of return on equity normalized by 
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expected gross return on equity). Together with Demsetz and Strahan’s results, this may indicate a 
reduction in large bank’s risk-taking behavior in the 1990s. On the other hand, Winton (1999) notes that 
bank loan portfolio risk is highly-skewed to the left, with losses peaking during infrequent downturns. 
Thus, risk measures such as variance which work well for normal distributions may not perfectly capture 
bank failure risk, especially if the sample does not include a major downturn. 
Another focus of the bank-size literature has been whether larger banks are less likely to lend to 
small firms. There are several overlapping motivations here. One focuses on diseconomies of monitoring 
more loans, as per Cerasi and Daltung (2000); if this is true, larger banks may prefer to focus their lending 
on large firms, since this requires fewer loans per dollar of assets. Since larger firms tend to be better 
diversified than smaller firms in the same industry, this need not reduce overall diversification very much, 
and saves on costs. An alternative argument is that large organizations favor the use of “hard” 
information; this may favor lending to large firms, since more information is publicly-available for them. 
Finally, large firms may prefer large banks simply because the level and complexity of their financial 
needs is beyond the capacities of a small bank or small group of small banks. 
Again, a full discussion of the literature is beyond the scope of our paper, so we report highlights 
and refer the reader to Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) for references not otherwise given. The 
general finding is that large banks focus more on larger firms, and small banks on small firms. Thus, a 
number of U.S. studies find that small loans are a smaller fraction of total assets at large banks than at 
small banks. Berger and Udell (1996) find that small firm loans at large banks have significantly lower 
rates and collateral requirements than those at small banks. Since a number of studies suggest that higher 
collateral goes along with more risky borrowers, this is consistent with the idea that large banks focus 
more on relatively safe, “transparent” small firms, while small banks take on the riskier, “opaque” small 
firms which require greater monitoring. Most U.S. studies find that mergers among larger banks reduce 
small business lending; Sapienza (2000) finds similar results following mergers of Italian banks. 
Conversely, recent studies of de novo U.S. banks find that these small banks focus more on small loans 
than do established banks of similar size, which is consistent with entry aimed at filling the financial 
needs of small firms that have been abandoned by large-bank mergers.  
We now turn to empirical evidence for scope economies linked to geographic or sector focus. 
Generally, in contrast to the findings for expansion within the U.S., there is evidence of geographic 
barriers to entry when banks expand internationally. This makes sense, since international cultural, legal, 
and informational differences are much greater than regional differences within the U.S. Berger, 
DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000) survey this literature, and provide a more comprehensive test by 
examining the efficiency of banks from a number of countries in five different “home” countries (France, 
Germany, Spain, U.K., U.S.). Home country banks are generally more efficient than foreign banks, but   58 
when the foreign bank is from the U.S., matters are usually reversed. Berger et al. interpret this as 
evidence that at least some U.S. banks are simply superior and able to more than overcome geographical 
barriers to entry. On the other hand, the sample may have been relatively favorable for foreign expansion: 
the “home” countries are relatively advanced economies, where informational barriers may be relatively 
less severe, and the sample period is from the mid-1990s, a relatively recession-free period.
38 
Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2001) examine the impact of commercial loan diversification on 
the profitability and risk of Italian banks. Consistent with models of specialization advantages, they find 
that diversification across industries reduces average returns and increases levels of doubtful or 
nonperforming loans. The effect of geographic diversification is mixed. Although such diversification 
generally hurts returns, for banks whose loans have moderate levels of risk, it actually improves returns 
slightly and reduces risk. This is consistent with the model of Winton (1999), which suggests that 
diversification is most likely to improve monitoring incentives when loans have moderate levels of risk. 
Indirect evidence for economies of scope and specialization advantages is provided by DeLong 
(2001), who finds that stock market reaction (bidder plus acquirer) to mergers between U.S. banks is only 
positive for mergers between banks with similar sector focus or geographic scope. This is consistent with 
the bulk of research on nonfinancial mergers from the 1980s on, which find that focusing mergers add 
value whereas diversifying mergers tend to destroy value. 
Finally, there is evidence that Winner’s-Curse effects can be significant. Shaffer (1998) finds that, 
consistent with Broecker (1990) and Riordan (1993), loan loss rates are higher in local U.S. markets with 
more banks. He also finds that, during every year from three to nine years after founding, de novo banks 
have loan loss rates that are significantly worse than those of the average bank. Since de novo banks are 
required to have experienced bank management and are often started by an existing bank holding 
company, Shaffer argues that this is due to the Winner’s Curse rather than lack of basic lending skills. 
To summarize, research on the industrial organization of the bank lending sector suggests caveats 
to the initial models of delegated monitoring. Because of inherent adoption externalities, laissez-faire 
banking need not quickly lead to a competitive, well-diversified banking sector. Informational problems 
such as the Winner’s Curse can compound this problem by creating endogenous barriers to entry; 
conversely, scope economies tied to specialized monitoring expertise may make “well-diversified” loan 
portfolios suboptimal. 
                                                 
38 At a more micro level, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) examine lending in Argentina and find that smaller 
borrowers are less likely to borrow from foreign banks, especially those headquartered outside Latin America. Since 
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E.   Credit Cycles and the Effect of Bank Funding on Lending 
The papers we have discussed in this section typically focus on microeconomic concerns such as 
the nature of interactions between bank and borrower or the structure of the banking sector. We now 
briefly discuss work that focuses on how such microeconomic concerns can interact with macroeconomic 
business conditions. Given the vast literature on this subject, our approach is selective, aiming at key 
points and a few illustrative papers. This also leads us to a discussion of papers that examine the 
interaction between a bank’s funding and lending activities, since some have argued that this is a critical 
source of business cycle effects.   
In principle, effects can flow both from business conditions to bank lending decisions and vice 
versa. Worsening business conditions will clearly increase the risk of many potential borrowers, making 
banks more conservative (“broad lending channel”). To the extent that bank borrowers tend to be smaller 
and riskier than firms that access public debt markets, bank-dependent borrowers may be hit harder by 
higher interest rates or worsening business conditions, and bank lending may fall further than public debt 
borrowings. Conversely, if banks are an important source of funds for firms and consumers, bank-specific 
shocks that make banks more conservative will reduce borrowers’ ability to invest or consume, and again 
this will hit bank-dependent borrowers hardest (“bank lending channel”). Thus, the evidence that the ratio 
of bank loans to public debt drops more when monetary policy is tight (see e.g. Kashyap, Stein, and 
Wilcox, 1993) is consistent with both models. 
Since it seems likely that both channels occur in practice, and that there is feedback between 
them, we will ignore the perennial debate in the macroeconomic literature on which of these channels is 
more important than the other. Instead, we will discuss models that illustrate how these two effects come 
about and empirical evidence on these effects. 
The simplest view of how worsening business conditions affect bank lending is that of Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989, 1990): worsening business conditions hurt borrowers’ net worth, increasing agency 
costs that lenders such as banks face. Since loans are less attractive, fewer loans are made, and rates on 
any loans that are made are higher to compensate for higher costs of distress. Thus, the presence of 
agency costs exacerbates business cycles.  
Although this focuses on the monitoring view of bank lending, Ruckes (1998) shows that similar 
results obtain when competing banks screen potential borrowers. Intuitively, screening does two things: it 
avoids making a bad loan, and (if the borrower is good) the screening bank has an information advantage 
over rivals that have not screened that borrower. When times are good, the chance of bad borrowers is 
low and any information rents are small, so banks do not screen intensively. As the proportion of bad 
borrowers grows, banks at first screen more intensively; eventually, however, there are so many bad   60 
borrowers that banks screen few borrowers and make few loans. These endogenous screening effects 
make lending contract and expand more than it would in the absence of differential information.  
Whereas Bernanke and Gertler and Ruckes assume that banks are out to maximize loan value, 
Rajan (1994) motivates credit cycles through an agency problem between bank managers and their 
investors. Suppose bank managers vary in their lending ability: only poorly-run banks have bad loans in 
expansions, but all banks have bad loans in recessions. In expansions, poorly-skilled managers have 
incentives to renew bad loans so as to hide their incompetence; in recessions, they liquidate bad loans 
because good banks can also have bad loans, so liquidation does not send a signal of their ability. The 
upshot is that banks have overly loose lending standards during expansions. One caveat to this argument 
is that it assumes that the relative difference in loan quality between poorly-run banks and well-run banks 
is highest in expansions. It seems more likely that normal recessions create more difficulties for weaker 
borrowers, which should then hit poorly-run banks harder than well-run banks. 
By focusing on problems within banks, Rajan’s work is also a step in the direction of “bank 
lending channel” models, which focus on how problems at banks can then spill over to their borrowers 
and thus the entire economy. This literature has two major strands: papers that focus on how a bank’s net 
worth (its level of equity capital) affects its lending behavior, and papers that focus on how adverse 
selection and other funding costs affect a bank’s ability to make loans. Since capital constraints would not 
be an issue if banks could raise additional equity at no cost, and costs related to adverse selection are a 
significant part of the costs of raising additional equity, the two strands are interrelated. We begin with 
bank capital effects. 
Thakor (1996) examines how changes in risk-based capital requirements affect bank lending 
decisions when it is costly to screen borrowers. Because equity capital is assumed to be more expensive 
than deposits, an increase in risk-based capital requirements makes loans less attractive on the margin 
relative to risk-free securities. As a result, higher capital requirements tend to reduce banks’ willingness 
to screen and thus to lend. Conversely, banks that are more constrained by capital requirements are less 
likely to lend than are their less-constrained rivals. 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) obtain similar results in a model of agency costs between borrowers 
and lenders. Firms are more likely to engage in risk-shifting as their net worth declines. Banks can 
prevent this via monitoring, but because banks borrow money from other investors, they too may engage 
in risk-shifting by not monitoring. As in Thakor (1996), banks with more capital monitor borrowers more   61 
intensively, allowing banks to credibly lend more. Thus, the link between capital shocks and lending 
depends critically on whether the net worth of nonfinancial firms or of banks is most affected.
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Whereas Thakor and Holmström and Tirole assume that bank managers are fully aligned with 
their shareholders’ interests, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) distinguish between insider shareholders and 
external shareholders. Raising external equity capital dilutes bank insiders’ incentives to monitor loans – 
another variant of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency problem between managers and outside 
shareholders. In some cases, the reduction in monitoring more than offsets the additional “cushion” 
against bank failure that the additional capital provides; thus, that higher bank capital requirements can 
sometimes increase the risk of bank failures. Although these results are striking, they seem most 
applicable to small banks, where issuing additional equity can substantially dilute top management’s stake 
in the bank. In a large bank such as Citigroup, even a relatively small stock or option-based stake can 
leave management with significant risk in absolute terms, and it seems less likely that issuing equity will 
significantly affect top management’s incentive to monitor loans effectively. 
Diamond and Rajan (2000) also incorporate external equity capital, using their “bank fragility” 
model (see Section II) as a base. Recall that, in their model, short-term deposits limit the rents a bank 
manager can extract, but bank failure is costly because the bank manager’s expertise is lost. Because it is 
junior to deposits, external equity cushions the bank against costly failure; however, shareholders have a 
weaker bargaining position than depositors and allow the bank manager to appropriate rents when the 
bank does not fail. It follows that, as the probability of good loan returns increases, the optimal level of 
bank capital falls. Also, because banks that are more capital-constrained face a greater risk of failure, their 
threat to liquidate borrowers is more credible, and they liquidate cash-constrained borrowers more often. 
By contrast, capital-constrained banks may find that their ability to extract cash now out of cash-rich 
borrowers is weakened, depending on the relationship between the firm’s current cash flows, its 
liquidation value now, and its liquidation value in the future. 
Diamond and Rajan’s results are heavily influenced by their use of a Hart and Moore (1998) 
“incomplete contracts” setting, where everything is observable but only liquidation values are verifiable. 
Thus, “good loan returns” are linked to high firm liquidation values rather than high firm cash flows per 
se. As we have argued, banks may have private information that outside investors do not have. Also, in 
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developed economies such as the U.S. or Japan, banks may be able to attach borrower cash flows. In this 
case, a capital-constrained bank may have incentive to squeeze cash out of small borrowers without much 
access to alternative funding sources; conversely, the bank may let a large, cash-constrained borrower 
with low liquidation value continue in the hope that its cash flows recover before outside investors realize 
the extent of the bank’s (or the firm’s) problems. Thus, Diamond and Rajan’s results may be most 
applicable to economies where legal and institutional safeguards are less advanced. 
Note that all four of these papers suggest that higher bank capital tends to increase lending, but 
whether this is good or bad depends on whether or not bank managers are aligned with bank shareholders. 
In Thakor (1996) and in Holmström and Tirole (1997), higher capital improves banks’ monitoring 
incentives and thus the quantity of loans banks can credibly make. In Besanko and Kanatas (1996) and 
Diamond and Rajan (2000), higher capital loosens banks’ lending standards, but this has either a bad 
(Besanko and Kanatas) or mixed (Diamond and Rajan) impact on credit quality. 
A large empirical literature has examined the link between bank capital and lending. Much of this 
work stems from the debate over whether implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord’s capital standards 
caused a “credit crunch” in the U.S.. Sharpe (1995) surveys this literature and finds that, overall, evidence 
suggests that bank profitability has a positive effect on loan growth, whereas loan losses have a 
significant negative effect on loan growth.
40 To the extent that higher profits increase capital and higher 
losses decrease it, this is consistent with banks cutting back lending when capital is low, but it is also 
consistent with banks cutting back lending when low profits or high losses suggest that loans will be less 
profitable going forward. In a more recent study, Beatty and Gron (2001) estimate a structural model of 
U.S. banks’ simultaneous choice of asset growth and capital growth during the period from 1986 to 1995. 
They find that, for banks whose capital to assets ratio is in the bottom decile, increases in capital go with 
higher risk-weighted asset growth or higher initial levels of risk-weighted assets, and vice versa. (Risk-
weighted assets weight loans most heavily.) For other banks, these relationships are less significant.  
Several studies have examined firm-specific effects of bank capital levels. Thakor (1996) finds 
evidence that announcement of a bank loan commitment causes the borrower’s stock price to increase 
significantly, which is consistent with bank screening activity. For the largest quartile of loan 
commitments as a fraction of bank capital, the increase is greater when the bank’s capital is lower, which 
is consistent with such banks being more choosy about making large loans. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia 
(1999) find that banks with weaker capital levels charge borrowers higher rates, even controlling for 
borrower risk characteristics. The effect is significant only for borrowers that are small and unrated, or 
whose loans are priced over prime, all of which proxy for firms with high informational switching costs.  
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The picture painted by these findings is most consistent with Thakor (1996) and Holmström and 
Tirole (1997): as capital levels fall, banks become more conservative. The findings of Hubbard et al. 
(1999) suggest that informational frictions as in Rajan (1992) are also important. The caveat is that these 
findings all come from recent studies of U.S. banks. As noted above, in other countries, different 
institutional settings may favor models where bank moral hazard becomes more severe as capital falls. 
We return to the issue of bank moral hazard in Section IV below. 
We now turn to papers that examine how adverse selection costs affect bank lending behavior. In 
these models, banks’ private information about their loan portfolios leads them to face adverse selection 
costs when they seek funds by selling loans or by issuing uninsured liabilities or equity. Stein (1998) 
shows that, on the margin, these costs lead banks to prefer to fund loans by either selling off liquid 
securities that they hold or else issuing insured deposits. Tighter monetary policy reduces bank reserves 
and thus the amount of insured deposits banks can have. Since uninsured liabilities involve adverse 
selection costs, banks that have fewer liquid securities to draw on for cash cut back on lending. To the 
extent that smaller banks are less diversified across loans, their private information about loans matters 
more and they face greater adverse selection costs; thus, such banks should cut back lending more. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) find evidence of such behavior: during monetary contractions, small banks 
with lower securities holdings do cut back on lending significantly more than their more liquid rivals. 
Ostergaard (2001) examines how lending at the U.S. state level and finds that loan supply in states with 
many small banks depends positively on banks’ internal cash flows, whereas this is not true for states 
with few small banks.
41  
To sum up, there are a number of models that suggest that banks’ monitoring or screening 
incentives can intensify credit cycles, both through changes in the external lending environment and 
through changes in banks’ internal capital and funding situations. Empirical evidence from the U.S. 
suggests that negative shocks to bank capital have effects over and above any worsening of borrowers’ 
conditions and that these effects are strongest for low-capital banks. Similarly, costs associated with non-
core deposit funding also constrain bank lending, with the effects being strongest for small banks.  
 
IV.    Banking Panics and the Stability of Banking Systems 
A key question about financial intermediaries is whether they are inherently unstable, that is, 
prone to banking panics?  Some researchers believe that a theoretical model of the existence of financial 
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downturns, bank loans are more risky because borrowers’ chance of default is higher. This increases adverse-
selection costs associated with equity or uninsured liability funding, again making banks more conservative about 
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intermediaries must simultaneously be a model of panics; banks and panics are inherently intertwined and 
models should reflect this.  Whether this is the correct view or not clearly is at the root of public policies 
towards banks.  In this section we first review the historical evidence on the experience of banking 
systems with respect to panics.  This experience is quite heterogeneous, even though all these systems 
have banks offering the same asset and liability contracts.  We also review the international experience 
with private bank coalitions.  Private bank coalitions are a widespread feature of banking systems, though 
their roles vary greatly.  In some systems they act as lenders-of-last-resort, while in others they are much 
less important.  A great deal of research has been conducted on the economic history of various banking 
systems in different countries and different periods.  Theories of banking panics should be seen in light of 
this research.  We then review the theoretical models that have been proposed as explanations of banking 
panics.  In the final subsection we briefly review the literature on bank regulation, including deposit 
insurance and capital requirements. 
 
A.   Definitions of Banking Panics and the Relation of Panics to the Business Cycle 
A great deal of confusion surrounds the notion of a banking panic.  One problem is the definition.  
There is a fairly broad range of phenomena that some researchers seem to have in mind.  These are 
described by a number of terms, such as “financial crisis,” “contagion,” “banking crisis,” “bank run,” and 
“banking panic,” that are somewhat unclear.  Many of the events being referred to are situations in which 
banking systems are weakened due to shocks, but nothing happened corresponding to a banking panic, as 
defined below.  It is not that such broader phenomena are uninteresting or unimportant.  The issue is first 
of all what exactly happened in these “crises” and then secondly whether such events are inherently 
related to the structure of bank contracts and bank capital structures.  Another problem is researchers’ 
narrow focus on the U.S. experience and, in particular the Great Depression in the U.S.  Many theorists 
cite Sprague (1910) as providing a description of the phenomenon they are interested in explaining and 
then proceed to develop a theory.  Indeed, Sprague does describe U.S. panics, but those experiences 
appear to be a somewhat special, compared to the experiences of most other countries 
With respect to a definition of a panic, it is difficult to be precise.  It is tempting to define a panic 
in terms of an increase in the currency/deposit ratio, but because of bank suspensions of convertibility this 
is not accurate.  Also, depending on the period over which the decline is defined, there can be large 
increases in this ratio without a panic having occurred.  For these reasons precise definitions have not 
been used.  Bernanke and James (1991), for example, express skepticism about this approach.  Instead, 
definitions rely on a reading of the historical literature.  Calomiris and Gorton (1991) define a banking 
panic as an event in which bank depositors at all or many banks in the banking system suddenly demand 
that banks convert their debt claims into cash, to such an extent that banks suspend convertibility.  In   65 
other words, if the depositors of a single bank suddenly demand cash in exchange for their deposits, this 
is not system-wide event.  It may be called a “run,” but it is not a banking panic.  In reality, however, 
panics in the U.S. tended to spread spatially and suspension happened in some cities before other cities, 
and sometimes not at all.  Such considerations make precise definitions hard.  A similar definition is 
given by Wicker (1996): 
… we define a banking panic to be an exogenous shock whose origins can be found in any sudden 
unanticipated revision of expectations of deposit loss accomplished by an attempt to substitute 
currency for checkable deposits, a situation usually described as a run on the banks.  A general loss of 
depositor confidence distinguishes a banking panic from other episodes of bank failures.  A transfer 
of deposits from weak to strong banks during a bank run without any change in the public’s 
preference for currency does not qualify. (p. 17) 
 
These definitions have in common the feature that a panic is a systemic event in which consumers want to 
hold currency in exchange for their demand deposits.  The structure of the banking contract allows such 
withdrawals from banks by consumers, and these withdrawals, or attempted withdrawals, is the 
precipitating event.
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  Applying the definition to Pre-Federal Reserve history in the U.S. is not easy.  Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991) identify six panics in the United States prior to 1865, seven during the National Banking 
Era, and finally the Great Depression (discussed below).  Table 3 shows the business cycle chronology 
and the dates of the panics in the United States during the National Banking Era.  Prior to the National 
Banking Era, there were panics in 1814, 1819, 1837, 1839, 1857, and 1861 (see Calomiris and Gorton 
(1991)).  After the National Banking Era ends, with the founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1914, 
there were the panics associated with the Great Depression.  Sprague (1910) labels 1873, 1893, and 1907 
as major panics.  Kemmerer (1910) identifies six major panics and fifteen minor panics between 1890 and 
1908.  Kemmerer’s major panics include 1873, 1893, and 1907, but he adds 1899, 1901, and 1903.  
Wicker (2000) agrees on 1873, 1893, and 1907, and calls 1884 and 1890 “incipient” panics.  The point is 
that there is no consensus about the events that should be called “panics” in the U.S. prior to the founding 
of the Federal Reserve System.  While there are common elements, corresponding to the definition, each 
episode has some unique features.  There are important papers on some individual panic episodes, e.g., 
Wicker (1980), Donaldson (1993), Moen and Tallis (1992), Calomiris and Schweikart (1991), and White 
(1984).  Wicker (2000) details each of the U.S. episodes. 
Definitions of other crisis phenomena abound.  An older literature links problems with the 
banking system to broader events and the business cycle, e.g. Fisher (1932), but is not specific about the 
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details.  Similarly, Bordo (1986) lists what he describes as “key elements of a financial crisis.” One of the 
key elements listed is “bank runs precipitated by … threats to solvency” (p. 191).   But, there are many 
other elements listed as well suggesting a link between panics and the macroeconomy.   Grossman (1994) 
argues that historically “banking crises” included one of three elements: (1) a high proportion of banks 
failed; (2) an especially large or important bank failed; or finally, (3) that government intervention 
prevented the failures associated with (1) or (2).  There are many other examples of attempts at 
definitions.  For the most part, the same events are identified. 
There are some notable features to Table 3.  First, the table shows the proximity of the panic to 
the last business cycle peak.  The timing of the panics in the U.S. prior to the National Banking Era is 
similar; see Calomiris and Gorton (1991).  The percentage change in pig iron production is a measure of 
real economic activity.  As might be expected, the currency deposit ratio rises sharply in a panic.   
Remarkably, the losses on deposits and the fraction of (national) banks failing during panics are very 
small.  This is due to the activity of private bank clearinghouses, discussed below.  It is, however, worth 
emphasizing that the actual historical experience of panics, small losses on deposits and few bank 
failures, seems at odds with the widely-held view of panics, mostly based on the experience of the U.S. 
Great Depression. 
In the twenty-five year period following World War II banking crises all but disappeared.  Bordo 
and Eichengreen (1999) find only one banking crisis between 1945 and 1971 in their sample of twenty-
one industrial and emerging market countries.  In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the International 
Monetary Fund counts fifty-four crises in member countries between 1975 and 1997, and the World Bank 
lists a larger number (see IMF (1998), and Caprio and Klingbiel (1996) for World Bank estimates).  In the 
case of recent international banking “crises” it seems difficult, at least so far, to determine whether these 
events are panics or whether the banking systems suffered severe losses due to macroeconomic shocks.  
Five recent studies, for example, all offer different definitions of a “banking crisis.”  See Caprio and 
Klingbiel (1996), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detraiache (1998), Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu (1997), Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999), and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996).  Caprio and Klingbiel (1996) is the root 
study for many of the lists of crises.  Basically, their definition focuses on loan losses and the extent to 
which the net worth of the banking industry has eroded.  If most or all of the capital in the banking system 
is gone, then there is a crisis.   
It is clear that there are situations in which a banking system faces a common shock of sufficient 
magnitude to bring the soundness of the banking system into question.  For example, the U.S. savings and 
loan debacle of the 1980’s (see e.g., Brumbaugh (1988), Kane (1989), Barth (1991), and White (1991)), 
and the current situation of the Japanese banking system, were caused by deregulation (see Hoshi and 
Kashyap (1999)).  These events may be called “crises,” but there were no banking panics involved.  A   67 
systemic shock to the banking system, whether it is part of a broader macroeconomic downturn or 
exchange rate shock, or a shock specific to the financial sector, do not obviously call into question the 
contractual design of financial intermediation.  Nevertheless, these crises raise a number of issues about 
banks, which are discussed further below. 
Despite the large number of “crises” it seems that bank panics and bank runs (on individual 
banks, but not systemic) have been relatively rare.  But, this is due to a rather narrow definition of 
“panic.”  Recent history suggests that “panic” and bank crisis” are rather difficult to distinguish, and 
certainly more research is needed.  Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) provide the most extensive study; 
they analyze all IMF member countries from 1980 to 1995.  By their definition 133 member countries of 
the 180 members experienced “crises” or significant problems in the banking sector during the period.
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Their analysis then focuses more specifically on 34 countries (19 developing economies, eight transition 
economies, and seven developed economies).  They single out 36 cases of banking crises.  In this sample 
there were seven cases of panic.  The study highlights the difficulties in distinguishing “panics” from 
other phenomena.  Indeed, unlike nineteenth century America, banking “crises” or “panics” may well be 
more complicated now by depositor beliefs about implicit or explicit deposit insurance.  Thus, although it 
is tempting to say that the definition of a “banking panic” is ultimately an empirical matter, the 
phenomena of interest are very complicated and seem likely to vary for many reasons, not the least of 
which is data availability, making any definition problematic.  Nevertheless, some important empirical 
regularity has been found.  We turn next to this evidence. 
It appears that there is an important business cycle component to the timing of panics.  Gorton 
(1988), studying U.S. panics, provides evidence that panics come at or near business cycle peaks.   See 
Table 3.  Mishkin (1991) summarizing the findings of his study states that “with one exception in 1873, 
financial panics always occurred after the onset of a recession” (p. 96).  Also, see Donaldson (1992).  In 
the recent international context Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study a large cross section of 
countries during the period 1981-1994 and also find that banking crises are more likely to occur with the 
onset of recession.  Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) also find that banking crises of the modern era are 
related to the business cycle. 
In terms of U.S. history, a seasonal factor in the timing of panics is noted by Andrew (1907), 
Kemmerer (1910), Miron (1986), Canova (1991) and Donaldson (1992), among others, though Calomiris 
and Gorton (1991), and Wicker (2000), among others, dispute the evidence.  All these studies focus on 
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the U.S. experience.  While the timing of panics is, broadly speaking, clear, it is not clear that seasonal 
money demand shocks caused panics.  At root the problem is that there are a small number of panic 
observations.  Miron (1986) and Canova (1991) focus on interest rate movements and the inelastic supply 
of money in the period before the Federal Reserve System.  Miron attributes the deceased occurrence of 
financial crises after 1914 to Federal Reserve activities, because the Fed essentially smoothed out 
seasonal interest rate movements.  Canova argues that the decline in the seasonal pattern of interest rates 
to Fed activity has been overemphasized.  Miron, Mankiw, and Weil (1987) and Barsky, Miron, Mankiw, 
and Weil (1988) also compare the pre-Fed period with the post-Fed period with respect to interest rate 
behavior. 
 
B.    Panics and the Industrial Organization of the Banking Industry 
Another stylized fact about banking panics is summarized by Calomiris (1993a): 
International comparisons of the incidence and costs of banking panics and bank failures, and 
comparisons across regulatory regimes within the U.S., clearly document differences in banking 
instability associated with different regulatory regimes.  The central lesson of these studies is that 
instability is associated with some historical examples of banking that had common institutional 
characteristics; it is not an intrinsic problem with banking per se…. the single most important factor 
in banking instability has been the organization of the banking industry (p. 21). 
 
That the industrial organization of the banking industry is a critical determinant of the propensity 
for an economy to experience panics has been confirmed in a large literature on the historical and 
international experience of banking panics.  Bordo (1985, 1986), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), and 
Calomiris (1993a) survey much of this literature and provide some new evidence on the causes of panics. 
Calomiris (1993a) examined Scotland, England, Canada, Australia, and the U.S.  Bordo (1986) 
studies the experiences of six countries (U.S., U.K., Canada, Sweden, Germany, and France) over the 
period 1870 to 1933.  One of his conclusions is that most severe cyclical contractions in all the countries 
are associated with stock market crises, but not with banking panics, except for the United States.  He 
notes that: “In contrast with the U.S. experience, the five other countries in the same period developed 
nationwide branch banking systems consolidating into a very few large banks” (p. 230).  Bordo (1985) 
surveys banking and securities market panics in six countries from 1870 to 1933 and concludes that: “the 
United States experienced panics in a period when they were a historical curiosity in other countries” (p. 
73).  Grossman (1994) examines the experience of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the 
Great Depression to determine the causes of the “exceptional stability” exhibited by their banking 
systems.  He considers three possible explanations: the structure of the banking system, macroeconomic 
policy and performance, and the behavior of the lender of last resort.  He concludes that banking stability 
is the product of exchange-rate policy and banking structure.   69 
Cross section variation in the United States is also interesting because some states allowed branch 
banking and some states did not.  In the United States, states that allowed branching experienced lower 
failure rates in the 1920s and smaller banks were more prone to failure (see Bremer (1935) and White 
(1983, 1984)).  Studying this cross section of state experience, Calomiris (1990) reaches the same 
conclusion about the importance of branching: “States that allowed branch banking saw much lower 
failure rates- reflecting the unusually high survivability of branching banks… From 1921 to 1929 only 37 
branching banks failed in the United States, almost all of which operated only one or two branches.  
Branching failures were only 4 percent of branch-banking facilities, almost an order of magnitude less 
than the failure rate of unit banks for this period” (p. 291).  Wheelock (1992a) compares the experiences 
of banks in different states during the 1920s in the U.S. and finds that states that allowed branch banking 
had fewer failures.  Also, see Wheelock (1995).  Calomiris (1993a) reviews more evidence.
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The importance of industrial organization of the banking system for the incidence of panics is 
illustrated by a comparison of the U.S. experience with the Canadian experience, which has been the 
focus of research by a number of scholars.  The economies are similar and close in proximity, but Canada 
is a system that historically has consisted of a small number of highly branched banks, in contrast to the 
American system of many banks that are not branched across state lines, and sometimes not even within 
the state.  Haubrich (1990), Bordo, Rockoff, and Redish (1994, 1995), and White (1984), among others, 
have studied the two systems.  The contrast in experience is dramatic, as summarized by Bordo, Rockoff, 
and Redish (1994): “There is an immediate and important difference between the Canadian and United 
States banking systems.  The Canadian experience has been one of considerable stability.  There has been 
only one major bank failure sine World War I, and there were no failures during the Great Depression.  In 
contrast, the American system has been characterized by a number of periods of instability.  Rates of bank 
failures were high in the 1920s, and of course the entire system collapsed during the 1930s” (p. 325).  
Similarly, White (1984) writes: “In Canada, from 1920 to 1929, only one bank failed.  The contraction of 
the banking industry was carried out by the remaining banks reducing the number of their offices by 13.2 
percent. This was very near the 9.8 percent decline in the United States…In spite of the many similarities 
with the United States, there were no bank failures in Canada during the years 1929-1933.  The number of 
bank offices fell by another 10.4 percent, reflecting the shocked state of the economy; yet this was far 
fewer than the 34.5 percent of all bank offices permanently closed in the United States” (p. 132).
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C.    Private Bank Coalitions 
Bank coalitions, formal and informal, are an essential part of the industrial organization of the 
banking system.  The existence or nonexistence of coalitions, the extent of their activity, and their 
interaction with the government are related to the likelihood of panic and to the resolution of panics if 
they do occur. 
Banks are involved with each other because of the clearing of their liabilities.  Banks mutually 
hold claims on each other because of their depositors writing checks and the banks need mechanisms for 
efficiently netting these claims.  Historically, this led to the establishment of clearinghouses, joint 
associations of banks that had the purposes of organizing the netting of interbank claims.  But these 
coalitions developed into institutions with many more functions.  And, more generally, other types of 
coalitions, sometimes less formal, sometimes organized around a single large bank or even the 
government’s central bank, seem to characterize the banking systems of many countries in many different 
historical periods.  The extent to which these private bank coalitions exist, or existed historically, seems 
related to the industrial organization of the banking system and the incidence of bank panics. 
The U.S. experience with banking panics appears to be an outlier in that it experienced fairly 
regular panics during the 19
th century when few other economies did, as discussed above.  Until the last 
few years, there have been a very large number of rather small, undiversified banks in the U.S.  The 
research cited above suggests that these two facts are linked.  U.S. banking history has also been 
intertwined with the development of the private clearinghouse system.  Clearinghouses are private 
associations of banks that formed in major cities, spreading out across the country during the 19
th century.  
On the U.S. clearinghouse system see Andrew (1908b), Cannon (1910), Gorton (1984, 1985), Gorton and 
Mullineaux (1987), Timberlake (1984), Sprague (1910), Moen and Tallman (2000), and Wicker (2000), 
among others. 
The U.S. clearinghouse system developed over the course of the 19
th century.  In particular, the 
clearinghouses developed methods for coping with banking panics.  At first the clearinghouse organized a 
method of pooling or equalizing reserves.  Wicker (2000) argues that such action prevented panics in 
1860 and 1861.  By the end of the century they had invented a method of turning illiquid loan portfolios 
into private hand-to-hand money that could be handed out to depositors in exchange for their demand 
deposits during times of panic.  This money, called “clearinghouse loan certificates,” originated in the 
interbank clearing system as a way to economize on cash during a panic.  During a banking panic member 
banks were allowed to apply to a clearinghouse committee, submitting assets as collateral in exchange for 
certificates.  If the committee approved the assets, then certificates would be issued only up to a 
                                                                                                                                                             
that there was no banking crisis because of implicit support from the government.  This viewpoint is disputed by 
Carr, Mathewson, and Quigley (1995).  Also, see Kryzanowski and Roberts’ (1999) rejoinder.    71 
percentage of the face value of the assets.  The bank borrowing against its illiquid assets would have to 
pay interest on the certificates to the clearinghouse.  The certificates could then be used to honor 
interbank obligations where they replaced cash, which instead could be used to pay out to depositors.  The 
clearinghouse loan certificate process is the origin of the discount window (and is described in detail in 
the above cited sources), and serves the same function.  Notably, the loan certificates were the joint 
obligations of the clearinghouse member banks; the risk of member banks defaulting was shared by 
allocating member liabilities in proportion to member bank capital.  Thus, the certificates implemented a 
risk-sharing device, where the members jointly assumed the risk that individual member banks would fail.  
In this way, a depositor who was fearful that his particular bank might fail was able to insure against this 
event by trading his claim on the individual bank for a claim on the portfolio of banks in the 
clearinghouse.  This was the origin of deposit insurance.  In order for this to work, the clearinghouses in 
the U.S. developed bank examination and supervision methods, as well as reporting systems for bank 
information to be made public on a regular basis.   
During the Panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907 the clearinghouse loan certificate process was 
extended, in increasingly sophisticated ways, in a radical innovation.  In particular, the clearinghouse loan 
certificates were issued directly to the banks’ depositors, in exchange for demand deposits, in 
denominations corresponding to currency.  The amount of private money issued during times of panic 
was substantial.  During the Panic of 1893 about $100 million of clearinghouse hand-to-hand money was 
issued (2.5 percent of the money stock).  During the Panic of 1907, about $500 million was issued (4.5 
percent of the money stock).  See Gorton (1985).  If the depositors would accept the certificates as 
money, then the banks’ illiquid loan portfolios would be directly monetized.   
The U.S. clearinghouse system was not the only private central bank-like institution.  Before the 
U.S. Civil War, coincident with the beginnings of the clearinghouse system, the Suffolk Bank of 
Massachusetts was the focal point of a clearing system and acted as a lender-of-last-resort during the 
Panic of 1837.  The Suffolk banking system operated in New England from 1825 to 1858 and was the 
first region-wide clearing system in the U.S.  The Suffolk system was unique in using a net clearing 
system (see Rolnick, Smith, and Weber (1998a,b)).  Rolnick, Smith, and Weber (1998b) argue that during 
the Panic of 1837 the Suffolk Bank it essentially acted as a lender-of-last-resort.  Also, see Mullineaux 
(1987), Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Rolnick, Smith, and Weber (1998a, 1998b), and Bodenhorn (1998). 
Bank coalitions are also not unique to the United States, though the extent of their activities 
varies enormously across countries.  Most countries did not experience banking panics as frequently as 
the U.S., but there are many examples of bank coalitions forming on occasion in other countries as well.  
For example, the Clearing House of Montreal was maintained by the Canadian Bankers’ Association and, 
according to Watts (1972), was officially recognized in 1901 ‘as an agency for the supervision and   72 
control of certain activities of the banks’  (p. 18).   According to Bordo and Redish (1987)  “the Bank of 
Montreal (founded in 1817) emerged very early as the government’s bank performing many central bank 
functions.  However, the Bank of Montreal never evolved into a full-fledged central bank as did the Bank 
of England (or the government’s bank in other countries) perhaps because of the rivalry of other large 
Canadian banks (for example the Royal Bank).”  See Watts (1972), Haubrich (1990), and Breckenridge 
(1910). 
The pattern of the Bank of Montreal (and earlier precursors like the Suffolk Bank) in which the 
bank coalition is centered on one large bank, is quite common.  Another common feature is the 
cooperation of a (perhaps, informal) coalition of banks with the government to rescue a bank in trouble or 
stem a panic.  For example, major Canadian banks joined with the Canadian government to attempt a 
rescue of the Canadian Commercial Bank in March 1985.  See Jayanti, Whyte, and Do (1993).  Similarly, 
in Germany the Bankhaus Herstatt was closed June 26, 1974.  There was no statutory deposit insurance 
scheme in Germany, but the West German Federal Association of banks used $7.8 million in insurance to 
cover the losses. 
 
D.    Are Banks Inherently Flawed Institutions? 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), reviewed above, is the most important paper on banking panics.  
Recall that this model combines preference shocks for early or late consumption with investment 
opportunities that are long-term.  The model becomes one of banking panics with the additional 
assumption that depositors face a first-come-first-served rule, that is, a sequential service constraint.  The 
assumption of this rule, combined with the irreversibility of long-term investment, means that if all agents 
decide to withdraw at the interim date, then those in front of the line will receive more than those at the 
end of the line.  Consequently, a panic corresponds to an equilibrium in which agents believe, for 
whatever reasons, that other agents are intending to withdraw their deposits at the interim date.  Such 
beliefs are self-fulfilling because the best response to the belief that other agents are intending to 
withdraw is to withdraw oneself.  As Wallace (1988) points out, without the assumption of sequential 
service the model does not generate panics. 
The theory of banking panics in Diamond and Dybvig intuitively corresponds to what many view 
as an irrational element of banking panics.  The theory articulates the view that banks are inherently 
unstable arrangements.  The theory is silent on the issue of what kinds of events would cause agents to 
have beliefs that other agents are going to withdraw their deposits; the events are “sunspots.”
46   So, it is 
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not testable; see Gorton (1988).  Moreover, the “sunspots” have to concern all banks in a banking system, 
in order to generate a system-wide panic, rather than a run on a single bank.  The theory is consistent with 
the cross-country variation in panic incidence only in the trivial sense that some countries have had 
system-wide sunspots, while other have not. 
As an explanation of panics, the theory amounts to the assertion that the sequential service 
constraint is an inherent feature of reality.  This is clearly unsatisfying in the sense that the underlying 
reality that would give rise to the sequential service constraint is not modeled.  Recognizing this several 
researchers have tried to address this shortcoming. 
Wallace (1988) presents a model that rationalizes the existence of the sequential service 
constraint.  He assumes the basic Diamond and Dybvig set-up where consumers’ preferences are such that 
they need to have assets that can be “cashed” at optional times and where long-term investments are 
irreversible.  They key new assumption is that consumers are isolated in the sense that they cannot 
coordinate their withdrawals or the amounts the bank will give each of them upon withdrawal.   
Consumers know where the bank is located and so they can go withdraw.  But, their isolation means that 
at random times they will withdraw and there is no possibility for coordination.  Sequential service is an 
outcome of the assumption that people are isolated from each other at the interim date, the date at which 
they learn their preferences for early or late consumption.  As Wallace explains the assumption “…is 
consistent with the notion that people hold liquid assets because they may find themselves impatient to 
spend when they do not have access to asset markets, in which they can sell any asset at its usual price.”  
Wallace shows that the details of the model have implications for Diamond and Dybvig’s arguments 
about deposit insurance. 
In Wallace’s formulation, following Diamond and Dybvig, bank liabilities do not circulate as a 
medium of exchange.  Instead, when a consumer learns that he has preferences for early consumption, he 
withdraws from the bank to satisfy those needs.  There is no purchase of consumption goods using bank 
liabilities as money.  In the model, the bank is, in effect, also the store.  But, in cash-in-advance type 
models or search-theoretic models, consumers buy goods with bank liabilities without any need to return 
to the bank to withdraw.  This is the essence of a medium of exchange.  And that is how bank notes and 
bank deposits work.  While consumption smoothing, and the demand for consumption insurance, are 
likely important features of reality, it is not clear that consumption smoothing is really a meaningful sense 
in which bank liabilities are a medium of exchange. 
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) rationalize sequential service as an optimal contractual response to 
depositors being uninformed about the value of their bank’s assets.  This information can be produced, 
but at a cost. As discussed above, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) assume that information about the banker’s 
decisions must be produced at a cost.  Individual depositors who expend resources to produce the   74 
information will get into line to withdraw at the bank first.  The sequential service constraint, i.e., a first-
come-first-served rule, rewards those depositors in line first, so the information-producing depositors will 
recover more than other depositors.  (As noted above, Jean-Baptiste (1999) is also relevant here.) 
Green and Lin (1999, 2000) critique the Diamond and Dybvig model.  They argue that the 
Diamond and Dybvig deposit contract is one of the feasible arrangements in the environment of their 
model.  They argue that there are other arrangements that implement an efficient allocation without bank 
runs.  In particular, agents are allowed to send messages of their type, i.e., their consumption timing 
preferences, to the bank.  It turns out that truth-telling is a strictly dominant strategy.  Green and Lin do 
not argue that their contracts are necessarily realistic, but that “Our results imply that environmental 
features from which Diamond and Dybvig’s model abstracts are crucial to a full understanding of banking 
instability.” 
Reflecting its importance in the literature, there have been many extensions of the Diamond and 
Dybvig model.  Goldstein and Pauzner (1999) is an important one.  They address some of the more 
fundamental problems with the multiplicity of equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig’s model.  Agents, for 
example, do not consider the possibility of a run at the initial date when they deposit in the bank, so the 
subsequent date is not part of a rational expectations equilibrium.  As a result, it is not clear that the 
deposit contract is optimal.  Since there is no theory of selection from the multiplicity of equilibria, the 
theory is empirically vacuous.  Goldstein and Pauzner modify the Diamond and Dybvig model by 
assuming that consumers do not have common knowledge about the fundamentals; rather they only 
obtain private signals.  A private signal provides information about the final payoff on the bank’s 
portfolio.  But, the signal, though private, allows an agent to draw inferences about what signals other 
agents received.  If an agent receives a high signal, the agent believes that other agents are likely to have 
obtained high signals as well.  In this environment, there is a unique equilibrium and the probability of a 
bank panic is related to news about fundamentals and to the promised payoff on the demand deposit.  
Morris and Shin (2000)’s set-up is similar. 
 
E.    Information-Based Theories of Panics 
  Another view of panics sees them as rational events where depositors are essentially reacting to 
new information that is not bank-specific.  The basic idea is that depositors learn some information that is 
relevant for assessing the risk of their bank, but is not specific to any particular bank; it is macroeconomic 
information. Nevertheless, the macroeconomic information is negative, i.e., a recession is looming, and 
risk averse depositors, revising their assessment of bank risk, may rationally decide to withdraw their 
deposits.  In other words, there is consumption smoothing because the consumers realize that a recession 
is coming and consequently will need draw down their saving.  They withdraw from their bank because   75 
they want to avoid losing their savings during the recession.  Gorton (1987), Chari and Jagannathan 
(1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Allen and Gale (1998), and Gorton and Huang (2001) all have 
versions of this basic story. 
  In Gorton’s (1987) model bank portfolio are subject to both idiosyncratic shocks and economy-
wide shocks, but only the latter are observable by depositors.
47  Depositors update their beliefs about the 
state of bank portfolio based on the economy-wide shocks.  Sometimes they seek to withdraw their 
deposits, a panic, because of fears that the banking system has a low quality portfolio, although they do 
not know whether their individual bank is in such a situation or not.  Banks suspend convertibility to 
communicate information to depositors.  In the model of Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) the bank cannot 
observe the true liquidity needs of depositors (i.e., depositor type) while depositors are do not observe the 
quality of bank assets.  A unique (i.e., there are not multiple equilibria) bank run occurs when some of the 
depositors receive bad news about the realized state of the bank assets.  In Chari and Jagannathan (1988) 
the proportion of depositors wanting to consumer early and the state of bank assets are also stochastic.  
Depositors can observe the initial size of the line of depositors at the bank and act conditional on this 
observation.  The line may be especially long because some depositors received news that the bank’s 
asset portfolio is in a bad state.  But, this can be confused with a high proportion of early consumers.  
Thus, sometimes runs result in liquidating banks that do not have low quality asset portfolios. 
Allen and Gale (1998) modify Diamond and Dybvig’s model so that panics are related to the 
business cycle, rather than unexplainable events caused by “sunspots.”  The two important modifications 
are, first, that there is aggregate uncertainty about the value of the long-term assets held by banks.  This 
assumption is introduced to link panics to business cycles, modeled as this aggregate risk.  Second, the 
assumption of sequential service is dropped, as unrealistic.  Consumers face consumption risk, as in 
Diamond and Dybvig.  They can, however, observe a signal, a “leading indicator,” that perfectly predicts 
the realization of the payoff on the long-term asset, but is not contractible.  First best risk sharing can be 
achieved if contracts could be written on this signal.  With noncontingent deposit contracts, but with the 
signal observable, panics can implement first best risk sharing when there is no cost to early withdrawal.  
Roughly speaking this is because when the long-term asset is worth zero, the bank’s remaining 
investment is shared equally among the depositors because there is no sequential service.  If there is a cost 
to early withdrawal, then the panic is inefficient and there is a role for the government. 
  An important difficulty with the information-based view of panics is that it views the problem as 
inherent in the banking system, like Diamond and Dybvig.  Gorton and Huang (2001) present an 
information-based explanation, with same basic source of confusion between aggregate and idiosyncratic 
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shocks as the above theories, but in the context of the industrial organization of the banking system.  In 
addition to the asymmetric information setting, bankers may engage in moral hazard if their bank is in a 
low state.  So, depositors must monitor banks.  In their model, a panic is a manifestation of depositors 
monitoring their banks by withdrawing.  But, this is not necessarily a panic, in the sense that only in 
systems of many small banks does it lead to banks being liquidated.  Systems of large banks are 
monitored, and there may be withdrawals, but not panics.  This is consistent with, for example, the 
comparison between the U.S. and Canadian experiences.  Gorton and Huang’s main result is to show how 
a coalition resembling a clearinghouse endogenously arises.   
    
F.    Other Panic Theories 
There are a number of papers that study banking panics in the context of the entire banking 
system.  These are models that focus on interdependencies between banks, either through interbank 
lending or through interbank clearing systems.  The first of these was Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) who 
extend the Diamond and Dybvig model to examine the effects of preference shocks when there are many 
banks.  Each individual bank faces uncertain liquidity demands, but there are many banks and there is no 
aggregate uncertainty.  Bhattacharya and Gale show that when banks meet unanticipated demands for 
liquidity by borrowing in the interbank market, there is a free rider problem so that banks under invest in 
liquid assets.   The basic result is that an unregulated interbank market for resources can be improved 
upon by a central bank that offers restricted opportunities to borrow and lend.  Allen and Gale (2000) 
focus on the transmission of a shock in one location to other locations, suggesting that “contagion” is an 
important feature of financial crises.  Other papers that examine crises and interbank links include Smith 
(1984, 1991), Donaldson (1992), Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996), and Rochet and Tirole (1996), 
among others. 
Williamson (1988) is a quite different model of panics.  It is a multi-period extension of Boyd and 
Prescott (1986).  His agents are risk neutral so there is no demand for consumption-smoothing insurance, 
but they do have random preferences and there are both a long-term and a short-term investment 
opportunity.   With decentralized trade there is a possible lemons problem in that agents selling high 
quality capital cannot distinguish themselves from those selling low quality capital.  Banks are large 
coalition of agents that overcome this information problem.  However, the bank must allow for early 
withdrawals due to the random preferences of the depositors, so it issues demand deposits.  The bank can 
achieve an allocation that is strictly preferred to the decentralized capital markets allocation by all agents 
in some states of the world.  But, in other states of the world agents are indifferent between the two 
allocations.  In states where agents are indifferent, the bank may dissolve.  Williamson interprets this as a 
bank failure or collapse of the banking system.   77 
G.    Tests of Panic Theories 
  On the basis of the stylized facts about cross-country banking history, reviewed above, it would 
seem straightforward to observe that banks are not fundamentally flawed institutions.  In fact, it does not 
seem to be an exaggeration to say that most of the theoretical work on panics has been motivated by the 
U.S. experience, which has then been incorrectly generalized.  Panics simply are not a feature of most 
economies that have banks.  The world is more complicated; industrial organization seems to be at the 
center of the incidence of panics.  Not surprisingly, therefore, almost all the empirical work on panics has 
been on the U.S. experience.  Until bank “crises” around the world in the last ten years, there simply has 
not been much else to study.  Clearly, from the point of view of public policy and the design of bank 
regulation and central bank lender-of-last-resort activity it is important to distinguish between the two 
views of banking panics outlined above, if only because policies should be in place that are workable in 
economies where the banking system is susceptible to panics. 
With regard to testing, a major difficulty is that Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is not a testable 
theory, since any observed a phenomenon is consistent with “sunspots.”  Instead, empirical investigations 
of panics have focused on the timing of panics in the U.S., checking for patterns that would be consistent 
with the information-based theories of panics.  Importantly then, there are no formal tests that have been 
conducted that test one hypothesis against any particular alternative.  Rather, there has been a variety of 
empirical work studying the times series behavior of the deposit-currency ratio, interest rates, and other 
variables, as well as studies of individual panic episodes.   Empirical investigations include Gorton 
(1988), Donaldson (1992), Mishkin (1991), Park (1991), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), and Calomiris and 
Mason (1997).  Wicker (1980, 1996, 2000), Donaldson (1993), Moen and Tallis (1992, 2000), Calomiris 
and Schweikart (1991), and White (1984) are also relevant. 
  Gorton (1988) argues that demand deposits are risky, like other securities, and that depositor 
behavior should correspond to consumption smoothing behavior based on the aggregate information 
available to them at the time.  The basic idea is that when depositors receive information forecasting a 
recession they know that they will be dissaving, drawing down their bank accounts.  But, their banks are 
more likely to fail during recessions, so they withdraw in advance to avoid such losses.  Empirically 
Gorton analyzes the period 1863-1914 (and also the Great Depression) and shows that the post Civil War 
period behavior of the deposit-currency ratio displays the hypothesized timing.  In fact, on every single 
occasion that a leading indicator of recession crosses a threshold, there is a recession.  The basic 
conclusion is that there is nothing special about panic dates compared to nonpanic dates in terms of the 
behavior of the deposit-currency ratio. While the “sunspots” theory cannot be rejected, the conclusion is 
that if there are “sunspots” they must be consistent with estimated reduced for description of the deposit-
currency ratio.   78 
  Donaldson (1992) revisits the issues raised by Gorton (1988) using weekly data, compared to 
Gorton who used data from the Call Reports, reported five times a year.  Donaldson confirms that there 
are periods that predictably (from the point of view of an econometrician) correspond to instances when 
panics are more likely to occur, but that the exact starting dates during such periods are unpredictable.  
One interpretation of his results is that, although panics do tend to occur at business cycle peaks, there is 
some unknown triggering event that is not predictable, perhaps a “sunspot,” but the data are not fine 
enough to say anything further. 
  Calomiris and Gorton (1991) first examine whether pre-panic periods were unusual.  That is, do 
measures of seasonal flows of reserves and deposits show any evidence of tightness or shocks?  There is 
no such evidence.  The onset of panics is after the money flows associated with planting and harvesting.   
However, measures of real economic activity, in particular, the liabilities of failed businesses do decline.  
Also, stock prices declines did precede panics.  Calomiris and Gorton write: “if one posits that the 
simultaneous violations of thresholds for percentages of real stock price decline and commercial failure 
increase are sufficient for panic, one can predict panics perfectly” (p. 144).   Second, Calomiris and 
Gorton analyze bank liquidations and deposits losses during and after panics.  Basically, there is no 
evidence of banks failing due to the panic.  Rather, weak banks, by pre-panic measures, fail.  Finally, 
Calomiris and Gorton look at sufficient condition for panics to end.  The basic point here is that 
availability of liquidity to satisfy depositor demands does not seem to end panics, with the availability of 
the discount window during the Great Depression being the outstanding example.  Rather, panics end 
when information becomes available, information typically produced by clearinghouses or the 
government about which banks are weak. 
  Mishkin (1991) also studies the National Banking Era in the U.S., as well as the Great 
Depression.  He focuses on the timing of events and financial variables to distinguish between the 
monetarist and asymmetric information-based views of bank panics.
48  For example, an observation that 
interest rate spreads widen and stock market prices decline just prior to the panic, rather than a disruption 
in the financial markets following the panic, is viewed as evidence in favor of the information theory.  
Mishkin analyses each panic episode in U.S, history starting with the Panic of 1857 and concludes that 
“the asymmetric information approach to financial crises explains the timing of patterns in the data and 
many feature of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain” (p. 104).  Mishkin’s evidence is 
consistent with that of Gorton and Donaldson. 
                                                 
48 Some tests of theories of panics have focused, in part, on discriminating between the monetarist views of crises, 
associated with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and the information-based theories, discussed above.  Monetarists do 
not proposed a theory of panics, but note that panics reduce the money supply since withdrawals decrease the money 
multiplier.  Thus, monetarists propose a central bank that acts as a lender-of-last-resort.  However, if panics are due 
to asymmetric information, then monetary policy alone cannot eliminate panics or mitigate their effects.   79 
If asymmetric information is at the root of panics, then panics should end when depositors receive 
credible information about individual bank shocks.  Park (1991) argues that empirically the evidence 
suggest that panics during in the U.S. did end when information about banks was provided to the public.  
He focuses on the actions of private bank clearinghouses and the government in providing credible 
information and concludes: “this empirical finding confirms the crucial link between bank-specific 
information and bank panics”  (p. 285).  Calomiris and Mason (1997) study the June 1932 bank panic in 
Chicago.  They compare the attributes of banks that failed during that event to those that did not fail.  
They conclude that: “the failures during the panic reflected the relative weakness of failing banks in the 
face of a common asset value shock rather than contagion” (p. 881).   “Private cooperation by the Chicago 
clearing house banks appears to have been instrumental in preventing the failure of at least one solvent 
bank during the panic” (p. 864).  Other papers on the Great Depression are discussed below. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study banking crises in a large sample of countries 
internationally during the period 1981-1994.
49  Their basic results “reveal strong evidence that the 
emergence of banking crises is associated with a deteriorated macroeconomic environment.  Particularly, 
low GDP growth, high real interest rates, and high inflation significantly increase the likelihood of 
systemic problems in our sample; thus crises do not appear to be solely driven by self-fulfilling 
expectations as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  This is consistent with the evidence presented in Gorton 
(1988) on determinants of bank runs in the U.S. during the eighteenth century” (p. 3-4).  While this study 
is the only study of an international cross section of countries, and therefore is unique, it did not include 
any variables that might capture cross section variation in the industrial organization of the banking 
system, which the studies reviewed above suggest would be important.  However, the study does include 
a dummy variable for the presence of explicit deposit insurance and an index of the quality of law 
enforcement.  The presence of explicit deposit insurance significantly increases the likelihood of a 
banking crisis, while the “law and order” index shows that more “lawful” countries are less likely to have 
a crisis. 
It should be emphasized that none of the above work constitutes a test in a statistical sense.  
While the evidence is suggestive, the basic finding that panics are associated with business cycle 
downturns does not rule out any theory of panics.  In fact, in the Goldstein and Pauzner (1999) and Morris 
and Shin (2000) extensions of Diamond and Dybvig, the business cycle timing is completely consistent 
with the self-fulfilling nature of a panic.  Morris and Shin write of their extension that: “The theory 
suggests that depositors will indeed withdraw their money when the perceived riskiness of deposits 
                                                 
49 The sample ranges from sixty five to forty five countries in different regression, depending on data availability. 
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crosses a threshold value.  But, nevertheless, the banking panic is self-fulfilling in the sense that 
individual investors only withdraw because they expect others to do so” (p. 14-15). 
In fascinating recent research Kelley and Ó Gráda (2000) and Ó Gráda and White (2001) study 
the patterns of withdrawals from a single bank, the Emigrant Savings Industrial Bank, during bank runs in 
1854 and 1857.  Study at this level of detail can address questions concerning whether depositors respond 
to a signal that causes them to all crowd at once at the bank, or whether the run builds up slowly.  Do rich 
or poor, less sophisticated or uninformed, line up first?  And so on.  Kelley and Ó Gráda (2000) find that 
in 1854 the bank panic followed ethnic patterns, particularly within the Irish community.  Ó Gráda and 
White (2001) document time patterns in withdrawals (or account closings).  There are responses to bad 
news, but there are elements of contagion as well.  Moreover, the patterns are different in 1854 and 1857.  
In 1857, unlike `854, the run was led by business leaders and apparently sophisticated agents, followed by 
less informed depositors. 
What is more important, however, is to keep in mind that, while to date it has not been possible to 
discriminate between panic theories with data, it is clear that the prima facie evidence is against theories 
that inherently intertwine banks and panics.  The previous evidence about the industrial organization of 
the banking system strongly suggests that, at least historically, there is no necessary link between banks 
and panics. 
 
H.    The Banking Crises During the Great Depression 
  The Great Depression was a momentous event, resulting in vast institutional change in the U.S., 
and casting a shadow over the discipline of economics.  In the case of U.S. banking, the Great Depression 
led to enormous change.  Deposit insurance was enacted, and the Glass-Steagall Act, separating 
commercial banking from investment banking, was also passed in response to this event.  Much has been 
written on the Great Depression (e.g., Kindleberger (1973), Temin (1989), Eichengreen (1992), Bordo, 
Goldin, and White (1998), and James (2001)) and we do not survey this vast literature here.  Even the 
literature more narrowly focused on banking and financial factors during the Great Depression is large.  
Our focus is only on issues concerning the experience of banks, and banking systems, during the Great 
Depression, to the extent that these can be separated from other issues.  Understanding the experience of 
banks during the Great Depression is important because much of bank regulatory policy emanates from 
this experience, rather than from the earlier panic experience.  But, the Great Depression was a very 
different banking crisis than the earlier episodes in the U.S. 
The panics during the Great Depression in the U.S. were certainly different from the previous 
episodes in terms of the extent of bank failures and losses on deposits.  In the U.S. more than nine 
thousand banks failed during the Great Depression, between 1930 and 1933.  That amounts to about one   81 
third of the total number of banks in existence at the end of 1929.  In previous panics, the numbers of 
banks failing were miniscule, as shown in Table 3.  Internationally, there was a variety of experience with 
regard to bank failure and system collapse.  While the experience in much of Europe was similar to that in 
the U.S., in that banking systems did collapse (e.g., see Beyen (1949), James (1986), and Kindleberger 
(1973)), many countries experienced the Great Depression without banking crises (e.g., the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Lithuania, Holland, and Sweden).  The international cross 
section variation with regard to banking crises during the Great Depression, and the magnitude of the 
failures in the U.S. are puzzles.  The experience of Canada, discussed above, is an important example of 
an economy that had a dramatically different experience than the U.S.  We begin with the international 
experience and then turn to the U.S. 
  Bernanke and James (1991) use annual data on twenty-four countries to study banking crises 
during the 1920s and 1930s.  They construct a chronology of banking crises during the interwar period 
and focus on the links between the gold standard, banking crises, and real economic activity.  The cite the 
industrial organization of the banking system as a significant factor in explaining which countries 
experienced banking panics during this period.  In terms of the shock causing panics in those countries 
whose banking systems were prone to panics, they observe that there “were virtually no serious banking 
panics in any country after abandonment of the gold standard…” (p. 53), suggesting that deflation was the 
important shock.  Another important point made by Bernanke and James (1991) concerns the real effects 
of severe banking problems.  They argue that countries that experienced panics had deeper depressions 
than countries that did not experience panics.  Bordo (1986), Calomiris (1993a), and Grossman (1994), all 
mentioned above, also focus on the cross-section variation of banking experiences internationally.   
Grossman (1994), like Bernanke and James, finds that a combination of macroeconomic policy and 
banking structure can explain much of the cross section experience in banking crisis.  He rules out, as an 
explanation, lender-of-last-resort behavior of central banks. 
  Indeed, central banks were relatively new and inexperienced at dealing with bank crises, with the 
exception of the Bank of England.  The Great Depression is a turning point in the history of central 
banking.  According to Capie (1997), there were only eighteen central banks at the beginning of the 20
th 
century.  By 1950 there were 59 central banks and by 1990 there were 161.  At the beginning of the 20
th 
century, the U.S. Federal Reserve System was not yet established; this would occur in 1914.  The Bank of 
Canada came into being after the Great Depression, in 1934.  Prior to the 20
th century central banks were 
established as institutions with monopoly rights over money issuance.  But, if a critical element of central 
banking is the function of lender-of-last-resort, then these institutions generally did not become central 
banks until later, typically during the 20
th century—after the Great Depression.   82 
  Although the Federal Reserve System came into existence in 1914, and so there was a central 
bank with a discount window in existence during the Great Depression, there was no deposit insurance.  
Prior to the Federal Reserve being enacted there was the private system of clearinghouses that did provide 
a form of deposit insurance.  And after 1934 there is explicit government-provided deposit insurance.  
However, during the period 1914-1934, there is no deposit insurance in the U.S., either private or public.  
Although during the Great Depression there were various points at which the government together with 
the clearinghouses attempted to act, nothing came of this.
50  Clearinghouses acquiesced to the Federal 
Reserve, but the Federal Reserve did not play the role that clearinghouses had played in earlier episodes.  
This accounts for much of how the panics of the Great Depression in the U.S. differed from earlier panics. 
  First of all, unlike earlier episodes in the U.S. where there was not a single panic near the 
business cycle peak.  Gorton (1988) constructs a counterfactual, based on estimated structural equations 
and argues that if the private clearinghouse system in existence prior to 1914 had been in existence during 
the Great Depression (and there had been no Federal Reserve system), then there would have been a 
single panic in December 1929 (and also in June 1920).
51  Instead of one quarter to one third of the banks 
failing, Gorton estimates that less than one percent would have failed had the private clearinghouse 
system been in place.  Instead, there was not a single panic during the Great Depression.   In fact, it is a 
matter of dispute which episodes really constituted panics.  The dates in question are periods in which 
there were numerous bank failures; November 1930 to January 1931, April to August 1931, September 
and October 1931, and February and March 1933.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) were the first to argue 
that these were four separate national banking panics during the Great Depression.  This has been 
disputed, as we discuss below.  The difficulty is not just the matter of the definition of what is a “panic,” 
but also that these episodes were different that previous US. Panics in another way, emphasized by 
Wicker (1996), namely, that the center of the panic was not the money market in New York City.  Rather, 
the initial banking problems were region specific.  Wicker (1996): “There is no discernible pattern in the 
diffusion of the crisis from certain regional centers to the periphery.  One reason for the absence of such a 
pattern is the fact that the panic did not at any time engulf any of the largest banks of Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, and Chicago.  Exactly how the loss of confidence spread across the twelve Federal Reserve 
Districts is still a matter requiring explanation” (p. 98). 
                                                 
50 In 1930 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York Clearinghouse Association attempted to 
arrange a rescue of the Bank of the United States, but the plan failed (see Wicker (1996)).  Later, in 1933 there was a 
proposal to issue clearinghouse loan certificates to the public, but this also failed (see Wicker (1996)). 
51 The fact that there was no panic in 1920 was also significant because the 1920s saw significant numbers of banks 
fail in the U.S.  See Alston, Grove, and Wheelock (1994).   83 
   The fact that the panics were more regional, at least they originated outside New York City, has 
led to disputes among researchers about which of the four events identified by Friedman and Schwartz 
really were national panics.  It has also complicated efforts to test hypotheses about the causes of panics 
during the Great Depression.  The debate over the origins of the panics in the Great Depression echoes the 
debates about whether panics are irrational contagion or information-based.  The fact that rural areas play 
a role has led to consideration of the fall in agricultural income as an important factor.  In a famous 
quotation, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) put it this way: “In November 1930 … a crop of bank failures, 
particularly in Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Arkansas, and North Carolina, led to widespread attempts 
to convert demand and time deposits into currency … a contagion of fear spread among depositors 
starting from agricultural areas, which had experienced the heaviest impact of bank failures in the 
twenties.  But such contagion knows no geographical limits” (p. 308).  In contrast to this view of 
contagion emanating from problems in agricultural, Temin (1976) argued that sharp declines in the value 
of bank asset portfolios caused bank failures.  He constructed proxies for the quality of bank portfolios 
using traded bond prices and performed annual cross section regressions, attempting to explain the pattern 
of bank failures.  Wicker (1980) presents a third point of view, arguing that the collapse in November 
1930 of Caldwell and Company of Nashville, Tennessee was the shock setting off the panic, rather than 
declines in bank asset values or agricultural incomes. 
  A number of other authors have contributed to the subsequent debate, attempting to shed light on 
the three interpretations.  The main innovation has been more detailed bank-level data.  White (1984) U.S. 
national banks during four years, 1929-1932.  For each of these years, the failed banks are matched with a 
stratified random sample of non-failing banks based on similar assets and geographical location.  White 
then uses financial ratios to try to discriminate between failed and nonfailed banks, using logit regression.  
He argues that his results show that Temin and Friedman and Schwartz are not really in conflict.  Bank 
failures are explained by a shocks causing agricultural distress, leaving banks with poorly performing 
loans.  Thies and Gerlowski (1993) revisit White’s analysis a bit differently and confirm his findings.  
Calomiris and Mason (2000) construct an even more detailed data set to analyze the causes of bank 
failure during the Great Depression.  Their measures of fundamentals include attributes of individual 
banks, as well as proxies for local, regional, and national economic shocks.  In the first three of the 
Friedman and Schwartz panics, they find no evidence of contagion-like effects.  But, for the last episode 
this does not appear to be the case.  Hamilton (1985) also examines the Panic of 1930 and the 
interpretations of Friedman and Schwartz, Temin, Wicker and White.  Hamilton presents a fairly nuanced 
view, concluding that “The banking panic of 1930…had no single cause, and none of the various 
interpretations of the panic’s causes—poor loans and investments made in the twenties, the Caldwell 
failure, or falling cotton prices—can fully account for the rise in the number of failures and for the shift in   84 
the states and regions afflicted with banking difficulties.  The wave of failures can be explained by the 
combined effect of the overextended condition of the failed banks, the Caldwell shock, and the 
deteriorating agricultural conditions” (p. 607). 
  There is also controversy concerning the effects of the collapse of the banking system during the 
Great Depression.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that the collapse of the banking system was only 
important because if meant a major decline in the supply of money, via the money multiplier when 
depositors withdrew currency.  Temin (1976) sees the collapse of the banking system as a result of real 
shocks and that even without the banking crisis “the overall story of the Great Depression would not have 
been much different” (p. 9-10).  Bernanke (1983) initiated a revision of the debate when he introduced 
another interpretation of the events.  He argues that “the financial crises of 1930-33 affected the 
macroeconomy by reducing the quality of certain financial services, primarily credit intermediation” (p. 
263).  In other words, banks perform a real allocative role, which is important for the functioning of the 
economy.  Without banks, due a collapse of the banking system, output will decline because banks can no 
longer allocate capital to firms. Bernanke works in the general econometric framework of unanticipated 
money causing changes in real output (the rate of growth of industrial production), introduced by Barro 
(1978).  His first finding is that declines in money are not quantitatively large enough to explain the 
output declines of 1930-33.  He then includes proxies for the effects of declines in intermediation 
services, for example, the real deposits of failing banks and the liabilities of failing businesses.  These and 
other proxies improve the explanatory power of the output equation, strongly suggesting his 
interpretation. 
  Bernanke’s paper has been very influential and generated a number of responses.  Temin (1989) 
argued that firms which were more reliant on bank loans, namely smaller firms, should suffer the most 
when the banking system collapses.  His analysis is based on dividing industries into bank-reliant ones 
and non-bank-reliant ones.  He finds no pattern, arguing that Bernanke is wrong.  Hunter (1982), 
however, provides more detailed analysis based on firm level characteristics and does find that small 
firms were affected differently.  Also see the discussion in Calomiris (1993b).  Another critique of 
Bernanke is that of Rockoff (1993) who argues that Bernanke’s results are not robust to how money si 
defined.  He constructs a measure of money that takes into account the fact that deposits in banks that 
have suspended convertibility are not “money” in the dame sense as deposits in other banks.  When this 
measure of money is used, Rockoff finds that the nonmonetary proxy variables are not important in the 
specification.  Essentially, Rockoff argues that any times series variable with a spike during 1929-1933 
will have statistical significance.  Calomiris and Mason (2001), in preliminary work, attempt to examine 
the issues at a much disaggregated level, asking whether indicators of local banks’ conditions can explain 
cross section variation in state income.   85 
  Bernanke’s original paper discusses the Canadian experience during the Great Depression, since 
it provides such a contrast to that of the U.S. suggesting that a more careful study of Canada would be 
valuable.  Haubrich (1990) provides such a study.  In Canada, there were no panics and no banking crises, 
though the number of branches declines from 4049 to 3640 between 1929 and 1933.
52  Essentially, 
Haubrich follows Bernanke’s path, but studies Canada.  He also looks at cross industry comparisons.  He 
finds that measures of financial distress have no economic or statistical significance.  His interpretation is 
that the real effects are due to crisis or panic.  The banking system can contract because the demand for 
loans declines, but real effects only occur when the supply of loans contracts due to crisis.  This 
interpretation is disputed by Calomiris (1993b). 
 
I.    Contagion 
“Contagion” is the idea that some event can cause a chain reaction or domino effect among 
banks.  For example, when one bank (or possibly a nonfinancial firm) fails, this, it is argued, can cause 
depositors at other banks to withdraw their deposits.  Alternatively, when one bank becomes insolvent 
this can cause other banks to become insolvent because of a chain of illiquidity stretching through the 
interbank market.  So, one view of “contagion” is that it refers to “interdependence” among banks, more 
so than nonfinancial firms.  In Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) or Allen and Gale (2000), as well as the 
other papers mentioned above, banks are interdependent so shocks to one or a few banks may have an 
impact on other banks.  This type of shock transmission mechanism is also prominent in discussions of 
the risks in the payments system.  For example, Flannery (1996) develops a model in which banks 
become wary of lending to other banks, although most banks are in fact solvent.  At root, the interbank 
loan market creates an interdependence that can propagate shocks through the banking system.  Another 
view of “contagion” is informational.  Banks are opaque institutions, so that information about a single 
institution might rationally or irrationally lead to a revision of beliefs about the value of other institutions. 
There are a variety of ways of testing contagion hypotheses.  Calomiris and Mason (1997) look 
for informational contagion effects.  They adopt the empirical strategy of comparing the ex ante attributes 
of banks that failed during the Chicago panic of June 1932 with those that did not fail.  If banks that failed 
were just as strong as those that survived, then this would be evidence in favor of confusion on the part of 
depositors.  If banks that failed were weaker, then runs on individual banks were not purely random; 
weaker banks were run and then failed.  They find that weaker banks did fail, and interpret their evidence 
as being inconsistent with contagion.  Rather, there is evidence that while depositors were somewhat 
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confused about the states of individual banks, only the weakest banks were forced into insolvency.
53  
Though Calomiris and Mason also point to Chicago clearinghouse as the institution that facilitated this.  
Their study shows that weak banks failed in the panics while the strong survived.  So, the panic did not 
cause ex ante stronger banks to fail.  But, is it is not clear that this is a statement about the causes of the 
panic.  The panic may have been caused by some version of “contagion,” but in the end only weak banks 
failed. 
Other studies of contagion have been event studies that examined the abnormal return on bank 
stocks when a bank fails, in the post WW II U.S. economy.  For example, Aharony and Swary (1983) 
look at the stock reactions to three large bank failures in the 1970s.  They found that other banks’ stock 
prices did not respond.  Similar studies include Aharony and Swary (1996), Swary (1986), and Wall and 
Peterson (1990).  Basically, the empirical results support the idea that the stock market prices respond to 
new information, rather than to contagion caused by interbank linkages or irrationality.  Kaufman (1994) 
reviews more of these studies.
54  Event studies test a number of joint hypotheses which makes them 
difficult to interpret.  Chief among these problems is the fact that large U.S. banks are viewed as being 
“too-big-to-fail.”  This is the implicit government policy of rescuing large banks, possibly preventing 
their failure to the benefit of shareholders.  O’Hara, Maureen and Wayne Shaw (1990) find positive 
announcement effects to encouraging government announcements concerning too-big-to-fail, suggesting 
that big bank shareholders benefit from this policy.  Consequently, there may be detectable contagion 
effects to a large bank failure were it not for the too-big-to-fail doctrine.  
Furfine (2001) analyzes the interbank market by analyzing all individual U.S. federal funds 
transactions during 1998, a year during which Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt and the hedge fund 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was rescued by the private sector.  These transactions allow 
Furfine to trace any chain reaction or domino effect and allow him to identify whether banks, as a group, 
became fearful of transacting with other banks.  Furfine (2001) finds that interest rates did not move from 
their level intended by the Fed, and that interest rate variability was not really affected by the crises with 
Russia and LTCM.  Aggregate volume in the fed funds market rose in the second half of 1998, during the 
crises.  Credit spreads in the interbank market did not increase, but were often narrower.  Finally, 
individual banks borrowers at least as much during the crises as before.  Furfine’s results are the strongest 
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54 Saunders and Wilson (1996) study
 deposit flows in a sample of failed and healthy banks
 over the period 1929-1933 
in the U.S.  They find evidence of contagion
 for 1930-1932, but not in
 1929 or 1933.  However, during 1930-1932,
 
failing-bank deposit outflows exceeded those at a
 matched control sample of nonfailing banks suggesting that there 
were informed depositors who distinguished among
 ex ante failing and nonfailing banks.     87 
results against contagion effects in the interbank market, but these results too are possibly a function of 
the too-big-to-fail policy of the U.S. government. 
  There are a large number of studies that examine banking crises in emerging markets in the 1980s 
and 1990s, arguing that some of these events seem to have elements of contagion.  While definitions of 
“contagion” vary considerably, one view of  “contagion” views it as the transmission of real shocks from 
country to country due to trade links, financial links, or “fear.”  Some studies of recent crises provide 
evidence that banks were an important transmission mechanism of shocks, possibly accounting for 
phenomena labeled “contagion.”  Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) see banks as a transmission 
mechanism, but do not think of it as contagion.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, 1999) identify three 
channels that may transmit shocks from one country to another: bank lending, liquidity, and trade.  Their 
empirical work is based on forming clusters of countries based on measures of these three channels. They 
then show that these clusters are regional, a possible source of transmission of shocks.  In the case of bank 
lending they distinguish a cluster of countries that borrows from Japanese banks and one which borrows 
from U.S. banks.  Their main result is that the probability of crisis, conditional on crisis having happened 
in a certain banking cluster, tends to be higher than the unconditional probability of crisis.  However, the 
clusters associated with each channel overlap so much that it is hard to argue that the common bank 
lender channel has really been isolated from the other channels.  In a similar vein, Caramazza, Ricci, and 
Salgado (1999) use BIS data define a “common bank lender” for each crisis as the country that lent the 
most to the first country in crisis in each of the major crises, using a sample of 41 emerging markets.  For 
example, in the Mexican crisis the common bank lender is the United States.  Their main result is that 
countries that experienced crises were more reliant on a common lender than other countries.  Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1999, 2000) also investigate the idea that international banks are a major channel 
for the transmission of shocks.  Studies in this area are relatively new, but seem promising. 
 
V.    Bank Regulation, Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements 
Government provision of deposit insurance and government intervention into banking markets, 
including bank supervision and examination, limitations on bank activities, capital requirements, charter 
requirements and entry restrictions, closure rules, and other rules for banks, are now widespread around 
the globe.  The rationale for deposit insurance and bank regulation is the argument that banks are 
inherently flawed institutions, being prone to harmful banking panics.  Consequently, the government 
should provide deposit insurance and regulate bank risk taking.  Moreover, once deposit insurance has 
been adopted, there is a further need for government intervention via bank regulation because of the 
incentive of banks to take additional risks once they have (underpriced) government deposit insurance 
(see Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981)).   88 
Most of the vast literature on bank regulation is within this paradigm of panics, deposit insurance, 
and moral hazard.  In general, the literature on bank regulation, and related issues, assumes the need for 
deposit insurance and government regulation and focuses on the implications of moral hazard problems 
for the design of bank regulation.  There is an associated empirical literature that has attempted to uncover 
evidence that moral hazard is a problem in banking systems with insured deposits.  The empirical 
literature, while covering a variety of topics, has not been particularly successful at finding evidence of 
moral hazard problems, despite its dominance as a theory of bank behavior and bank regulation.  We start, 
however, with a discussion of the origins of bank regulation and deposit insurance.  This is an important 
topic because the government provision of deposit insurance, and the associated bank regulation, is a 
quite recent phenomenon.  
 
A.    The Origins of Government Bank Regulation and Government Deposit Insurance 
If banks are inherently unstable institutions, prone to panics, then government regulation is 
perhaps justified, in the form of government deposit insurance, capital requirements, and bank supervision 
and examination.   However, as discussed above, most countries did not have banking panics, or, if they 
did, panics were infrequent.  Why then are government deposit insurance schemes and bank regulation so 
widespread?  Part of the answer is that they were not widespread until recently, reflecting policy advice 
based on the paradigm of panics, deposit insurance, and moral hazard. 
Bank regulation and deposit insurance have their origins in the private arrangements among 
banks, as described above in the discussion of bank clearinghouses and other private bank coalitions, and 
theoretically by Gorton and Huang (2001).  Governments took over these insurance schemes and 
regulations fairly recently, although in the U.S. there were various earlier deposit insurance arrangements 
sponsored by state governments (see White (1983), Calomiris (1990), and Wheelock (1992b)).  The first 
formal nationwide government deposit insurance system in the world was established in the United States 
in 1934. Other countries did not follow the U.S. lead, even those that had experienced the depression of 
the 1930s.  It was not until after World War II that countries around the globe began to adopt deposit 
insurance.  For example, Canada did not adopt deposit insurance until 1967.  Figure 2 shows the number 
of explicit national deposit insurance programs in countries around the world.
55  In 1980 only sixteen 
countries had explicit deposit insurance programs; by 1999, sixty-eight countries had such programs (see 
Kyei (1995), Garcia (1999) and Demirigüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2000)).  Two thirds of the deposit insurance 
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programs in the world have been established in the last fifteen years.  Widespread banking crises during 
the 1980s and 1990s were the proximate cause of the spread of government deposit insurance. 
Not only is deposit insurance recent, it has been hard to explain why it was adopted in the first 
place.  In the U.S., the federal deposit insurance legislation was originally supported by all but the largest 
banks, but was widely viewed by others as special interest legislation, a subsidy for banks.  Even with the 
collapse of the banking system during the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration, the bank 
regulatory agencies, and large banks opposed the legislation.  See Flood (1992) and White (1998).  In 
fact, looking at U.S. history, White (1998) concludes that: “There is no ready model to explain the growth 
and spread of federal insurance of intermediaries” (p. 87-89).  This challenge may have been answered by 
Kane and Wilson (1998). 
That deposit insurance and capital requirements are recent developments is consistent with the 
above observations that instability is not inherent in banking, that most banking systems do not have 
problems with banking panics; the U.S. experience is an outlier.  Since 1934, when deposit insurance 
came into being, most of the U.S. banking experience has been quiescent.  Figure 1 shows the number of 
bank failures in the U.S. since 1934.  The figure strongly suggests that deposit insurance per se is not 
subject to moral hazard.  For fifty years the banking industry in the U.S. was a rather quiet industry, with 
few failures and little academic attention.  It appears that there was a regime switch in the mid-1980s.  We 
return to this issue below. 
 
B.   Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard 
  Moral hazard is the idea that bank shareholders have an incentive to take advantage of under-
priced deposit insurance by engaging in riskier actions than they would otherwise.  The idea that equity 
holders want to increase risk, at the expense of bondholders, applies to all situations where there is limited 
liability (and under the standard Black-Scholes assumptions).  This is the observation that, viewing equity 
as a call option on the value of the firm, option values are increasing in volatility.  In other words, the 
equity holders do not care if the payoffs are low because of limited liability, but they will benefit if the 
payoffs are high.  This idea is commonly described as “gambling for resurrection” or  “playing the 
lottery.”  Moral hazard has been viewed as being of particular relevance to banking because government 
deposit insurance premia are not (explicitly) based on the riskiness of the bank.  Moreover, the argument 
is that banks are regulated, in part, to prevent them from engaging in moral hazard. The usual view, 
however, is that the equity holders will engage in risk-increasing strategies only when bank capital is low 
or nonexistent.  This view implicitly reflects the idea that there are some institutional and contractual 
constraints on equity holders, but that these constraints lose their force when equity value is low.  It has 
never been clear what these constraints actually are, or why they lose their force at low equity values.   90 
  A starting point for considering the moral hazard issue concerns whether deposit insurance 
premia are (implicitly) set to reflect the risk of individual banks.  If insurance premia are fairly priced, 
then the incentives to engage in moral hazard are the same as in nonfinancial firms and, presumably it is 
prevented in the same way.  Using stock price data and an option-based approach, Marcus and Shaked 
(1984) found that the vast majority of large banks are overcharged for deposit insurance.  Pennacchi 
(1987), also using an option-based approach, finds that nearly all the banks in his sample were 
overcharged.  These results suggest that the bank regulators or corporate governance mechanisms exert 
control over banks to limit their risk-taking so that they are effectively being overcharged even with flat 
rate premia.  Also, see Ronn and Verma (1986).  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2000) discusses 
a variety if risk-based pricing methods. 
Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) and Marcus (1984) raise an important issue with the moral hazard 
argument, that is that in order to enter the banking industry, a charter from the government is required.  
The charter is the license to take deposits and make loans.  The charter is not a transferable asset and it is 
lost if the bank fails.  Charters are in limited supply because the government, in many countries, does not 
allow free entry into banking.  This valuable charter alters the bank’s risk-taking behavior, particularly as 
posited by those who argue that deposit insurance is under-priced and so bank equity holders have an 
incentive to engage in moral hazard.  As Marcus (1984) put it “…the traditional view of bank finance in 
the presence of FDIC insurance is overly simplistic in that it ignores the effects of potential bankruptcy 
costs” (p. 565).  Charter value causes the bank equity holders to decrease risk as default becomes more 
likely. 
  The pattern of bank failures shown in Figure 1 may be understandable based on the value of 
commercial bank charters.  What changed?  Essentially, the story is that prior to the 1980’s banks were 
partially protected from competition.  They often had local monopolies in deposit markets (see Hannan 
and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992); there was no competition from money market mutual 
funds and there are interest rate ceilings.  In other words, the charter values of banks were high.  Keeley 
(1990) was the first to link Marcus’ theoretical insight to the empirical world of banking in the mid-
1980s.  Keeley (1990) uses Tobin’s q as a measure of market power or charters in banking.  (Also, see 
Saunders and Wilson (2001).)   For example, banks that have a local monopoly on deposits can issue 
deposits at below- market rates, and this will be reflected in the bank’s stock price.   He finds “that 
[Tobin’s] q appears to be useful proxy for market power and that banks with greater market power hold 
more capital and pay lower rates on CD’s” (p. 1186).  Keeley’s interpretation of banking in the 1980s is 
that increased competition in banking reduced charter values, causing banks to increase risk in response.  
Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) also conclude that banks with high charter values operate more   91 
safely than other banks.  Keeley’s argument is consistent with moral hazard being operative when 
commercial bank charter values are low.  We return to Keeley’s argument below. 
The bulk of the empirical work aimed at testing the moral hazard hypothesis as applied to 
financial intermediaries analyzes the behavior of insolvent or poorly capitalized U.S. savings and loan 
institutions, “thrifts,” during the 1980s.  The S&L crisis would appear to be a good testing ground for the 
moral hazard hypothesis.  A series of exogenous interest rate shocks in late 1979 and early 1980, and the 
deregulation of deposit rates, caused large numbers of thrifts to lose significant amounts of equity.   
Essentially, deregulation reduced the value of thrift charters while interest rate shocks almost 
simultaneously reduced their equity value. Between January 1980 and December 1988, nearly 1,200 
thrifts failed, though not all were actually closed, later described as a policy of regulatory “forbearance,” 
which makes for an even more interesting testing ground for moral hazard.  Brumbaugh (1988), Kane 
(1989), Kormendi et. al. (1989), Barth (1991), and White (1991), among others, provide background on 
the thrift crisis. 
The first type of tests for the presence of moral hazard in the thrift industry focused on comparing 
the behavior of insolvent thrifts with those of solvent counterparts.  For example, Barth, Bartholomew, 
and Bradley (1990) find that failed thrifts had disproportionately high concentrations of commercial 
mortgages, real estate loans, and direct equity investments, compared to the average thrift.  DeGennaro, 
Land, and Thomson (1993) study the investment strategies of the 300 largest thrifts to post capital 
deficiencies in 1979.  The institutions of this group that subsequently failed followed “higher-growth 
investment strategies” than did those that returned to health.  Benston (1985) analyzed a matched sample 
of solvent and insolvent thrifts.  Between January 1, 1980 and August 31, 1985, 202 thrifts failed.  Each 
of these thrifts was matched to two nonfailing thrifts, two just smaller and two just larger.  Barth and 
Bradley (1989) also pursue this empirical strategy.  Rudolph and Hamdan (1988) use financial ratios to 
try to discriminate between failed and solvent thrifts in the post-deregulation period (i.e., after the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 
1982).  Brewer (1995) look at changes in thrifts’ stock prices in response to changes in the mix of asset 
investments.  
  A related approach is to look at changes in thrift behavior following major legislation to see 
whether solvent and insolvent thrifts responded differently.  The Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allowed 
thrifts to invest in previously forbidden assets.  McKenzie, Cole, and Brown (1992) estimate the average 
returns on various types of thrift investments for the years ending June 30, 1987 and June 30, 1988.  In 
particular, they estimate the returns on traditional thrift assets and on the new, nontraditional, investments.  
Returns on nontraditional assets are estimated to be lower than on traditional assets, but in particular, the   92 
results are more pronounced at capital deficient thrifts.  This can be interpreted as evidence that thrifts 
with low capital were engaging in moral hazard.  However, as the authors note, there are a number of 
other explanations consistent with the finding.  First, thrifts that were about to fail may have already sold 
the more liquid traditional assets, biasing the estimates of returns.  Second, nontraditional assets may be 
easier to use to engage in fraud or “looting,” a hypothesis distinct from moral hazard, as discussed below.  
Third, regulators were more inclined not to close insolvent thrifts with traditional portfolios. 
These approaches to testing for moral hazard are fraught with difficulties.  There is no question 
that failed thrifts are different than solvent thrifts; this is true by definition, since they failed and the 
others did not.  And it is not surprising that the failed thrifts have many common characteristics; they 
engaged in similar types of investments and those investments did not do well.  But, it is not clear that 
these observations have anything to do with moral hazard.  For example, if a thrift is not successful 
investing in traditional asset categories, for whatever reasons, it may invest in new asset classes allowed 
by deregulation.  If there is a negative exogenous shock to this new asset class, and the thrift subsequently 
is closed, it may have nothing to do with moral hazard.  But, this outcome must be distinguished from the 
case where the thrift, seeing that its net worth is negative invests in the new asset class because the new 
assets are viewed ex ante as being very risky. 
In addition to the problems mentioned above, another problem involves ensuring that the risk-
taking behavior is caused by insolvency, rather than the other way around.  This issue is related to the use 
of accounting data, which almost all of the studies rely on.  Benston, Carhill, and Olasov (1991) discuss 
the accounting issues, and then go on to base their analysis on estimates of market values.  These authors 
“conclude that insolvent thrifts did not expand more rapidly than did solvent thrifts and, in general, did 
not take greater risks” (p. 379).  Brickley and James (1986) also avoid the accounting issues by looking at 
the response of stock prices to changes in Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation closure 
policy.  They find that the response is as if access to underpriced federal deposit insurance is a valuable 
option, but it is not clear that there is moral hazard.  According to standard option theory, call options are 
more valuable if the maturity is extended, ceteris paribus.  
  Another interesting experiment concerns the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency’s announcement, 
in 1984, that the eleven largest U.S. banking firms were "too big to fail" (TBTF), implying they would 
receive de facto 100 percent deposit insurance.  Did this encourage risk-taking?  O’Hara and Shaw (1990) 
investigate the effect on bank equity of the Comptroller of the Currency’s announcement using event 
study methodology.  They find positive wealth effects accruing to TBTF banks, with corresponding 
negative effects accruing to non-TBTF banks.  Boyd and Gertler (1994b) study the poor performance of 
banks in the 1980s in a statistical study controlling for location, asset size remains a significant factor in 
poor performance of large banks.  They find that the poor performance of the U.S. banking industry in the   93 
1980s was due mainly to the risk-taking of the largest banks and interpret this as risk-taking that was 
encouraged by the U.S. government’s too-big-to-fail policy.  Also, see Black, Collins, Robinson and 
Schweitzer (1997).  De Nicolo (2001) shows that the link between bank size and risk extends beyond the 
U.S.  He examines banks in 21 industrialized countries during 1988-1998 and finds that larger banks have 
lower charter values (as measured by Tobin’s q ratio) and higher risk of insolvency.   
Some authors have attempted to address the shortcomings of studies based on the thrift crisis by 
examining historical situations where some institutions are covered by insurance, while other similar 
institutions are not.  Wheelock (1992b), Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995), and Wheelock and Wilson 
(1995) looked at individual banks in Kansas that participated in a state deposit insurance program in the 
1920s, on a voluntary basis.  Banks that chose insurance coverage took additional risks.  Calomiris (1990) 
finds that deposit insurance in the early 1900s increased bank risk-taking, more so for states with 
mandatory insurance than for states with voluntary insurance.  Grossman (1992), examining thrifts in the 
1930s, found that thrifts entering the voluntary federal insurance program did take on more risks than 
uninsured thrifts after several years. 
  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) analyze international evidence.  They estimate the 
probability of a systemic banking crisis in a panel of 61 countries over the period 1980-1997.  This is the 
period when most countries adopted deposit insurance; see Figure 2.
56  About 40 banking crises are 
identified in the panel and for about half the observations a deposit insurance system was present.  The 
main result is that a dummy variable for the presence of deposit insurance is positive and significant.  
Refining this by distinguishing different types of deposit systems shows that explicit deposit insurance is 
associated with higher likelihood of crisis.  As the authors point out, one possibility for the association 
between deposit insurance and bank crises is that economies with fragile banking systems tend to adopt 
deposit insurance.  An instrumental variable approach to this issue shows deposit insurance to still be 
associated with crisis.  The authors conclude that “explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to 
bank stability” (p. 22). 
  The international evidence of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache raises another issue.  The moral 
hazard argument is the idea that equity holders are motivated to take on risk inefficiently in the hopes that 
there is a state of the world that could be realized in the future in which their equity would be positively 
valued.  But, Akerlof and Romer (1993) point out that much of what is claimed to be evidence of moral 
hazard, in fact, appears to be behavior in which there is NO state of the world in which equity would be 
positively valued.  Rather, it is “looting,” that is, the equity holders are simply illegally stealing from the 
institution.  Akerlof and Romer attempt to estimate the extent of looting during the U.S. S&L crisis and 
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present a range of estimates that would account for a large fraction of the government clean-up costs.  The 
argument is also applied to the banking systems of emerging markets.  As Akerlof and Romer write: “..it 
is a safe bet that many developing countries that have far less sophisticated and honest regulatory 
mechanisms than those that exist in the United States will be victimized by financial market fraud as their 
financial markets develop” (p. 59).  An important question concerns whether this type of fraud is 
increased when deposit insurance is adopted. 
  Returning to the U.S. S&L crisis, there is little dispute that if the government had closed thrifts 
faster, then the costs of resolving the insolvencies would have been lower.  But, closure policies are 
somewhat complicated by the constraints the government may face.  The government may optimally not 
want to close banks or thrifts and instead engage in a kind of moral hazard itself.  See Gorton and Winton 
(2000). Acharya and Dreyfus (1989) and Mailith and Mester (1994) also analyze government closure 
policies for financial intermediaries.  If there had been no deposit insurance for U.S. savings and loan 
institutions, then there would likely have been a generalized panic at some point, rather than forbearance 
by the government.  This raises the question of the costs of deposit insurance.  White (1998) attempts to 
address this issue with regard to U.S. commercial banks.  While it is a difficult problem, and White 
admits the to tenuousness of his estimates, it certainly raises the point that the social value of deposit 
insurance is uncertain.  White concludes that ‘…it is hard to escape the conclusion that deposit insurance 
did not substantially reduce aggregate losses from bank failures and may have raised them” (p. 119). 
 
C.   Corporate Governance in Banks and the Moral Hazard Argument 
  Despite the appealing simplicity of the moral hazard argument, it has been difficult to find 
compelling evidence of its existence.  One issue concerns whether there are counterbalancing forces, 
arrangements that provide incentives for shareholders to not engage in risky strategies.  Another issue 
concerns whether equity holders are even in a position to make decisions in large institutions anyway.  As 
a practical matter, equity holders are not in a position to dictate policy in large banks, where management 
may be “entrenched.”  The idea that equity holders control the firm, the basis of the moral hazard 
argument, appears to contradict the standard corporate finance view of large firms, namely that managers 
are effectively in control, not equity holders.  This is the essence of the agency view of corporate 
governance.  This raises issues of corporate governance in banking.  Are the corporate governance issues 
in banking similar to those in unregulated nonfinancial firms?  Are there agency conflicts between bank 
owners and their managers?  Is executive compensation for bankers different?   
Not surprisingly there is evidence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders in 
banking.  James (1984) and Brickley and James (1987) demonstrate the importance of the market for 
corporate control in banking.  James (1984) finds that salary expenses, occupancy expense, and total   95 
employment are higher for banks in states that prohibit acquisitions by other banks.  James and Brickley 
(1987) find that banks in states that allow acquisitions have more outside directors on their boards.   
Schranz (1993) finds that banks in states that allow a more active takeover among banks are more 
profitable.  Houston and James (1993) find that the frequency of management turnover among poorly run 
commercial banks is about the same as management turnover in poorly run nonbanks.  They also find that 
the costs to managers, in terms of lost income and future job opportunities, of their departure are 
significant.  Cannella, Fraser and Lee (1995) find that the bank managerial labor market discriminates 
between cases were the bank manager was arguably at fault for the bank failure and those cases where 
failure was due to exogenous events.    Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that the pay-for-performance link 
in bank management compensation is stronger in states that permit interstate banking, suggesting that the 
market for corporate control is important.  Also, see Barro and Barro (1990) and Crawford, Ezzell, and 
Miles (1995). 
Corporate governance in banks may be similar to nonbanks in some ways, such as frequency of 
management turnover, but this may be due to regulatory intervention.  Prowse (1995) studies corporate 
governance in U.S. commercial banking, and considers this issue.  He borrows the method employed by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) to a sample of manufacturing firms and studies a sample of U.S. bank 
holding companies.  The results are given in Table 4 (which is Table 1 of Prowse, p. 28).  The frequency 
of control changes, in terms of percentage of the sample that experienced a change, is about the same for 
banks and nonbanks.  But, the composition of the changes is very different.  Clearly, regulatory 
intervention is important for banks, while hostile takeovers are not frequent.  In Prowse’s sample, 
management turnover is less important in banks than in nonbanks. 
If there is a separation of ownership and control in larger banks, then moral hazard would be a 
problem only if the interests of equity holders and their managers were in alignment.  Houston and James 
(1995) consider this question, that is, they ask whether executive compensation in banking is structured to 
promote risk-taking? They find that (on average) CEOs of banks are less likely to participate in a stock 
option plan; they hold fewer stock options, and they receive a smaller fraction of their total pay in the 
form of equity-linked remuneration compared to CEOs in other industries.  They also find that the 
relation between equity-linked compensation and the value of the bank charter is positive and significant.  
Finally, they find that weakly capitalized banks (as identified by the regulators) are no more likely to use 
equity-linked compensation than other banks.  Overall, it does not seem to be the case that equity-holders 
attempt to induce or entice managers to engage in moral hazard. 
We are left with a conundrum.  If there are corporate governance problems with large financial 
institutions, and these appear to be similar in magnitude to the problems in nonfinancial firms, how are 
bank and thrift managers being enticed to engage in moral hazard?  Keeley’s identification of the increase   96 
in commercial bank failures and the decline in bank capital ratios in the mid-1980s with increased 
competition seems compelling.  But, it is not clear that the explanation is “moral hazard,” that is, an 
increase in risk by equity holders seeking to maximize the value of their equity (given insured deposits). 
In the case of U.S. commercial banking, there was no exogenous shock that had the same detrimental 
effect on equity capital that occurred with thrifts.  Competition increased in banking, and over a 
protracted period of time commercial banks failed.  The question is: Who made the decision to engage 
risky investments, equity holders or bank managers? 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) empirically analyze whether the risk-taking identified by Keeley is 
explained by shareholders making the decisions, i.e., moral hazard, or by managers.  They look at the 
relationship between risk-taking and the ownership structure in banks.  The banking environment of the 
late 1980s was not the usual environment.  It was a competitive environment where opportunities were 
shrinking.  In such an environment, managers may resist shrinking their banks through merger, 
acquisition, or directly by making fewer loans.  But, equity value is not yet low.  As charter values 
decline, shareholders prefer to exit the industry and redeploy their resources in investments with higher 
returns.  But, to the extent that managers are entrenched, this could mean that their careers as bankers are 
over in many cases, as the industry is shrinking.  In a shrinking industry, managers and equity holders 
have different incentives, and they are different than they would be in a growing industry. 
Which group, managers or equity holders, make decisions depends sensitively on the relative 
sizes of the equity holdings of the managers versus the outside equity concentrations.  At one extreme, the 
manager is the owner if he owns all the equity.  At the other extreme, the manger may have no equity and 
face a large outside block holder who is in control.  But, more likely combinations involve a manager 
with a small amount of equity in a bank where all the other shareholders are dispersed or there is a group 
of outside block holders.  In these cases, a manager may not have enough equity to care as much about his 
pecuniary returns as he does about his private benefits of control, but his equity holding may be large 
enough for him to exert control.  Because the other shareholders are dispersed, he is effectively 
entrenched and can attempt keep the size of his bank from decreasing in the shrinking industry.  These 
issues mean that the sought after relationship is potentially nonlinear.  This turns out to be very important 
empirically.  Gorton and Rosen find that the managerial hypothesis is empirically more important than the 
moral hazard hypothesis, which can be rejected, in explaining risk-taking by banks.  
  The relations between managers’ equity holdings and the ownership structure of the outside 
shareholders, i.e., the extent to which there are blocks, makes the relationship between control and risk 
taking potentially highly nonlinear. Gorton and Rosen use semiparametric methods to tests for the 
nonlinearities.  Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) estimate a linear relation between managerial stock 
holdings and the stock price volatility of their bank holding company over the period 1978-1985 and find   97 
a positive relation.  Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1997) use piecewise linear regression.  They find 
that risk increases with the shareholdings of managers, but only for banks with relatively low charter 
value.The sample period is 1991-1995. 
  The structure of ownership and risk taking has also been investigated in the thrift industry.   
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1995) analyze balance sheet measures of risk for samples of thrifts 
in 1988 and 1991.  Independent variables include the holdings of insiders, and this variable squared, and a 
measure of the percentage of equity held by institutional investors.  They find that “S&Ls with a high 
concentration of managerial stock ownership exhibit greater risk-taking behavior than other S&Ls in 
1988, a period of regulatory leniency and forbearance on S&L closures, but lower risk-taking behavior in 
1991, a period of regulatory stringency and nonforbearance” (p. 63).  These results are confirmed in 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1999) over the period 1986 to 1995 with the same quadratic term 
included for insider holdings. 
 
D.    Bank Capital Requirements   
Like deposit insurance, bank capital requirements, or at least, explicit capital requirements, are 
also a recent development.  In the U.S., the Banking Act of 1933 required that bank regulators consider 
the “adequacy of the capital structure.”  In the 1950s, the Federal Reserve mandated capital levels on the 
basis of a formula based on amounts to be held against different asset categories.  This was dropped in the 
1970s.  But it seems that no attempt was made to enforce explicit capital requirements until 1982 (see 
Morgan (1992), and Baer and McElravey (1992)).  Risk-based capital requirements became effective in 
the U.S. in 1991 with the passage of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, which 
explicitly required regulators to enforce capital requirements.  The Basle Accord, reached on July 12, 
1988, was a regulatory agreement among the G-10 countries, together with Switzerland and Luxembourg, 
which specified risk-based capital requirements. 
Intuitively, bank capital reduces the likelihood of bank failure.  So, if banks are riskier than 
socially desirable, why not require that they hold more capital?  What is the cost of such a policy?  For 
nonfinancial firms equity finance is costly because of asymmetric information, the explanation developed 
by Myers and Majluf (1984).  Wansley and Dhillon (1989) and Polonchek, Slovin, and Sushka (1989) 
find that the announcement of common stock issuances by commercial banks in the U.S. results in a 
significant negative stock price reaction, though the reaction is smaller, on average, than for industrial 
firms.  This is somewhat surprising because banks are generally viewed as more opaque institutions than 
nonfinancial firms.  Cornett and Tehranian (1994) may provide some of the answer.  They document that 
the stock price reaction to a voluntary equity issuance is significantly more negative than those associated   98 
with an involuntary issuance taken to satisfy capital requirements.
57  But, these results do not address 
other issues concerning bank capital, to which we now turn. 
The recent attention to bank capital requirements seems ironic, as Benveniste, Boyd, and 
Greenbaum (1991) point out.  They observe that in the U.S. there has been a century-long secular decline 
in bank capital ratios, until about forty years ago.  Prior to 1850 about 50% of bank assets were financed 
with capital.  By the turn of the century the fraction financed by capital had shrunk to less than 20 percent.  
It was about 14 percent in 1929 and just over six percent at the end of World War II.  Since then bank 
capital rose a small amount from the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s, then declined through the mid-
1970s, and rose thereafter.  In 1986, total capital was 6.8 percent, the same as it was in 1950.  When first 
implemented, the Basle Accord called for a minimum capital of 7.25 percent of total assets by the end of 
1990 (of which at lest half was to be “core capital”) and at least 8.0 percent of assets by the end of 1992 
(against with at least half in core capital).
58  During the late 1980 and through the 1990s U.S. bank 
holding companies increased their capital ratios to the highest levels in 50 years.  See Saunders and 
Wilson (1999) and Flannery and Rangan (2001).  However, the nation’s largest banks lost about one 
fourth of their market capitalization in the third quarter of 1998, coinciding with the Russian crisis and the 
Long Term Capital Management debacle.  Hovakimian and Kane (2000) argue empirically that neither 
the market nor regulators prevented large banks from shifting risk to the government deposit insurance 
safety net. 
These trends raise a number of questions.  Why was there such a long downward trend?  Why has 
it been reversed?  Why did regulators (and academics) start focusing on capital requirements?  What are 
the trends in other countries? Most of these questions have not been studied.  Benveniste, Boyd, and 
Greenbaum (1991) interpret bank charter value (monopoly rents) as a hidden source of capital that began 
to dissipate in the late 1970s and 1980s, as discussed above.  Flannery and Rangan (2001) argue that the 
increase in capital ratios in the last fifteen years is due to market forces disciplining banks.  This argument 
contrasts with earlier views that banks always held the minimum amount of required capital, and that 
increases in capital ratios imposed costs on banks, and possibly on borrowers through a “credit crunch.”  
  If there are significant costs to raising bank capital, government-imposed capital requirements can 
have real effects.  Banks may choose to exit the industry rather than satisfy the requirements.  Such “exit” 
                                                 
57 Wagster (1996) studies the wealth effects to shareholders of stocks of banks in Canada, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States due to announcements of eighteen important 
events leading up the Basle Accord, starting on September 11, 1985 and ending on March 28, 1990.  The main result 
is that only shareholders of Japanese banks experienced significant wealth effects for all eighteen events.  Moreover, 
the cumulative gain was a positive 31.63 percent.   
58 “Core capital” includes common equity and minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries, but excludes loan loss 
reserves.    99 
may occur through a reduction in bank loans rather than a reduction in bank assets per se.  In such an 
event, otherwise worthy borrowers would not obtain bank loans.  There would be a “credit crunch” due to 
capital requirements.  Shortly after the Basle Accord in 1988, U.S. banks reduced their investments in 
commercial loans and increased the investments in government securities.  More specifically, the share of 
total bank assets composed of commercial and industrial loans fell from about 22.5 percent in 1989 to less 
than 16 percent in 1994.  At the same time, the share of assets invested in government securities increased 
from just over 15 percent to almost 15 percent.  See Keeton (1994) and Furfine (2001).  This period has 
been identified as a “credit crunch,” which refers to the possibility that banks were reluctant to lend to 
worthy loan applicants because of capital requirements. 
In fact, the credit crunch, broadly outlined above, could be due to a number of nonmutually 
exclusive factors.  Banks may have voluntarily and autonomously reduced their risk appetites.  Regulators 
may have become tougher, causing the loan contraction.  The Basle Accord, because of its risk-sensitive 
measures of capital, may have encouraged banks to reallocate their assets towards government securities.  
Finally, aside from the risk-sensitive nature of the capital requirements, the level of the required capital 
(to assets ratio) may have caused the reallocation.  These factors are all supply-related.  But, since there 
was a recession during the early 1990s, the decline in lending may have been demand-related.  As noted 
above in Section III, a large empirical literature has searched for evidence of a supply-related credit 
crunch.  The basic approach is to regress bank loan growth on measures of bank capital and control 
variables.  Versions of this regression have been studied by Bernanke and Lown (1991), Hall (1993), 
Berger and Udell (1994), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Hancock and Wilcox (1994), Brinkman and 
Horvitz (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1995), and Beatty and Gron (2001).  With different sample periods, 
slightly different econometric specifications, different definitions of capital adequacy, and so on, it is not 
surprising that the results are mixed.  Other researchers have tested whether bank supervisors or 
regulators become tougher during recessions, causing or contributing to a credit crunch.   See, for 
example, Bizer (1993), Wagster (1999), Furfine (2001), and Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2001).  Although 
there is some evidence that bank capital does affect bank lending, the studies have a difficult time 
distinguishing loan demand shifts from loan supply shifts, leaving the question of the relative importance 
of different effects unanswered. 
  While we discussed bank capital models generally above, there are other papers focusing on the 
effects of increasing regulatory capital on bank risk taking.  Flannery (1989), Furlong and Keeley (1989, 
1990), and Kim and Santomero (1988) are examples of partial equilibrium models that examine the 
relationship between bank leverage and risk-taking.  Because these papers are partial equilibrium, the 
issue of whether there is anything peculiar about banks raising capital is not addressed.  Gennotte and 
Pyle (1991) is more general equilibrium.  Gorton and Winton (2000) present a general equilibrium of   100 
bank capital in which there is a social cost to increasing bank capital requirements, as well as a benefit.  
The benefits are clear; nontransferable charter value, which is also socially beneficial, is protected more 
with higher capital ratios.  But, there is a unique cost to forcing banks to raise capital, namely, they can 
supply fewer deposits in general equilibrium.  Deposits are in demand for the reasons put forth by Gorton 
and Pennacchi (1990); they provide a way for uniformed agents to transact.  In this context, the 
government never imposes binding capital requirements because it is not socially optimal for bank equity 
holders to exit the industry, resulting in a smaller banking industry. 
 
E.    Other Issues 
  There are many other regulatory issues that have been studied.  In this subsection, we mention a 
few of the more important or more interesting issues. 
  The Glass-Steagall Act, passed in the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression, 
separated commercial banking from investment banking, ostensibly because of conflicts-of-interest in 
undertaking lending activity and underwriting activity.  While this is no longer the case under current 
U.S. law (due to changes that culminated in the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999), the question whether such separation is socially desirable remains of interest.  If banks produce 
private information in their lending activity, might they have an incentive to only underwrite their poor-
quality borrowers?  Such questions have been addressed by Ang and Richardson (1994), Gande Puri, 
Saunders and Walter (1997), Krozner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1994, 1996), Gande, Puri, and Saunders 
(1999), Yasuda (1999), and Schenone (2001), among others.  An open issue is the way in which these 
joint activities affect bank relationships with borrowers and borrower corporate governance. 
  Market discipline of banks refers to the extent to which market participants can determine when 
and which banks are riskier, and impound this information into asset prices.   To the extent that market 
participants are better able to perform this role, there is less need for government oversight.  A large 
literature has investigated this question.  For example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) consider the extent to 
which bank subordinated debt prices reflect the riskiness of banks.  Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) 
compare the information in market security prices to the information produced by bank supervisors.  See 
Flannery (2001) for a discussion. 
  Another interesting regulatory issue concerns the behavior of the regulators.  Kane (1990) focuses 
on the incentives of regulators during the resolution of insolvent thrifts in the U.S.  According to Kane, 
the Resolution Trust Corporation, the government agency charged with liquidating insolvent thrifts, was 
inefficient due to the agency problem of the government wanting to avoid recognizing losses that would 
be borne by the government insurance fund.  Dell’Aricia and Marquez (2001) analyze competition among   101 
regulators when there are externalities across national markets.  Competition can result in lower 
regulatory standards. 
 
VI.    Conclusion 
  We have surveyed the major themes and major developments in research in financial 
intermediation over the last two decades, or so.  There are many related topics that we have not covered.  
For example, the roles of banks in economic growth, and the role of banks in the transmission of 
monetary policy, are large subjects that we have not touched on at all.  Other topics have been only 
briefly examined.  Nevertheless we hope the reader is convinced of the progress made in understanding 
financial intermediation.  Despite this progress there are still major questions.  Some of these are: 
 
1.  Why do banking crises and banking panics persist?  Most theories of banking panics seem 
inconsistent with the facts put forth by economic historians.  The view that banks are inherently 
unstable seems based on a misreading of U.S. financial history.  Overall, it seems that the question of 
whether banking is inherently unstable or not remains unresolved. 
2.  Recent experience in emerging markets again raises the issue stability of banking systems.  Why are 
emerging markets experiencing banking panics and crises?  Are these crises fundamentally different 
than earlier historic episodes?  Is the basic problem corruption, bad regulations, moral hazard, or 
some combination? 
3.  What features of the industrial organization of banking systems make the banks in the system more 
prone to panics?  Are these features consistent with the usual model of competition?  In other words, 
if a few large banks are not panic prone, are they prone to being monopolists? 
4.  On a related note, how does the industrial organization of the bank lending sector interact with banks’ 
funding and capital structures? Empirically, how does bank funding structure affect the structure of 
the bank’s loans and loan portfolio? 
5.  The basic paradigm of bank regulation, namely, moral hazard emanating from mispriced deposit 
insurance, may have outlived its usefulness, if it was ever relevant.  It is clear that in the U.S. this has 
not been a problem since the inception of deposit insurance, nor has clear-cut evidence been produced 
for the existence of this problem.  Corporate governance issues in intermediaries and the intersection 
of governance and alleged incentives for moral hazard have yet to be fully explored.  What is the 
rationale for government intervention into banking markets? 
6.  Is corporate governance in banks fundamentally different than nonbanks? 
7.  Why are deposit insurance and capital requirements such recent developments, especially if their 
efficacy is as claimed?   102 
8.  The differences between loans and bonds seem clear, but questions remain.  The existence of loan 
sales complicates the distinctions that have been made theoretically.  The existence of vulture 
investors, who act like state-contingent banks, buying up blocks of bonds in distressed firms and then 
actively participating in restructuring, also complicates the distinction.  Finally, despite the large 
literature on potential conflicts of interest, there has been little work on how bank lending and bank 
underwriting activities jointly affect the corporate governance of bank borrowers. 
9.  Our survey has focused on the traditional “bank-like” model of monitored finance. There are other 
forms of monitored finance, such as venture capital. What determines the choice between these 
different structures? Are these differences driven by the type of firm that seeks financing, or by 
financing structure of the intermediary? 
10. Most models of banking assume that banks and borrowers are perfectly rational. How can insights 
from the growing field of behavioral finance change our understanding of banks?  This question is 
only just starting to receive attention.
59 
11. Why are bank liabilities used as media of exchange, but not the liabilities of nonbanks?  Why can’t 
demand deposits be traded without being cleared through the banking system?  These questions 
remain largely unexplored. 
12. How have loan sales, credit derivatives, commercial paper conduits, collateralized loan obligations, 
and other recent financial innovations, affected banking? 
13. Are banks and stock markets substitutes?  Is there a meaningful distinction between of “bank-based” 
systems and “stock market-based” systems? What are the welfare implications of “bank-based” 
systems versus “stock market-based” systems?   
 
                                                 
59 Manove and Padilla (1999) examine how the presence of overly-optimistic entrepreneurs complicates bank 
lending decisions; under competition, banks may be insufficiently conservative, reducing investment efficiency. 
Coval and Thakor (2001) show how rational agents may endogenously choose to become intermediaries between 
overly-optimistic agents, who become entrepreneurs, and overly-pessimistic agents, who become depositors. References 
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Net Financing of Nonfinancial Enterprises, 1970-1985 (%) 
 
 
  Canada  Finland  France  Germany  Italy Japan U.K.  U.S. 
Retentions  76.4 64.4 61.4 70.9 51.9 57.9  102.4  85.9 
Capital 
transfers 
0.0 0.2 2.0 8.6 7.7 0.0 4.1 0.0 
Short-term 
Securities 
-0.8 3.7 -0.1 -0.1 -1.3 N.A. 1,7  0.4 
Loans  15.2 28.1 37.3 12.1 27.7 50.4  7.6  24.4 
Trade 
Credit 
-4.4 -1.4 -0.6 -2.1 0.0 -11.2  -1.1 -1.4 
Bonds  8.5 2.8 1.6 -1.0 1.6 2.1 -1.1  11.6 
Shares  2.5 -0.1 6.3 0.6 8.2 4.6 -3.3 1.1 
Other  1.3 7.4 -1.4  10.9 1.0 -3.8 3.2  -16.9 
Statistical 
Adjustment 
1.2 -5.0 -6.4 0.0 3.2 N.A.  -13.4  -5.1 
Total  99.9  100.1 100.1  99.9  100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0 
 













Stock Price Response to Announcements of Corporate Security Offerings 
 
 
Type of Security Offering  Two Day Abnormal Return
+ 
Common Stock  -3.14% (155) 
Preferred Stock  -0.19% (28) 
Convertible Preferred Stock  -1.44% * (53) 
Straight Bonds  -0.26% (248) 
Convertible Bonds  -2.07% * (73) 
Private Placement of Debt  -91.0% (37) 
Bank Loans  1.93% * (80) 
 
+ Sample size in parentheses. 
 
* Indicates significantly different from zero. 
 
















% Change in the 
Currency-to-
Deposits Ratio+ 
% Change in Pig 
Iron Production++ 
Loss Per Deposit $  % and # Nat’l Bank 
Failures 
Oct. 1873 - Mar. 1879  Sept. 1873  14.53  -51.0  0.021  2.8 (56) 
Mar. 1882 - May 1885  Jun. 1884  8.8  -14.0  0.008  0.9 (19) 
Mar. 1887 – Apr. 1888  No Panic  3.0  -9.0  0.005  0.4 (12) 
Jul. 1890 – May 1891  Nov. 1890  9.0  -34.0  0.001  0.4 (14) 
Jan. 1893 – Jun. 1894  May 1893  16.0  -29.0  0.017  1.9 (74) 
Dec. 1895 – Jun. 1897  Oct. 1896  14.3  -4.0  0.012  1.6 (60) 
Jun. 1899 – Dec. 1900  No Panic  2.78  -6.7  0.001  0.3 (12) 
Se. 1902 – Aug. 1904  No Panic  -4.13  -8.7  0.001  0.6 (28) 
May 1907 – Jun. 1908  Oct. 1907  11.45  -46.5  0.001   0.3 (20) 
Jan. 1910 – Jan. 1912  No Panic  -2.64  -21.7  0.0002  0.1 (10) 
Jan. 1913 – Dec. 1914  Aug. 1914  10.39  -47.1  0.001  0.4 (28) 
 
+ Percentage change in the ratio at the panic date from the previous year’s average. 
 
++ Measured from peak to trough. 
 
 






Corporate Control Changes in Banks and Nonbanks 
(Percent of total sample) 
 
 
  Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny Sample of 454 
Manufacturing Firms 
Prowse Sample of 234 
Bank Holding Companies 
Hostile Takeover  8.8 1.7 
Management Turnover  20.5  10.2 







Regulatory Intervention  0  14.1 
    
Total Control Changes  36.8  36.7 
 
 
















Source: FDIC.  36
Figure 2 
 





























































Source: Demirgüc-Kunt and  Sobaci (2000). 